Press Conference Re. MMT Transcripts Highlights

[ElleninLosAngeles]

**What I find to be the most interesting parts from the Press
Conference with L.Ham, P.Engelhauf and L.Cain:

QUESTIONER: And what did you mean when you said January 21st that,
"Really, I don't think there's much we can do"?

MS. HAM: Now, back on the other question about on the 21st which when
I made a statement about what we could or couldn't do during the
flight, when I first was alerted to that, I couldn't even recall
making that statement. But, of course, I did go back, re-read the
transcript and listen to the tapes, and sure enough, I did say that.
Now, if you put that in context to what the MER manager was talking to
me about and the things that I was thinking, the way I recall this is
I was thinking out loud, and, of course, I do know that we do not have
TPS repair, tile repair or RCC repair capability that we fly as a kit
on the Orbiter. That was part of what I was thinking.
The other thing that I was trying -- thinking about was having the
engineering community go back and get a flight rationale from STS-1.
If you recall two flights prior to 107, we had the foam come off, a
pretty big chunk of foam from the same area that we were thinking came
off the 107, the bipod ramp, and it struck the SRB.
I was trying to remember back to October when we were at the flight
writing review for the STS-113, the next flight, trying to think about
what was our flight rationale, was it based on the fact that the
density, the properties of that foam could not do any damage to the
Orbiter. I couldn't recall, and I wanted the engineering to go back
and pull that data, so that we could confirm that.
If that was what the flight rationale was, then we would feel pretty
comfortable about this mission being safe. It didn't end up being what
the flight rationale was. That is where I was going with that.

QUESTIONER: For any of you, how should the request for imaging have
been handled? You make it sound like a very casual off-the-cuff
process, but what should the process have been to formally request
imaging that didn't happen?

MS. HAM: Well, the formal, I can explain. There is a formal route, but
even an informal route we typically work. If we hear about the
request, we can certainly act upon it, if we need to meet or just
pursue it.
The formal process would be that if someone brought it up at the MMT
or brought it up to someone when we would hold the meeting, they would
share with what we wanted to do, and then we go through the Mission
Ops Directorate to a [inaudible] position they have, flight dynamics
officer. He had some standard procedures that they work with the
Department of Defense or whoever it is to ask for the outside
assistance.

QUESTIONER: Linda, reading through the transcripts, there's a couple
of places where you ask [inaudible] issue only and we have seen pieces
of this size before, haven't we. McCormack says that you sort of
fumbling about what the size of the damage is and that the analysis
isn't complete and [inaudible] jump conclusions. You sort of cut him
off and say no burn-through means no catastrophic damage, localized
heating damage [inaudible] tile replacement.
In hindsight, 20/20 hindsight, were you sufficiently open to the idea
that this was a really serious problem?

MS. HAM: In 20/20 hindsight, you are asking 20/20 hindsight or what my
thought was then?

QUESTIONER: Well, it sounds like you were just kind of seeking
reassurance that everything was okay as opposed to digging in and
saying how do we know this, are we asking the right questions, do we
have the right people on this, have we [inaudible] this properly.

MS. HAM: I was asking to make -- I was trying to reiterate what Don
McCormack had already said to me, so that everyone in the room could
understand what he was saying.
When he said -- would make statements like no burn-through, that that
meant no safety-of-flight issue, I wanted -- I was trying to reassure
even myself that that was a true fact. I couldn't really [inaudible]
or jump to a conclusion that there could be no damage until they came
forward and -- catastrophic damage, until they came forward and
complete that analysis and tell me what the analysis showed.
Again, I don't have the engineering expertise, nor do I have the tools
to do that kind of analysis. So I didn't have a preconceived notion on
the damage or the possible consequences, and I needed to wait for them
to complete their work.

MR. CAIN: Just to add on that real quickly, ultimately it is my
understanding, anyway -- and as the entry flight director, I certainly
again will reiterate I wasn't aware of any of those, anybody being
concerned, and my understanding is that ultimately every person that
we are aware of, every single person and individual and group and part
of the team in the organization was in agreement that we didn't have a
safety-of-flight issue.
So, in the end, even those folks who -- or parts of the organization,
purportedly, anyway, who may have had a concern and were reluctant to
raise it in the end didn't have a concern is the way I understand it
today.

**my comment: Anyone have personal opinions on L.Cain and L.Ham?
P.Engelhauf? L.Cain especially seems a completely sweet, intelligent
person, well-spoken and straightforward. Same for Engelhauf. Ham, I
think, doesn't come across well as far as speaking well/making her
point in a concise and coherent manner. Is she better in real life?

[Roger Balettie]

"ElleninLosAngeles" > wrote:
> **my comment: Anyone have personal opinions on L.Cain and L.Ham?
> P.Engelhauf?

Yes. They are all three consumate professionals.

I worked many flights with all of them in various roles -- as peer Flight
Controllers in different positions, as well as once they became Flight
Directors. All three of them are extremely competent, and were well-suited
for the roles they played.

If Linda didn't "come across well" to you in this press conference, then
chalk it up to being somewhat distraught over what has happened and to
perhaps some level of unease with the media... not very surprising in either
case, IMHBCO.

Roger
--
Roger Balettie
former Flight Dynamics Officer
Space Shuttle Mission Control
http://www.balettie.com/

[Terrence Daniels]

"Roger Balettie" > wrote in message
. ..
> I worked many flights with all of them in various roles -- as peer Flight
> Controllers in different positions, as well as once they became Flight
> Directors. All three of them are extremely competent, and were
well-suited
> for the roles they played.

This makes me wonder... Is there such a thing as a BAD Flight Controller or
Director? By the time somebody gets to that position, they've been pretty
well-screened, and the differences between people would be personal and not
so much professional, I imagine.

[Roger Balettie]

"Terrence Daniels" > wrote:
> This makes me wonder... Is there such a thing as a BAD Flight Controller
or
> Director? By the time somebody gets to that position, they've been pretty
> well-screened, and the differences between people would be personal and
not
> so much professional, I imagine.

Don't get me wrong... we're not a bunch of unemotional automatons. To the
contrary, the passion that *is* spaceflight runs deep in everyone who
aspires to work in the MCC or any of the associated crew training positions.
There are, as in every walk of life, people with different skill sets...
*and* different personality traits. The goal of management is to try to fit
people with the appropriate flight requirements.

But, you are correct in the assessment that, by the time they're actually
supporting a mission, many opportunities for weeding out the folks that, for
one reason or another, aren't cut out for real-time flight operations have
occurred.

