On Feb 16, 7:53 am, Pat Flannery wrote:

The Russians are having a hard time figuring out why ABMs are to be put
in Poland to defend the U.S. against missile attack from Iran or North
Korea,


Surprisingly enough, there's a not-bad discussion of possible Russian
worries in this regard from a Russian analyst at http://
www.kommersant.com/p741700/strategic_weapons/ . (Most such analysis
coming out of the FEE fails to impress.)


"Now the American military is covering itself against Iran. From the
military point of view, placing interceptor missiles in Poland and
radar facilities in the Czech Republic is a sound idea. The trajectory
of middle-range or intercontinental missiles, if they are created, and
aimed at targets in Europe or North America, is such that Poland looks
like the optimal location for interceptors.

[snip]

"What Russia Has to Be Afraid Of

"It is highly likely that the missile threat from "problem" states is
not the genuine reason for the creation of the missile defense system
by the Americans. The real motivation of the multibillion-dollar
undertaking is the desire to expand U.S. military and strategic
capacities and constrict those of other states that have nuclear
missiles, Russia and China most of all. Even a limited missile defense
system injects a high degree of indeterminacy into the strategic plans
of other countries and undermines the principle of mutual nuclear
deterrence. With Russia continuing to reduce its nuclear arsenal
significantly and China maintaining a low missile potential, the
Americans' ability to down even a few dozen warheads could deprive the
other side of guaranteed ability to cause the U.S. unacceptable damage
in a nuclear war.

"If current tendencies continue, Russia will be unlikely to have the
capacity to maintain more than 400-500 nuclear warheads by 2020.
Russian experts have estimated that the U.S. could down half of that
quantity with its missile defense system. That would be an especially
heavy blow if the Americans delivered a disarming nuclear missile
first strike and the remaining Russian missiles could be eliminated
almost completely.

"Of course, the first ten U.S. interceptor missiles in Poland will not
make a serious dent in Russian nuclear potential for the first few
years. But the Russian Army is buying six or seven Topol-M ballistic
missiles per year. The destruction of just one of two of them by the
American missile defense system would have a high price for Russia.
And the placement of a strategic weapons system in Poland, even a
defensive one, is a challenge to Moscow by Washington.

"Practically the only way to prevent a slow growth of the American
strategic advantage is a significant increase in the purchase of new
ballistic missiles by Russia. But the current Russian leadership is
not prepared for that, mainly for political reasons. Therefore,
Russia's reaction to the news of the possible placement of American
interceptor missiles by the Russian border was loud and disorderly,
both in political circles and in the press. Officials, as usual, made
a number of contradictory statements that amounted to the usual vague
threats to "take adequate measures," boasting ad unconvincing
justification for their helplessness. The Russian leadership had the
same initial reaction to the expansion of NATO and the U.S. withdrawal
from the Antiballistic Missile Treaty. Everything possible has been
done to convince the West that there is no need to pay attention to
Russia and Moscow's loud objections. For an "energy superpower," it is
more important to be able to pump its energy resources westward than
to maintain any strategic balances."



What makes it so pointless is that 10 ABMs in Poland are worthless
against a North Korean attack and so would only be of any possible use
against a Iranian attack that overflew Europe on the way to the U.S..


It's instructive to fire up Google Earth and draw great circles
between a site in Iran (I use central Iran, but choose your own launch
point), Washington D.C. and Los Angeles. Remember to lead the targets
by a few degrees to take earth rotation into account. The trajectory
to DC does run right over the proposed Polish GBI sites in the
vicinity of Slupsk, but those towards more westerly CONUS targets pass
over western Russia. So either the GBIs would have to be fired in the
direction of Russia and intercept the Iranian warhead over Russia, or
wait until the warheads got over the Arctic Ocean and do a stern
chase.