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Old September 3rd 08, 08:25 PM posted to sci.space.shuttle,sci.space.history,sci.space.policy,sci.space.station
Jeff Findley
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Default Shuttle program extension?


"Derek Lyons" wrote in message
...
"Jeff Findley" wrote:
With Challenger, the blame sits squarely on management's shoulders. The
engineers recommended to *not* launch Challenger in such cold conditions.
They had some data to back them up, but management wanted them to prove
the
shuttle would fail if they launched. Management turned safety upside
down.


Of course, once again, the engineers mistakes go umentioned - because
management is blame. Always and forever.


I used to have a good link for this one...

Here we go, straight from the Rogers Commission Report:

http://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/.../Chapter-5.txt

Quote from above:

The decision to launch the Challenger was flawed. Those who made
that decision were unaware of the recent history of problems
concerning the O-rings and the joint and were unaware of the initial
written recommendation of the contractor advising against the launch
at temperatures below 53 degrees Fahrenheit and the continuing
opposition of the engineers at Thiokol after the management reversed
its position. They did not have a clear understanding of Rockwell's
concern that it was not safe to launch because of ice on the pad. If
the decision makers had known all of the facts, it is highly unlikely
that they would have decided to launch 51-L on January 28, 1986.

I think that just about does it. The engineers at Thiokol knew there were
problems with the o-rings when launching in cold weather. They were opposed
to launching in cold weather. They were overruled by Thiokol management.

Also, NASA management was pushing Rockwell around as well (on the issue of
ice on the launch vehicle): "In this situation, NASA appeared to be
requiring a contractor to prove that it was not safe to launch, rather than
proving it was safe." Even though ice turned out to not be an issue in this
case, NASA's decision making process was clearly flawed when it came to
safety. There was a whole boatload of recommendations about safety and
safety processes that came out of the Rogers Commission Report. IMHO,
safety is something that has to be managed very carefully.

So, just how was the Challenger disaster the fault of the engineers?

Jeff
--
A clever person solves a problem.
A wise person avoids it. -- Einstein