While it's not impossible, it's pretty rare that a
not-as-qualified-as-possible person gets through the process. The
pre-certification simulations and training are intense, and the training
team attempts to throw every conceivable failure scenario (including
combinations!) that they can come up with at the hapless trainee.

Working an actual mission is usually a piece of cake, compared to the
simulations... *especially* the certification sims!

Roger
--
Roger Balettie
former Flight Dynamics Officer
Space Shuttle Mission Control
http://www.balettie.com/

[Doug...]

In article >,
says...
>
> <snip>
>
> While it's not impossible, it's pretty rare that a
> not-as-qualified-as-possible person gets through the process. The
> pre-certification simulations and training are intense, and the training
> team attempts to throw every conceivable failure scenario (including
> combinations!) that they can come up with at the hapless trainee.
>
> Working an actual mission is usually a piece of cake, compared to the
> simulations... *especially* the certification sims!

I can understand that, though how often do the certification sims toss
you situations that are unrecoverable by their very nature? How often do
they give vague clues of potential LOCV problems that are very hard to
follow up, and that require you to seek outside engineering evaluations?
Just curious...

As for the concept that all flight controllers are equal, I'd have to
think that some are more equal than others. I certainly don't have the
on-the-job experience you do, Roger, and I defer to you in this, of
course. But I have heard that, during Apollo, there were people
considered "lead" controllers at their positions, who were actively
sought over their peers by various of the flight directors. Aaron Cohen,
John Aaron, Jerry Bostick and John Llewellyn are names that come to mind.

I always got the feeling that Gene Kranz's Apollo 13 Tiger Team gathered
all of the best at their positions, leaving some unlucky White Team
members to realize that, even if they were on the "number one" team at
the beginning of the flight, Kranz obviously felt that they weren't the
best at their positions. Sy Leibergot comes to mind -- granted he was
traumatized by the accident, but it had to be tough to get shoved aside
by John Aaron when the flight turned hairy.

--

It's not the pace of life I mind; | Doug Van Dorn
it's the sudden stop at the end... |

[Roger Balettie]

"Doug..." > wrote:
> I can understand that, though how often do the certification sims toss
> you situations that are unrecoverable by their very nature?

Cert sims? Rarely, if ever.

There *are* scenarios, though, where generic or flight-specific simulation
mistakes made by the MCC team or the crew in the simulator *can* lead to a
"Bad Day T", including LOCV. Flight Controllers do *FAR* more
non-cert-simulations than certification runs. The intent, though, is to
always give the Flight Control team and the crew "outs" so that, if they
read all of the clues, they can avoid those "Bad Days T".

> How often do they give vague clues of potential LOCV problems that
> are very hard to follow up, and that require you to seek outside
> engineering evaluations?

I can remember more than a few simulation scenarios where, had it been a
"real flight", I would have needed to have called in external resources...
and at least a few missions where I did.

> As for the concept that all flight controllers are equal, I'd have to
> think that some are more equal than others.

No doubt! I'm sorry if I gave the impression that they were!

My intent was to point out that the "minimum standards" bar is set very
high, so that everyone who *does* sit on console has a pretty good set of
skills, both personal and technical, for their position.

> But I have heard that, during Apollo, there were people
> considered "lead" controllers at their positions, who were
> actively sought over their peers by various of the flight directors.

There still are. :)

Roger
--
Roger Balettie
former Flight Dynamics Officer
Space Shuttle Mission Control
http://www.balettie.com/

[Roger Balettie]

"Roger Balettie" > wrote:
> There *are* scenarios, though, where generic or flight-specific simulation
> mistakes made by the MCC team or the crew in the simulator *can* lead to a
> "Bad Day T", including LOCV.

<bleargh> I was trying to be clever and using the "tm" sign... but it came
out as a "T".

That should be "Bad Day (tm)". :P

Roger
--
Roger Balettie
former Flight Dynamics Officer
Space Shuttle Mission Control
http://www.balettie.com/

[John Maxson]

I can't remember a time when you were *not* "trying to be
clever," but putting your foot in your mouth is your forte.
I guess that's why you and Berndt understand each other.

--
John Thomas Maxson, Retired Engineer (Aerospace)
Author, The Betrayal of Mission 51-L (www.mission51l.com)


Roger Balettie > wrote in message
...
> "Roger Balettie" > wrote:
>
> > There *are* scenarios, though, where generic or flight-specific
simulation
> > mistakes made by the MCC team or the crew in the simulator *can* lead to
a
> > "Bad Day T", including LOCV.
>
> <bleargh> I was trying to be clever and using the "tm" sign... but it
came
> out as a "T".
>
> That should be "Bad Day (tm)". :P
>
> Roger
> --
> Roger Balettie
> former Flight Dynamics Officer
> Space Shuttle Mission Control
> http://www.balettie.com/

[Richard F. Drushel, Ph.D.]

Roger Balettie > spake unto the ether:

[Re: sims]

: The intent, though is to
: always give the Flight Control team and the crew "outs" so that, if they
: read all of the clues, they can avoid those "Bad Days TM".

Here's something I asked about a little while ago, but got no
follow-ups:

Maybe every 18-24 months there should be a large-scale integrated
sim that *is* LOCV (Loss of Crew and Vehicle). Surely there are enough
obscure failure combinations involving Crit-1 items to choose from. Make
it something in the spirit the Kobayashi Maru sim from "Star Trek II: The
Wrath of Khan", i.e., something that is no-win by design, a test of
everyone's character. I bet that it would really uncover the cracks in the
system...and *then* NASA should proceed with whatever fixes would be needed,
just as if it were a true LOCV.

It would be emotionally harrowing, but probably beneficial to the
overall program. People need to think and train for the unthinkable. I
remember a quote from (IIRC) Jack Swigert after Apollo 13, something to
the effect that, had the Apollo 13 scenario been given in a sim, the
astronauts would have complained that it wasn't realistic; but after
living through it, they wouldn't object to anything SimSup felt like
throwing at them.

Comments from real Mission Control folks?

*Rich*
--
Richard F. Drushel, Ph.D. | "Aplysia californica" is your taxonomic
Department of Biology, Slug Division | nomenclature. / A slug, by any other
Case Western Reserve University | name, is still a slug by nature.
Cleveland, Ohio 44106-7080 U.S.A. | -- apologies to Data, "Ode to Spot"

[Roger Balettie]

"Richard F. Drushel, Ph.D." > wrote:
> Maybe every 18-24 months there should be a large-scale integrated
> sim that *is* LOCV (Loss of Crew and Vehicle).

You don't want to advertise it like that, though... if you *know* going in
that there's no way to save the Kobayashi Maru, what point is there in
trying hard to *do* so?

> ... a test of everyone's character.

