In article , John Maxson wrote:
Stephen Stocker wrote in message
...
In article ,
Jon Berndt wrote:

Can we point to a document that comes out and says specifically
"The RCS jets do not - and in fact are incapable of - firing during
first stage"? I cannot find one,
snip
It touches on the other point which I still couldn't pin down, which
basically goes back to the question of possibilities.
snip
Are we supposed to believe that John Maxson personally verified
that the software that was loaded in the GPCs on Challenger's last
flight specifically included code that fired the RCS jets (for
God-knows-what reason)? In light of what I know and what others
have posted, and given the kind of "proof" that I have seen in his
book personally, I have only one thing to say: prove it.
snip
That was my *assumption* of what John meant, at least that the
software loaded was capable of firing them.
snip
There is no proof I am aware of that the RCS jets could fire during
nominal first stage flight for 51l, nor is there visual evidence they
did,
nor have we seen telemetry evidence that there was.

Can you make the same statement if you remove the word "nominal?"

And this, I think, is the only real issue of debate related to the RCS?

There is no "issue of debate" with me over any "nominal" 51-L ascent,
nor over any of the flights beyond Mission 51-L. The officials who
launched 51-L waivered at length over the unusual hazards involved.

OK. I *think* I'm still on the right track, even though the only thing
I can do is ask questions and try to learn something.

Pages 31-32 and 46-47 of my book (over which Berndt is in denial) tell
some of "the rest of the story" (as Paul Harvey would say), and I have
good reason to believe that anyone except someone as biased as Berndt
would find it extremely compelling.

I believe that everybody who knows the technical aspects of the
shuttle would have to be "biased", in the sense of having their own
opinions based on their experiences. Maybe I'm weird, but I also think
it can lead to quality debate, and I hope that's where this is
leading.

I do not intend to post all of that on USENET, however. Let me just
say that KSC made more last-minute changes to the 51-L flight software
load than for any prior mission, many without verification and proper
sign-off. There were many verbal waivers. I'll quote from page 31:

"Johnson waived a requirement to downlink the RCS data, and
an unusual Lockheed uplink accomplished the change."

Now whether that extended to the switch-scan data, I'm not positive;
but sources whom I trust felt very strongly that it should not have.

That probably answered Jon's question, if I understood it correctly.
(Please correct me if I'm wrong, my brain's tired!) And again, I
appreciate the information from both of you.

Steve