Ian Stirling wrote in message
...

How do you reconcile this with
http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v1ch4.htm#4.75

Which gives the strut closest to failure at liftoff somewhere around
40% of it's maximum load.?

That's not "closest to failure," but "closest to" what NASA called
"*the* failure" (ie., an enhanced reflection).

I have NASA's initial loads analysis for lift-off (by Townsend at
MSFC). The "final" version was done at JSC. Without the MET,
who knows what JSC called "lift-off?" The critical MET occurred
during the ignition transient. You'll note that even JSC's version
gives much higher loads for 51-L on the P8 and P11 struts, although
without checking Townsend's analysis I don't recall their locations.
Off the top of my head, my unrefreshed recall is that P8 was key.

I also recall that elsewhere in the Rogers Report, even Al McDonald
testified and/or wrote about high 51-L strut loads. He may have also
done so in the final Accident Panel meeting (closed, in Washington),
which is not part of the Rogers Report (but I have the transcript).

Do you believe that the rogers report was just sloppy, driven by
pressure to get back to flights, or was intentionally covering up
evidence? If the latter, why?

I wouldn't have called it a cover-up if I could not (and had not)
proved it (to myself, to experts, and on sci.space.shuttle). Check
the discussion I had with Gavin Bull (put his name in the title box).
Rogers, Keel, and Kutyna went to great lengths to evade my reports.

--
John Thomas Maxson, Retired Engineer (Aerospace)
Author, The Betrayal of Mission 51-L (www.mission51l.com)