We get lots of that. ;)

Seriously, though, simulations that take place over an 8-hour period are
tough to represent the amount of off-line analysis and discussions that take
place during a real mission. We *do* have what are called "long sims" that
may take place over 2-3 days, with the teams getting a chance to actually
exercise some long-range planning.

Roger
--
Roger Balettie
former Flight Dynamics Officer
Space Shuttle Mission Control
http://www.balettie.com/

[Richard F. Drushel, Ph.D.]

Roger Balettie > spake unto the ether:

: You don't want to advertise it like that, though... if you *know* going in
: that there's no way to save the Kobayashi Maru, what point is there in
: trying hard to *do* so?

Because you don't know for sure it *is* a no-win scenario until
you try...and even if you fail, what you learn may help with some future
situation. As I mentioned, the Apollo 13 scenario would have been
considered no-win until it happened in real life :-) And I have read
that a 13-type failure during translunar coast was part of every
subsequent Apollo mission's sims.

*Rich*
--
Richard F. Drushel, Ph.D. | "Aplysia californica" is your taxonomic
Department of Biology, Slug Division | nomenclature. / A slug, by any other
Case Western Reserve University | name, is still a slug by nature.
Cleveland, Ohio 44106-7080 U.S.A. | -- apologies to Data, "Ode to Spot"

[Jon Berndt]

"John Maxson" > wrote in message news:bfn8r0

> I can't remember a time when you were *not* "trying to be
> clever," but putting your foot in your mouth is your forte.
> I guess that's why you and Berndt understand each other.

Boy, are you in for a surprise.

[James Oberg]

Roger, what I saw in the sims and mission debriefs -- and I earned my
stripes the old-fashioned way -- that was totally absent from the
Ham/Engelauf/Cain performance was the naked self-introspection that leads
the operator to stand up and say over the AFD loop, 'I ****ed up, Flight'.
It leads the STS-32 INCO to stand up in the auditorium at the team
debriefing and apologize to everyone there for a bad call that caused no
real damage, just a midnight crew wakeup.

The team couldn't fix the Columbia's wing because they failed to recognize
it had been broken. What I saw on Tuesday was that they will -- if left
alone -- fail to fix the sick safety culture, because they fail to recognize
it's broken.

[James Oberg]

I totally concur with Roger -- the Mission Operations team as I watched it
from the mid-1970's through the mid-1990's was about the last bastion of
pure meritocracy in NASA. I never saw ANY candidate get ANY points for
diversity.



"Roger Balettie" > wrote in message
news:p0GTa.102828> Again, this "quota" practice was not in place in the MCC.
We have plenty of
> women and minority representatives in the MCC... but, as it *should* be
> everywhere, MCC Flight Controllers are selected by the "content of their
> character" (and intelligence), not by the "color of their skin" (to
> paraphrase Dr. King).

[Jorge R. Frank]

(Richard F. Drushel, Ph.D.) wrote in
:

> Roger Balettie > spake unto the ether:
>
> [Re: sims]
>
>: The intent, though is to
>: always give the Flight Control team and the crew "outs" so that, if
>: they read all of the clues, they can avoid those "Bad Days TM".
>
> Here's something I asked about a little while ago, but got no
> follow-ups:
>
> Maybe every 18-24 months there should be a large-scale
> integrated
> sim that *is* LOCV (Loss of Crew and Vehicle). Surely there are
> enough obscure failure combinations involving Crit-1 items to choose
> from. Make it something in the spirit the Kobayashi Maru sim from
> "Star Trek II: The Wrath of Khan", i.e., something that is no-win by
> design, a test of everyone's character. I bet that it would really
> uncover the cracks in the system...and *then* NASA should proceed with
> whatever fixes would be needed, just as if it were a true LOCV.
>
> It would be emotionally harrowing, but probably beneficial to
> the
> overall program. People need to think and train for the unthinkable.
> I remember a quote from (IIRC) Jack Swigert after Apollo 13, something
> to the effect that, had the Apollo 13 scenario been given in a sim,
> the astronauts would have complained that it wasn't realistic; but
> after living through it, they wouldn't object to anything SimSup felt
> like throwing at them.
>
> Comments from real Mission Control folks?

Following up on what Roger said, from the perspective of one on the other
side of the fence (the "sim sadists"), we don't find it necessary to
deliberately script LOCV scenarios. They come up on their own frequently
enough, and come in several flavors.

First are the scenarios that are scripted to be recoverable but a LOCV
occurs due to a crew or MCC error. This can happen pretty often, especially
in "generic" ascent/entry sims. Generally these sims have inexperienced
flight controller trainees, and flight crews that have not worked together
before and therefore their CRM isn't quite up to snuff. In debrief, the
penitent flight controller is expected to "fall on his/her sword" and admit
the error. Senior flight controllers and instructors look for this trait -
it's important to recover from one's mistakes and move on.

Second are the scenarios that are scripted to be recoverable but turn out
to be unrecoverable due to errors by the training team. These can include
things like improperly calculating a leak rate malfunction in some critical
system, or failing to account for interactions between multiple
malfunctions (again, something that tends to happen mostly in generic sims,
which can have uncertified instructor trainees working them), or simple
"d'oh" moments like clicking the mouse on the wrong malfunction. As in the
previous case, the instructor involved is expected to admit the error
during debrief. However, the sim isn't immediately halted - sometimes the
sim sup will elect to play the scenario anyway to see how the flight
control team handles it.

Third are the cases that are scripted to be recoverable but turn out to be
unrecoverable due to latent problems with the shuttle itself. In integrated
sims, these are more likely to involve flight software than hardware, since
the Shuttle Mission Simulator (SMS) uses real flight computers running real
flight software, but the hardware (except for the cockpit displays and
switches) are emulated. There are a couple of examples I can share.

Back in '97, there was a sim where the commander's attitude direction
indicator (ADI - the "eight-ball") had a stuck error needle. This wasn't a
scripted malfunction - the needle just mechanically stuck. The needle is
used as a flight director by the crew during entry, and in this case it
resulted in CFIT (controlled flight into terrain - i.e. a shuttle-sized
hole in the Florida swamps). This served to remind everyone - crew and MCC
- of the importance of crosschecking their cues and communicating
discrepancies (the pilot's needles were fine, as was MCC's telemetry - it's
just that no one spoke up in time). This problem could just as easily have
happened in real life, but fortunately is no longer possible since the ADIs
and other "steam gauge" displays are now history - Atlantis has the new
"glass cockpit", and Discovery and Endeavour will be upgraded prior to
return-to-flight. Until we got to that point, of course, we'd stick the
needles deliberately every now and then in sims to make sure the lesson
hadn't been lost on anyone.

