On Wed, 17 Aug 2005 22:08:55 GMT, "Jim Oberg"
wrote:

Task group panelists blast space shuttle management
BY WILLIAM HARWOOD (CBS News space consultant)
http://www.spaceflightnow.com/shuttl...4/050817rtftg/
August 17, 2005

snip

Well, let me comment on some of those points...

"They had to go from an engineering and organizational approach that
was focused on flying on a regular basis to one that went into almost
a development mode and in some areas, an engineering redesign mode,"
he said. "Now, when that happens ... there's going to be some hiccups.
It's not an easy transition, particularly when much of the design and
development capability had long been lost within the program because
of decision that had been made years ago."

And there it was just stated that the ISS will not be completed in any
acceptable form. A problem will now require the whole thing to be
built again. Lots of down time and minimal flights.

--

Citing "the enduring themes of dysfunctional organizational behavior,"
the group said a lack of personal accountability was pervasive in the
shuttle program, "from the failure to establish responsibility for the
loss of Columbia up to and including a failure to require an adequate
risk assessment of (the shuttle Discovery's recent) flight."

An interesting notion to find the person to blame for that piece of
falling foam. Or the other person who thought that foam hits were not
a serious problem. Not that they could have done anything had they
known anyway.

Well a adequate risk assessment for Discovery now has data to make an
adequate risk assessment. No flight test, no assessment.

--

Another factor affecting the rigor of NASA's engineering processes is
lax leadership, Crippen and his co-authors concluded. During a
February design certification review, "a senior program manager
commented that, 'It is no longer an important question as to whether
or not any given item is certified. Some things won't be certified ...
Items don't have to be certified to fly, and we can even get waivers
for the safety cert if need be.' It was astounding that there was no
rebuttal to this statement, even though the individual was not the
most senior person at the table."

Sweet. So just what did you say to pee this person off? I think that
comment should be hung on the door to the shuttle hanger. And it can
always pop up again at appropriate times.

--

"Throughout the return-to-flight effort, there has been a reluctance
to appropriately characterize the risks inherent in the space shuttle
program. As an example, it is has proven irresistible for some
officials to characterize the modified external tank as 'safer,' the
'safest ever,' or even 'fixed,' when neither the baseline of the 'old'
tanks nor the quantitative improvement of the 'new' design has been
established. The tank may well be safer, but without adequate risk
assessment based on objective evidence it is impossible to know."

Well I have also said all those terms. :-]

And certainly someone could go through all the previous shuttle
flights and to compile foam loss and damaged reports, where they would
then have their evidence. That evidence can then be used in a risk
assessment reports for following shuttle flights.

I think that would be a good thing.

Anyway, anyone who knows the shuttle well enough already knows that
this shuttle flight was a large improvement.

--

"The space shuttle program has been repeatedly cited for having too
many waivers, and has become reluctant to add additional waivers,
choosing instead to 'beat' the system by using other means," the panel
members wrote.

Well their B plan got busted. Looks like they will have to switch back
to the signing too many waivers problem.

Anyway, that is all my comments. I do not know their shuttle
maintenance well enough to see if they should be doing "best job" or
"meeting the design requirements".

A useful event anyway. Such a shame that increasing shuttle safety
will decrease ISS completion. Safety failure, or mission failure?

Cardman.