In article ,
Greg D. Moore \(Strider\) wrote:
...there's a considerable body of *rules* about how these
things are done... precisely to require angry or frightened politicians to
slow down and think and get concurrence from others...

Given an incoming missile threat, I think a good argument could be made that
a retalitory strike ordered by the President with little to no consultation
might be considered a valid, legal order...

The problem is, how do you *know* there's an incoming missile threat? The
complex electronic systems can lie to you -- on occasion, they have, e.g.
because a training tape was accidentally played live.

My understanding is that a Presidential order for nuclear use always
requires confirmation. *Positive evidence* of a nuclear attack on the US
does qualify as confirmation, but that means verified nuclear explosions
on US soil, not just blips on a radar screen. In the absence of such
unequivocal evidence, confirmation has to come from a second official --
doesn't have to be the SecDef, but does have to be someone from a fairly
short list.

(And there's the story that in
Nixon's final days, any orders regarding use of nuclear weapons originating
from the WH be verified).

If I recall correctly, the instructions were that *any* order coming
direct from the White House was questionable -- that a legitimate order
would always come through the normal chain of command. The concern was
less about misuse of nuclear weapons than about attempts to overrule the
political process by force. (Maybe Nixon was capable of such a thing and
maybe he wasn't, but it was a legitimate worry for the military.)

In any case, I can't see Bush in any condition authorizing release of
nuclear weapons in the original scenario of Iran launching something. Short
of a full-scale attack from Russia, whether folks like it or not, it's
almost certainly better to ride out the initial attack and then respond.
Worse case scenario actually would be the incoming warheads to be not be
WMDs and for us to have wiped out a country.

No, worst-case scenario is that there *were* no incoming warheads, and
you've just started a nuclear war -- which may then come to include *real*
incoming warheads -- because of an electronic mistake. People worried
about this a lot in the early Cold War. Hence the long-standing aversion
to "launch on warning" policies -- what if the warning is wrong?

This is why there were -- and I think still are -- provisions for getting
the President out of DC quickly on a moment's notice, 24x7: so he can opt
for a "ride it out" approach without worrying about his personal safety.

I have no great respect for Bush, but am inclined to agree that even he
would opt to wait and see. It's just too grave a decision to take in
haste on indirect evidence.
--
spsystems.net is temporarily off the air; | Henry Spencer
mail to henry at zoo.utoronto.ca instead. |