In '99, there was a sim where a series of scripted computer malfunctions
resulted in the shuttle performing a wild pitching motion during first
stage ascent that certainly would have destroyed it in real life. This was
initially thought to be an SMS problem, but *any* unanticipated loss-of-
control scenario is investigated for potential flight software problems. In
this case we hit the jackpot: an obscure bug was uncovered in the backup
flight system. The sequence of events that would manifest the bug was
deemed extremely unlikely, but nevertheless a patch was developed for the
next shuttle flight, and the software was fixed in the next release.

Cases like these (I think) meet the intent of your "Kobayashi Maru"
scenarios, and they seem to come up every couple of years or so, so most
folks don't feel a need to script them deliberately.
--
JRF

Reply-to address spam-proofed - to reply by E-mail,
check "Organization" (I am not assimilated) and
think one step ahead of IBM.

[Jorge R. Frank]

"Greg D. Moore \(Strider\)" > wrote in
:

> Actually many of the components of Apollo 13's actual problems had
> been practiced individually. But they had not been put together in a
> single sim.
>
> The lifeboat concept had been discussed and even practiced before
> Apollo 13.

Sy Liebergot's autobio reveals that, after the first such sim (on an Apollo
10 sim in 1969, which ended in loss of crew), the LM systems branch chief
formed a Tiger Team to develop a set of "LM Lifeboat cases". These cases
were put on the shelf when it was decided not to put them in the crew
checklists, but they were adapted to the Apollo 13 situation.


--
JRF

Reply-to address spam-proofed - to reply by E-mail,
check "Organization" (I am not assimilated) and
think one step ahead of IBM.

[Charleston]

> says...
> >
> > The team couldn't fix the Columbia's wing because they failed to
recognize
> > it had been broken. What I saw on Tuesday was that they will -- if left
> > alone -- fail to fix the sick safety culture, because they fail to
recognize
> > it's broken.

It is impossible to never fail, but you never stop trying to avoid failure!
Never. What tore me up more than anything else about Columbia, was the
fatalistic "there is nothing we could have done" attitude that some NASA
managers took on as their mantra. As long as the crew lived, hope lived.
As we learned from Apollo 13, there are multiple levels of failure. NASA
even categorizes the failures into loss of mission, vehicle, and crew as
increasing levels of failure. To have never tried is of course the ultimate
failure. The orbiter Columbia, along with her mission may have been doomed
to failure, but the Columbia crew should have been given every last chance
to succeed, to survive. STS 107 would have been a far more acceptable
failure if NASA had tried to save the crew. We never got to see the many
brave and determined people at Mission Control "Do" everything they could to
cheat fate. How sad it is that the engineers at NASA and its contractors
were denied the chance to become the heroes. Instead they were sentenced to
watch helplessly as seven people became fallen heroes.

--

Daniel
Mount Charleston, not Charleston, SC

[Doug...]

In article >,
says...
> "Greg D. Moore \(Strider\)" > wrote in
> :
>
> > Actually many of the components of Apollo 13's actual problems had
> > been practiced individually. But they had not been put together in a
> > single sim.
> >
> > The lifeboat concept had been discussed and even practiced before
> > Apollo 13.
>
> Sy Liebergot's autobio reveals that, after the first such sim (on an Apollo
> 10 sim in 1969, which ended in loss of crew), the LM systems branch chief
> formed a Tiger Team to develop a set of "LM Lifeboat cases". These cases
> were put on the shelf when it was decided not to put them in the crew
> checklists, but they were adapted to the Apollo 13 situation.

And one of those lifeboat cases was actually exercised during an Apollo
13 prime crew sim. What I read was that the CSM/LM was going "over the
hill" in lunar orbit, prior to landing, when the cabin pressure indicator
on the EECOM's console started showing erratic behavior, but trending in
a downward direction. The EECOM asked the crew to check the gauge and
report back when they came back around. But in the sim, by the time they
came back around, cabin pressure was zero and the crew were in hard
suits. They ran that one for about six more hours, figuring out how to
get the crew into the LM to perform a TEI with the DPS and how to keep
them in a livable environment (in the LM) on the way home.

So, the Apollo 13 crew indeed ran a LM lifeboat sim, though quite
different from the actual circumstance that they faced on the flight.

--

It's not the pace of life I mind; | Doug Van Dorn
it's the sudden stop at the end... |

[Roger Balettie]

"DSCOTT" > wrote:
> If as you say they are so well qualifed that should be easy for
> you to get.

That makes no sense whatsoever. My ability to "get" personal information
such as you demanded has no bearing whatsoever on her ability to perform her
assigned duties.

> But I suspect you can't. Also where did she get
> her degrees assuming she has any.

I have no need to know that info... and, your snotty assumption that she has
no college degree proves you to be unworthy of my continuing this
conversation with you.

Good evening.
Roger
--
Roger Balettie
former Flight Dynamics Officer
Space Shuttle Mission Control
http://www.balettie.com/

[Kent Betts]

> > But I have heard that, during Apollo, there were people
> > considered "lead" controllers at their positions, who were
> > actively sought ... by various of the flight directors.
>

"Roger Balettie
> There still are. :)

Polularly known as "steely-eyed rocket men"

http://www.space.com/news/apollo12_blastoff_991112.html

"In Houston, experts in Mission Control struggled to understand what was
happening aboard Apollo 12. Flight director Gerry Griffin turned to 24-year-old
controller John Aaron, who was responsible for the electrical system, and asked,
"What do you see?" Aaron couldn't see much -- a meaningless jumble of numbers
had replaced all the telemetry from the spacecraft. Everyone knew that the
mighty Saturn 5 booster was still propelling the astronauts toward space with
7.5 million pounds of thrust. Would it stay on course?

"Inside Yankee Clipper, Conrad heard a request from Houston: "Apollo 12, try
S-C-E to Auxiliary." Conrad had no idea what that meant, but Bean did. When he
flipped the switch, Mission Control had their data back."
By Andy Chaikin

[Bruce Palmer]

Roger Balettie wrote:
> "DSCOTT" > wrote:
>
>>If as you say they are so well qualifed that should be easy for
>>you to get.
>
>
> That makes no sense whatsoever.

Neither do his ravings over on sci.crypt where he's regarded as a fringe
lunatic. Interested in cryptography? Then stay away from his web
pages. He sees the NSA in every nook and cranny of modern existence.
Hmmm.... Maybe the letters N, S and A just set him off where govt
agencies are involved.

--
bp
Proud Member of the Human O-Ring Society Since 2003

[Richard F. Drushel, Ph.D.]

