On Feb 15, 8:12*pm, "Jonathan" wrote:



"Overwhelming to the point of saturation"

February 20, 2010
Military Analysis
Afghan Push Went Beyond Traditional Military Goals
By THOM SHANKER

WASHINGTON — Before 10,000 troops marched through central Helmand
Province to wrest control of a small Afghan town from a few hundred
entrenched Taliban fighters, American officials did something more
typical of political than military campaigns: they took some polls.

Perhaps no other feature of the offensive now under way in and around
the town, Marja, speaks so clearly to its central characteristic: it
is a campaign meant to shift perceptions as much as to alter the
military balance, crush an enemy army or seize some vital crossroads.

The polling was aimed at understanding what local residents wanted;
how they viewed local security; what they thought of the Americans,
the Taliban and the foreign jihadis fighting for local control; and
what might give them confidence in the central government in Kabul.

Whatever the limitations of this opinion sampling — what is the margin
of error when there are whole neighborhoods where it is deadly to
knock on doors? — what the commanders learned helped shape the entire
campaign. Among other things, those living in the area still harbor
some friendly feelings for the Americans, remembering how years ago
they built dams in the region, and strongly favor an effort to oust
the Taliban.

That gave the military extra confidence as they mounted a
counterinsurgency operation that stands out in many ways.

Notably, this was the first time that the Americans took pains to
involve the central government of President Hamid Karzai in such a
significant operation, let alone a multiphase campaign that included
the military, government and economic stability. Aside from
contributing thousands of troops, Mr. Karzai and his aides, with
significant help from the Americans, basically built a government in
waiting. The aim is for the Afghan government to carry out programs in
education, health and employment as soon as the area is secured,
according to a senior American officer.

The size of the onslaught was a departure from past practice, too. The
allied force is so large as to be described by one senior American
adviser as “overwhelming to the point of saturation.”

And the operation was advertised, almost in neon lights, so far in
advance and in such detail that there was none of the element of
surprise that combat commanders usually prize.

All of those characteristics are explained by the psychological goal
of this campaign, a shift of perceptions among the fence-sitters and
the fearful among the Afghan people.

Even domestically, the operation is supposed to show Americans that
the buildup ordered by President Obama can have swift and positive
results. The White House is not declaring victory, though; after Mr.
Obama was briefed by Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, his field commander,
on Tuesday, the White House press secretary, Robert Gibbs, said only
that the campaign was “highly planned and orchestrated.”

The project was set in motion six months ago, when General McChrystal
reported to President Obama that the Taliban, despite its relatively
light forces, had seized the initiative largely through adroit
exploitation of the tools of psychological warfare. Insurgent leaders
had become more nimble at exploiting even small victories — and
retelling even their battlefield defeats as successes through a
propaganda network of radio broadcasts, Web postings and threatening,
hand-delivered “night letters” to Afghan villages.

The problem was how a foreign army, no matter how much it built up,
could drown out the Taliban message and try to recast the Afghan
government and its coalition partners as winners. Combat operations
measured by industrial-age standards of captured terrain and enemy
dead had to be replaced by another standard adapted to the information
era: whether the operation can win the trust of the local people.

“The biggest thing is in convincing the Afghan people,” General
McChrystal said in Istanbul, where he joined Defense Secretary Robert
M. Gates to brief NATO allies just before the offensive began.

“This is all a war of perceptions,” General McChrystal said. “This is
not a physical war in terms of how many people you kill or how much
ground you capture, how many bridges you blow up. This is all in the
minds of the participants.”

Senior Pentagon and military officers also point out that the troop
ratio reverses several years in which planners sought to capitalize on
new technologies and new theories of military reform to fight in both
Iraq and Afghanistan with the smallest possible forces. “The number of
the enemy did not drive the equation,” said one senior American
officer involved in the Marja effort. “It was a calculation based on
how much ground we wanted to cover with a security blanket to reassure
the population.”

The senior officer and other military officials spoke on the condition
of anonymity because they were not authorized to speak about the
operation.

Although it is a battle for public support, it is by no means a phony
war. The bullets, bombs and booby traps are real, putting everyone in
the area, including civilians, at real risk.

The leaflets scattered over the region persuaded some of the Taliban
to flee in the face of the onslaught, but others dug in and laid down
mines.

It was a risk that the commanders accepted, hoping that civilians, at
least, would be able to stay relatively safe. They knew that one of
the principal dangers to their psychological war would be the anger
stirred if civilian casualties were high.

They are hoping the campaign will be short. Officers say the major
combat portion of the offensive should be over within a month or so.

Then political and economic development advisers, now standing by,
will move in behind the combat force, along with two thousand Afghan
police officers.

On Thursday, the British commander of NATO forces in southern
Afghanistan, Maj. Gen. Nick Carter, told reporters at the Pentagon
that it would take months to judge whether the local residents were
satisfied.

“We probably won’t know for about 120 days whether or not the
population is entirely convinced by the degree of commitment that
their government is showing to them,” General Carter said.

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/20/wo...gewanted=print