Pat Flannery wrote:" " well no i quess it isnt worth it, it was just
trolling fluff stuff not worth showing again.

And Yes pat, just for you next time ill try to include pictures for
your limited understanding, but until then troll somewhere else, it
just shows youre limited critical thinking, logic, and comprehension
skills... Oh yeah pat, besides calling me names (ie trolling) have you
provided anything to this thread, or do you think you usenet bullying
is productive.

Now back to the facts, as the rogers commission stated unequivocally
"Under the terms of the FRR Policy Directive, such damage would
appear to require discussion: "the scope of the review should cover
status and issues in areas such as . . . prior flight anomalies"
(*1), when referring to the previous flights (sts-61c) srbs evaluation
(*2) which clearly showed a burn through problem, but because of
attempting to meet schedule demands the time was not taken by mission
managers to make logical correlation of with the effects of cold
weather on the srb joint o-ring seal resiliency, when making a go for
launch decision in the cold weather the morning of jan 28, 1986.

Now implementing the recommendations contained in the diaz report to
the caib, in conjunction with a full quantitative risk assessment of
the shuttle system would provide nasa managers with the communication
structure, information, and technology to manage and understand the
technical input from others up and down the decision making process in
operating the shuttle safely within it's capabilities throughout the
fleets retirement process.

(*1)
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/challenger/64_420b.pdf
page (26 pdf) or 208 in the report
Post-flight disassembly of STS 61-C SRB hardware following its launch
on January 12 revealed that erosion of the primary O-ring had occurred
in the aft field joint of the left motor. Hot gas had also bypassed the
primary seal in the left nozzle joint. Erosion of the primary seal had
also occurred in the nozzle joint of the right motor.6 Under the terms
of the FRR Policy Directive, such damage would appear to require
discussion: "the scope of the review should cover status and issues
in areas such as . . . prior flight anomalies. . . ."
lies. . . ."

(*2)
And the sts-61c srb evaluation stated:
http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/ca...992075284..pdf
NSTS-22301, page 4
"SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER
The STS 61-C flight utilized lightweight solid rocket motor (SRM)
cases. SRM
propulsion performance was normal and within specification limits, with
propellant burn rates for both SRM's near predicted values. Solid
rocket booster (SRB) thrust differentials were within specification
throughout the flight....

A postflight evaluation of the SRM structure to determine the extent of
damage
revealed the following significant items:
a. A gas path was noted at the 154-degree position of the aft field
joint of the left S_M. Soot was found from the 140-degree to the
178-degree position, and soot was found in the primary groove from the
68-degree to the 183-degree (115 degrees arc) position. C-ring
damagewas noted at the 154-degree position with a maximumerosion depth
of 0.00_ inch and erosion length of 3.5 inches. The 0-ring was affected
by heat over a 14-inch length in this area.
b. A gas path was found from the 273.6-degree to the 309.6-degree (36
degrees arc) position of the left S_Mnozzle joint. Soot was found in
the primary 0-ring groove over the entire 360-degree circumference. A
potential impingement point was located at the 302.4-degree point;
however, no 0-ring damage was found.
c. A gas path was found at the 162-degree point with soot in the
primary 0-ring groove from the lOS-degree to the 220-degree (112
degrees arc) point on the right SRM nozzle joint. 0-ring damage was
found at the 162-degree point with the maximum erosion depth being
0.011 inch and the erosion length being 8 inches. The 0-rlng was
affected by heat over a 26-1nch length in this area.
d. A gas path was found on the outer surface of the igniter at the
130-degree point of the left SRM. Soot was found on the aft side of the
outer Gaskoseal, approaching the primary sea! over a 70-degree arc (130
to 200 degrees), and on the outer edge of the inner Gasko seal over a
130-degree arc (ii0 to 240 degrees), however, no seal damage was found.
e. A gas path was found on the outer surface of the igniter at the
250-degree point of the right S_. Soot was found on the inside edge of
the outer Gasko seal over the entire 360-degree circumference, however,
it did not progress beyond the edge of the seal. There was a slight
discoloration of the metal on both sides of the seal over the entire
360-degree circumference."

Probabilistic Risk Analysis for the NASA Space Shuttle:
A Brief History and Current Work by Elisabeth Paté-Cornell, Stanford
University,
and Robin Dillon, Virginia Tech Submitted for publication in
Reliability Engineering and System Safety April, 2000

Schedule pressures
Caib report vol 1 page 131, col 1, par 10
"Chapter 6, Decision Making at Nasa
Recomedations
6.2 SCHEDULE PRESSURE
Countdown to Space Station "Core Complete:" A Workforce Under
Pressure
During the course of this investigation, the Board received several
unsolicited comments from NASA personnel regard-ing pressure to meet a
schedule. These comments all con-cerned a date, more than a year after
the launch of Columbia, that seemed etched in stone: February 19, 2004,
the sched-uled launch date of STS-120. This flight was a milestone in
the minds of NASA management since it would carry a sec-tion of the
International Space Station called "Node 2." This would configure
the International Space Station to its "U.S. Core Complete" status.


Independent Technical Authority
Caib report vol 1 page 227 col 1
"Chapter 11 Recommendations
Organization
R7.5-1 Establish an independent Technical Engineering Authority that is
responsible for technical requirements and all waivers to them, and
will build a disciplined, systematic approach to identifying,
analyzing, and controlling hazards throughout the life cycle of the
Shuttle System. The independent technical authority does the fol-lowing
as a minimum:
· Develop and maintain technical standards for all Space Shuttle
Program projects and elements
· Be the sole waiver-granting authority for all technical standards
· Conduct trend and risk analysis at the sub-system, system, and
enterprise levels
· Own the failure mode, effects analysis and hazard reporting systems

· Conduct integrated hazard analysis
· Decide what is and is not an anomalous event
· Independently verify launch readiness
· Approve the provisions of the recertifica-tion program called for
in Recommendation R9.1-1.
The Technical Engineering Authority should be funded directly from NASA
Headquarters, and should have no connection to or responsibility for
schedule or program cost.
R7.5-2 NASA Headquarters Office of Safety and Mis-sion Assurance should
have direct line authority over the entire Space Shuttle Program safety
organization and should be independently re-sourced.
R7.5-3 Reorganize the Space Shuttle Integration Office to make it
capable of integrating all elements of the Space Shuttle Program,
including the Or-biter."


Open sharing of information is crucial to improving everybody's
understanding of the universe around us.
Tom