Jorge R. Frank > spake unto the ether:

[examples of recent Shuttle sims involving LOCV deleted]

: Cases like these (I think) meet the intent of your "Kobayashi Maru"
: scenarios, and they seem to come up every couple of years or so, so most
: folks don't feel a need to script them deliberately.

Thanks for this very interesting information! It makes sense to
me.

*Rich*
--
Richard F. Drushel, Ph.D. | "Aplysia californica" is your taxonomic
Department of Biology, Slug Division | nomenclature. / A slug, by any other
Case Western Reserve University | name, is still a slug by nature.
Cleveland, Ohio 44106-7080 U.S.A. | -- apologies to Data, "Ode to Spot"

[James Oberg]

"DSCOTT" > wrote in message
> Well Roger what gives Ms Ham such power to ignore the wishes
> of the engineers that wanted more info. I don't know her but
> if NASA is damn careful. What is here IQ. What is her work
> experience. What are her degrees in. What is her class standing.
> If as you say they are so well qualifed that should be easy for
> you to get. But I suspect you can't. Also where did she get
> her degrees assuming she has any.

None of these questions are relevant to her earning her place at that
console. The MCC training and certification process -- more than equivalent
to a MS degreee in class and lab work -- and the side-by-side practice
sessions were the only wickets she needed -- or needed to be required to --
pass. Controllers come from all sorts of technical fields -- engineering,
math, missile ops, etc -- but need the right attitude. The tragedy is, Ham
passed all those criteria -- and yet somehow, slipped up at this subtle but
critical juncture.

[Dale]

On Thu, 24 Jul 2003 11:40:23 GMT, "James Oberg" > wrote:

>
>"DSCOTT" > wrote in message
>> Well Roger what gives Ms Ham such power to ignore the wishes
>> of the engineers that wanted more info. I don't know her but
>> if NASA is damn careful. What is here IQ. What is her work
>> experience. What are her degrees in. What is her class standing.
>> If as you say they are so well qualifed that should be easy for
>> you to get. But I suspect you can't. Also where did she get
>> her degrees assuming she has any.
>
>None of these questions are relevant to her earning her place at that
>console. The MCC training and certification process -- more than equivalent
>to a MS degreee in class and lab work -- and the side-by-side practice
>sessions were the only wickets she needed -- or needed to be required to --
>pass. Controllers come from all sorts of technical fields -- engineering,
>math, missile ops, etc -- but need the right attitude. The tragedy is, Ham
>passed all those criteria -- and yet somehow, slipped up at this subtle but
>critical juncture.

One name that seems to have dropped out of discussion here is that
of Ron Dittemore. I probably haven't been paying close enough attention
lately, but what is his role in all this? Not trying to point blame at anyone-
it just seems the blame is already being pointed at Ms. Ham, whereas
before it was being pointed (at least here) at Mr. Dittemore. Did I miss
something?

I enjoyed (if that's the word for it) reading Mr. Oberg's opinion piece.

Thanks,
Dale

[DSCOTT]

(Roger Balettie) wrote in
>:

>
>"DSCOTT" > wrote:
>> If as you say they are so well qualifed that should be easy for
>> you to get.
>
>That makes no sense whatsoever. My ability to "get" personal
>information such as you demanded has no bearing whatsoever on her
>ability to perform her assigned duties.
>
>

But it does raise the question how you can assume she
was well qualified. I have a feeling what you and I call
qualifed are very different. Does she at least have a resume
out on the net some where. Does she have an engineering degree?
Surely if she was qualifed at all that would be known.

David A. Scott
--
My Crypto code
http://cryptography.org/cgi-bin/crypto.cgi/Misc/scott19u.zip
http://cryptography.org/cgi-bin/crypto.cgi/Misc/scott16u.zip
http://www.jim.com/jamesd/Kong/scott19u.zip old version
My Compression code http://bijective.dogma.net/
**TO EMAIL ME drop the roman "five" **
Disclaimer:I am in no way responsible for any of the statements
made in the above text. For all I know I might be drugged.
As a famous person once said "any cryptograhic
system is only as strong as its weakest link"

[Jorge R. Frank]

Dale > wrote in
:

> One name that seems to have dropped out of discussion here is that
> of Ron Dittemore. I probably haven't been paying close enough
> attention lately, but what is his role in all this?

As space shuttle program manager, Dittemore was Linda Ham's superior. He
was telecon'ed into the MMT meetings (perhaps with the exception of the
1/30 meeting - his name does not appear in the roll call).

> Not trying to
> point blame at anyone- it just seems the blame is already being
> pointed at Ms. Ham, whereas before it was being pointed (at least
> here) at Mr. Dittemore. Did I miss something?

Nope. Dittemore is ultimately accountable for his subordinates' decisions.


--
JRF

Reply-to address spam-proofed - to reply by E-mail,
check "Organization" (I am not assimilated) and
think one step ahead of IBM.

[DSCOTT]

(Dale) wrote in >:

>On Thu, 24 Jul 2003 11:40:23 GMT, "James Oberg"
> wrote:
>
>>
>>"DSCOTT" > wrote in message
>>> Well Roger what gives Ms Ham such power to ignore the wishes
>>> of the engineers that wanted more info. I don't know her but
>>> if NASA is damn careful. What is here IQ. What is her work
>>> experience. What are her degrees in. What is her class standing.
>>> If as you say they are so well qualifed that should be easy for
>>> you to get. But I suspect you can't. Also where did she get
>>> her degrees assuming she has any.
>>
>>None of these questions are relevant to her earning her place at that
>>console. The MCC training and certification process -- more than
>>equivalent to a MS degreee in class and lab work -- and the
>>side-by-side practice sessions were the only wickets she needed -- or
>>needed to be required to -- pass. Controllers come from all sorts of
>>technical fields -- engineering, math, missile ops, etc -- but need the
>>right attitude. The tragedy is, Ham passed all those criteria -- and
>>yet somehow, slipped up at this subtle but critical juncture.
>

I have various certificatiopns. The thing I notice about
certification is that it tends to be a joke. Certification is
used more to keep good people out of a job than good people in.
If your blessed you could go get it too. Its not the same as actual real
on the job work exeperance in the real world.

>One name that seems to have dropped out of discussion here is that
>of Ron Dittemore. I probably haven't been paying close enough attention
>lately, but what is his role in all this? Not trying to point blame at
>anyone- it just seems the blame is already being pointed at Ms. Ham,
>whereas before it was being pointed (at least here) at Mr. Dittemore.
>Did I miss something?
>

I was wondering that myself. Years ago I heard of the "morman mafia"
infecting the space program. Its not my term it was in a major magazine.
I was wondering what the religous makeup of the team was. The reason
I say this is when I worked for the government for some strange reason
the religion which should make no difference but it did make a difference.
Catholics tended to work in catholic groups and protected each other.
As did mormans and etc. I did work work for the rare honest morman in
one group. We got a long so well that many people falsely assumed I was
morman. I could understand there feelings since religion played a far
greater role then it should in settling arguments. Each group tended
to protect its own. Its quit possible relgion played a role here
in getting things considered or looked into.

