Jordan wrote:


The main problem I see with your proposed strategy, _even if America
KNEW the ICBM's were conventional-armed_, is that, as soon as a North
Korean ICBM hit an American city, there would be immediate popular
support in America for doing whatever amount of damage to North Korea
was required to eliminate the threat. Americans under these
circumstances would get angry at North Korea rather than afraid to
continue the fight, because they would be quite aware that America has
the power to annihilate the entire North Korean population, if
necessary.


You don't understand too things - how deterrents work and what North
Korean leadership is concerned about. Deterrents work by the adversary
being able to make a promise of what will almost definitely happen
if the other party does something specific. Like take a sufficently
offensive action. What North Korea as a state is concerned about is
regime survival - it is thus irrelevant whetever anybody now living
in the regime doesn't survive the collapse of it.

Consequently it is not relevant what the US response to the use of
teh NK deterrent would be as it would be used (like any deterrent)
once a point of no return was reached.

[snip - blah blah blah]


- Jordan


--
Sander

+++ Out of cheese error +++