Pre-Columbia Criticism of NASA's Safety Culture in the late 1990's
From Jon Berndt:
"Stuf4 (a.k.a. CT)" wrote:
The shuttle IS operational, and it has been for a long time. An
airline could not get away with dismissing a crash by saying that the
plane hadn't been fully tested.
What they could say is that the particular circumstance that caused the
crash had not been tested. The point is: there's always something that's
going to get you. With proper backup systems, one will occasionally
experience a "successful failure". In the other case:
Own up to the safety requirements or stop flying.
[I'd add "all" prior to the "safety"]
Where there's not a backup, that's where the input from the ASAP, etc. comes
into play, but the report is not worth much if it is not heeded.
I totally agree. Ironically, hours prior to Columbia's final entry I
had posted a link to an old ASAP document from the early '70s where
the shuttle program manager was being questioned for not having
designed a crew escape module. Talk about not being heeded. NASA's
answer was that (other than the two ejection seats already designed in
for OFT) it would be too expensive to redraw the shuttle design to
include crew escape. I'd like to see those people involved with that
decision personally contact the 14 families to explain why
Challenger's and Columbia's crews had no way out.
~ CT
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