>I enjoyed (if that's the word for it) reading Mr. Oberg's opinion piece.
>
>Thanks,
>Dale
>
>
>


David A. Scott
--
My Crypto code
http://cryptography.org/cgi-bin/crypto.cgi/Misc/scott19u.zip
http://cryptography.org/cgi-bin/crypto.cgi/Misc/scott16u.zip
http://www.jim.com/jamesd/Kong/scott19u.zip old version
My Compression code http://bijective.dogma.net/
**TO EMAIL ME drop the roman "five" **
Disclaimer:I am in no way responsible for any of the statements
made in the above text. For all I know I might be drugged.
As a famous person once said "any cryptograhic
system is only as strong as its weakest link"

[James Oberg]

I have never seen anyone in Mission Operations treat certifications as any
kind of joke.

I worked directly for Dittemore on STS-2, and later on other efforts as we
both rose in the MOD hierarchy. People knew he was a Mormon but I for one
never saw it affect any choices he made.

[Chris Jones]

(DSCOTT) writes:

[...]

> But it does raise the question how you can assume she
> was well qualified. I have a feeling what you and I call
> qualifed are very different. Does she at least have a resume
> out on the net some where. Does she have an engineering degree?
> Surely if she was qualifed at all that would be known.

You are choosing to ignore or discount the answers you receive because
they don't support your (I would have to say preconceived) conclusion.
People are not *assuming* she was well-qualified, they are saying that
they personally worked with her, are aware of her experience, are aware
of the culture and what it took to progress through the positions she
did, and have seen no evidence that she was anything but qualified.
That's not good enough for you, so you're asking for more, and less
relevant, evidence. There is a natural feeling that if the relevant
evidence hasn't convinced you, providing more evidence will just cause
you to invent more necessary qualificiations that have to be spoon-fed
to you, and the available evidence is that *that* won't be enough for
you.

I notice I've got you in my crypto kill file. I conclude that the
issues are systemic, not specific. Adios.

[Bruce Palmer]

DSCOTT wrote:
> I was wondering that myself. Years ago I heard of the "morman mafia"
> infecting the space program. Its not my term it was in a major magazine.

It's M-O-R-M-O-N you moron. That's the second time I've corrected you
on that, Scott. Pay attention. I doubt any major magazine would print
_anything_ about the, ahem, "morman" mafia. "Morman" is not a word.
"Moron" on the other hand, is a word, and it describes you to a T.

> I was wondering what the religous makeup of the team was. The reason
> I say this is when I worked for the government for some strange reason
> the religion which should make no difference but it did make a difference.
> Catholics tended to work in catholic groups and protected each other.
> As did mormans and etc. I did work work for the rare honest morman in

I always knew you had to be some sort of a bigot deep down inside.
Welcome back to my killfile you lowlife piece of dog ----.

--
bp
Proud Member of the Human O-Ring Society Since 2003

[Ron]

Linda Ham is taking a lot of flak here. Is there any proof that she knew or
understood that the analysis performed by Boeing on the RCC panels was not
based on the Crater program? From what I read in the transcripts, someone
said that the analysis was based on the Crater program and then spewed out a
bunch of test results.

Perhaps it was not made clear in the meeting which test results came from
Crater and which did not.

R


Jorge R. Frank > wrote in message
...
> Dale > wrote in
> :
>
> > One name that seems to have dropped out of discussion here is that
> > of Ron Dittemore. I probably haven't been paying close enough
> > attention lately, but what is his role in all this?
>
> As space shuttle program manager, Dittemore was Linda Ham's superior. He
> was telecon'ed into the MMT meetings (perhaps with the exception of the
> 1/30 meeting - his name does not appear in the roll call).

[Greg D. Moore \(Strider\)]

"Bruce Palmer" > wrote in message
.net...
> DSCOTT wrote:
> > I was wondering that myself. Years ago I heard of the "morman mafia"
> > infecting the space program. Its not my term it was in a major magazine.
>
> It's M-O-R-M-O-N you moron. That's the second time I've corrected you
> on that, Scott. Pay attention. I doubt any major magazine would print
> _anything_ about the, ahem, "morman" mafia. "Morman" is not a word.
> "Moron" on the other hand, is a word, and it describes you to a T.

This is reminding me of an episode of cheers where Rebecca makes a comment
about "Why can't more men give flowers?"

And of course Woody of course starts wondering why Mormans can't give
flowers.

[Terrence Daniels]

"OM" <om@our_blessed_lady_mary_of_the_holy_NASA_research _facility.org> wrote
in message ...

> 1) None of them could install Windows NT 3.51 or 4.0,

I can do that.

> 2) None of them could trace registry keys to determine whether a
> driver had been installed correctly.

Hmm... Maybe I could do that.

> 3) None of them could comprehend a simple diagram to determine whether
> a printer's ink heads were properly aligned with each other.

!

> 4) None of them could properly document each step of their debugging
> process when a problem was encountered.

Done it already. I beta-tested a flight sim. :P

> 8) Only one knew how to assemble a PC from component parts, install
> the OS, and get it hooked up to the network.

Done that four times. :)

> 9) None of them could work together without resorting to arguements
> over test results and/or getting into oneupsmanship sessions.

Maturity issue.

> 10) With regards to 9), the most egocentric of the group was the
> self-professed Unix guru, who kept bitching about the lack of a Unix
> driver.

Loser.

> Also, no Unix geeks, either. Besides, one of the things I heard from
> HR after we'd let the first group go was that the guys who came in
> that were heavy on Unix all had either appeance or hygene problems.

For real? And I always thought that was a stereotype...

> playing Doom, Doom II and Heretic with ultramassive WAD files while
> printing was running in the background, we were able to verify that
> the print spooling behaved itself far more reliably than just testing
> with some spreadsheet app.

Utterly sensible... Stress the system and see where it breaks.

> Bottom Line: a diploma or a certificate has the same value as a sheet
> of toilet paper if there's no practical experience behind it.

Damn. :(

There's the rub for new people... You need experience to get in, but the
only way to get experience is to get in...

[David Higgins]

Terrence Daniels wrote:
> "OM" <om@our_blessed_lady_mary_of_the_holy_NASA_research _facility.org> wrote:

>>Also, no Unix geeks, either. Besides, one of the things I heard from
>>HR after we'd let the first group go was that the guys who came in
>>that were heavy on Unix all had either appeance or hygene problems.
>
>
> For real? And I always thought that was a stereotype...

Well, I saw lots of "Unix Geeks", including our own Henry
Spencer, at a Usenix conference in WashDC back in the late
'80s. Don't remember any raging cases of B.O. :-)

Now if "appeance" refers to beards and such ...

[Jorge R. Frank]

"Ron" > wrote in
thlink.net:

> Linda Ham is taking a lot of flak here. Is there any proof that she
> knew or understood that the analysis performed by Boeing on the RCC
> panels was not based on the Crater program? From what I read in the
> transcripts, someone said that the analysis was based on the Crater
> program and then spewed out a bunch of test results.
>
> Perhaps it was not made clear in the meeting which test results came
> from Crater and which did not.

There's no proof that she knew; really no credible evidence that she knew.
She *could* have known, if she had asked the right questions to the right
people. The transcripts show that she did not. I have often wondered, had I
been in her shoes, without the benefit of hindsight, whether I would have
thought to ask the right questions. I cannot honestly answer yes.

--
JRF

Reply-to address spam-proofed - to reply by E-mail,
check "Organization" (I am not assimilated) and
think one step ahead of IBM.

[DSCOTT]

(Jorge R. Frank) wrote in
>:

>
>There's no proof that she knew; really no credible evidence that she
>knew. She *could* have known, if she had asked the right questions to
>the right people. The transcripts show that she did not. I have often
>wondered, had I been in her shoes, without the benefit of hindsight,
>whether I would have thought to ask the right questions. I cannot
>honestly answer yes.
>
>

I would have asked the right questions. You may not be sure
but I am.


David A. Scott
--
My Crypto code
http://cryptography.org/cgi-bin/crypto.cgi/Misc/scott19u.zip
http://cryptography.org/cgi-bin/crypto.cgi/Misc/scott16u.zip
http://www.jim.com/jamesd/Kong/scott19u.zip old version
My Compression code http://bijective.dogma.net/
**TO EMAIL ME drop the roman "five" **
Disclaimer:I am in no way responsible for any of the statements
made in the above text. For all I know I might be drugged.
As a famous person once said "any cryptograhic
system is only as strong as its weakest link"

[Michael R. Grabois ... change $ to \s\]

On Wed, 23 Jul 2003 23:11:57 GMT, "Roger Balettie" >
wrote:

>While it's not impossible, it's pretty rare that a
>not-as-qualified-as-possible person gets through the process. The
>pre-certification simulations and training are intense, and the training
>team attempts to throw every conceivable failure scenario (including
>combinations!) that they can come up with at the hapless trainee.

The trick, especially for cert runs, is to try to come up with the failure
scenario that the trainee has NOT seen before. That gets them to use all their
knowledge to be able to come up with something new (to them).

One of the questions we in the training world ask while scripting these runs is
where are the holes in the procedure that nobody thought of yet? Where are the
holes in the Flight Rules? How about putting them into a gray area where they
could go either way, where they have to make a decision that's not clear-cut?
The Flight Director will often try to talk the trainee into or out of a
decision, to see whether the trainee changes his mind or sticks to his guns.

Kill a signal conditioner and take out some of their data. Can they see enough
of the rest of the system to be able to diagnose failures without their primary
cues? What's the next worst failure, and what will you do if (or more often
than not, when) it happens?

Some people can't take the pressure, others don't like the hours. Some people
are Just Not Cut Out to be flight controllers and move elsewhere. But nothing
is handed to you, you have to earn it, especially when you have a Flight
Director sitting at your console watching you and listening to you on your cert
run.

>Working an actual mission is usually a piece of cake, compared to the
>simulations... *especially* the certification sims!

We throw more malfunctions into an 8-hour orbit sim than are normally seen
throughout an entire mission. Sometimes two.

[DSCOTT]

(Mary Shafer) wrote in
>:

>
>I doubt it greatly. Sure, you'd ask them _now_ but not in January.
>
>

Lady you may not have asked but I would. Those that know me
know I can be a pain. I ask questions. Especially in a case like
this. There was extrem damage to a depth of over 3 inches in the
tiles of earlier launches. This was the largest known foam strike.
I can see where one who only has paper certificates and no real
world engineering experience may not. But lady I would have asked
and demanded to get to the bottom of it. The fact is many died
she sould not be in charge again.
I also posted here rigt after the crash. I was angry they didn't
allow the engineers to find the full extent of the damage.

David A. Scott
--
My Crypto code
http://cryptography.org/cgi-bin/crypto.cgi/Misc/scott19u.zip
http://cryptography.org/cgi-bin/crypto.cgi/Misc/scott16u.zip
http://www.jim.com/jamesd/Kong/scott19u.zip old version
My Compression code http://bijective.dogma.net/
**TO EMAIL ME drop the roman "five" **
Disclaimer:I am in no way responsible for any of the statements
made in the above text. For all I know I might be drugged.
As a famous person once said "any cryptograhic
system is only as strong as its weakest link"

[DSCOTT]

(Mary Shafer) wrote in
>:

>
>I was certified as a test conductor, roughly the equivalent of CAPCOM.
>I didn't get certified by taking a multiple-choice test after an hour
>lecture. I spent months studying for the certification. I had to
>know the BOM, the Dash-1, all the checklists and the boldface, the
>AFFTC procedures, the High Range and restricted air space, the
>functions and responsibilities of everyone involved on the project
>team, the test maneuvers and flight cards, the safety and photo chase
>procedures and checklists, and the aircraft capabilities and flight
>rules, as well as comm procedures. Then there was all the discipline
>engineering I had to understand.
>
>Believe me, that certification meant something. There were times I
>held the pilo

Belive me a few months is not enough to get an understanding of
the engineering and physics envovled. You most likely were only
fooling yourself. It takes years of hard work and sweat to become
good.

David A. Scott
--
My Crypto code
http://cryptography.org/cgi-bin/crypto.cgi/Misc/scott19u.zip
http://cryptography.org/cgi-bin/crypto.cgi/Misc/scott16u.zip
http://www.jim.com/jamesd/Kong/scott19u.zip old version
My Compression code http://bijective.dogma.net/
**TO EMAIL ME drop the roman "five" **
Disclaimer:I am in no way responsible for any of the statements
made in the above text. For all I know I might be drugged.
As a famous person once said "any cryptograhic
system is only as strong as its weakest link"

[Greg D. Moore \(Strider\)]

"DSCOTT" > wrote in message
...
> (Mary Shafer) wrote in
> >:
>
> >
> >I doubt it greatly. Sure, you'd ask them _now_ but not in January.
> >
> >
>
> Lady you may not have asked but I would.

Dave, exactly how many test aircraft have you flown or worked on?

How many accident review boards have you worked on?

How much work on shuttle thermo and aerodymanics have you done?


I think I'll take Mary's known credentials over yours.

[Greg D. Moore \(Strider\)]

"DSCOTT" > wrote in message
...
> (Mary Shafer) wrote in
> >:
>
> >
> >I was certified as a test conductor, roughly the equivalent of CAPCOM.
> >I didn't get certified by taking a multiple-choice test after an hour
> >lecture. I spent months studying for the certification. I had to
> >know the BOM, the Dash-1, all the checklists and the boldface, the
> >AFFTC procedures, the High Range and restricted air space, the
> >functions and responsibilities of everyone involved on the project
> >team, the test maneuvers and flight cards, the safety and photo chase
> >procedures and checklists, and the aircraft capabilities and flight
> >rules, as well as comm procedures. Then there was all the discipline
> >engineering I had to understand.
> >
> >Believe me, that certification meant something. There were times I
> >held the pilo
>
> Belive me a few months is not enough to get an understanding of
> the engineering and physics envovled. You most likely were only
> fooling yourself. It takes years of hard work and sweat to become
> good.

You know, Mary needs no defense, but given her credentials, I highly doubt
she was fooling herself.

Exactly how many years did you work at Edwards or another aircraft research
facility? How many papers on aircraft have you written?

(I ask since I honestly don't know. I've never seen your name on papers.
On the other hand, I've read some of Mary's work.)

[jeff findley]

"Jorge R. Frank" > writes:
> There's no proof that she knew; really no credible evidence that she knew.
> She *could* have known, if she had asked the right questions to the right
> people. The transcripts show that she did not. I have often wondered, had I
> been in her shoes, without the benefit of hindsight, whether I would have
> thought to ask the right questions. I cannot honestly answer yes.

If you hadn't thought to ask the right questions, would you later take
responsibility, or would you say something along the lines of "It
wasn't anyone's fault, we just didn't know"? This is what I'm
currently hearing from NASA management. They are currently unwilling
to take any responsibility for what's happened.

I'm afraid this attitude will lead to the culture staying the same.
After all, if you don't admit any responsibility for the failure, then
why should you change the way you act in the future? If you feel
you've done nothing wrong, where is the motivation to change?

Jeff
--
Remove "no" and "spam" from email address to reply.
If it says "This is not spam!", it's surely a lie.

[jeff findley]

(DSCOTT) writes:
> Lady you may not have asked but I would...

Dave, you're talking to Mary Shafer, not "any lady".

Jeff
--
Remove "no" and "spam" from email address to reply.
If it says "This is not spam!", it's surely a lie.

[DSCOTT]

(jeff findley) wrote in
>:

(DSCOTT) writes:
>> Lady you may not have asked but I would...
>
>Dave, you're talking to Mary Shafer, not "any lady".
>
>Jeff

I have to admit I don't know her. But likewise I
dought she knows of my experience either.
But the postings I follwed implied she had only a
few months work to get some "certificate" it implied
she had no degrees. For that matter I did not mention
my degrees. BSEE electrical engineering in fields and waves
and a MSEE electrical engineering in control theroy.
I am sure she or linda better in many things than me.
Especially writting. However I'm sure I know more about
advanced calculus or control theory than they especially
if they only have a few months training no engineering
experience and no degrees.

David A. Scott
--
My Crypto code
http://cryptography.org/cgi-bin/crypto.cgi/Misc/scott19u.zip
http://cryptography.org/cgi-bin/crypto.cgi/Misc/scott16u.zip
http://www.jim.com/jamesd/Kong/scott19u.zip old version
My Compression code http://bijective.dogma.net/
**TO EMAIL ME drop the roman "five" **
Disclaimer:I am in no way responsible for any of the statements
made in the above text. For all I know I might be drugged.
As a famous person once said "any cryptograhic
system is only as strong as its weakest link"

[Greg D. Moore \(Strider\)]

"DSCOTT" > wrote in message
...
> (Greg D. Moore (Strider)) wrote in
> >:
>
> >
> >Dave, exactly how many test aircraft have you flown or worked on?
> >
>
> I dought that I could even give you an accurate number. Or
> that you would belive it if I did. I worked on several projects
> over the years. However all my flying experence is on simulators
> or cessna type of craft. I never got a pilots license I did pass
> all the tests the only thing I never bothered with was formal flying
> part of flight school. You imply Mary as flown aircraft.

Just for background, Mary worked at Dryden for I think 30+ years.

She's written articles on among other things the flight dynamics of the
orbiter. I don't think she's a pilot, but she's worked with most every NASA
test pilot over the last few decades.

>Does
> she have a license is she a pilot. If she is I would trust her
> flying expericence over mine once in the air. However if programming
> a flight computer or even a flight simmulator.I think I would
> beat her hands down.

She's probably done much of the research on flight dynamics that go into
most flight simulators.

[JGM]

Greg D. Moore wrote:

>"DSCOTT" > wrote

>> (Mary Shafer) wrote

>> >I doubt it greatly. Sure, you'd ask them _now_ but not in January.

>> Lady you may not have asked but I would.

>Dave, exactly how many test aircraft have you flown or worked on?

Not speaking for Dave here: of course nobody can say in hindsight exactly
what they would have done in a given situation, and I respect Mary's opinions
greatly, and, to answer Greg's question for myself: zero, however I've been in
countless design reviews, risk assessments, and post-mortem reviews for various
(non-aerospace) failure scenarios.

Having said all that, I can honestly say that I am highly confident that
there is no way I would have let the Boeing pitches -- particularly the 1/23
briefing -- go by without *significant* probing, follow-up questions, and
documented requests for more information. The number of caveats and
disclaimers is the first clue that questions need to be asked. The "flight
condition is significantly outside of test database" statement on page 6 of the
1/23 is *begging* for followup. Just looking at the blank cells in the chart
on page 10 of the 1/23 briefing makes my fingers tingle.

Note that nothing about these analyses or presentations requires specialized
aerospace knowledge -- anyone with a basic understanding of simulation tools
and general engineering analysis processes should have been able to ask these
types of questions. And I'm not claiming that what was going to happen was
obvious from these slides (in fact, given the presentation I would have been
much more likely to raise hell about the status of the tiles vs. the RCC), or
that had more questions been asked the outcome would have been different.

JGM

[Mary Shafer]

On 25 Jul 2003 16:14:41 GMT, (DSCOTT) wrote:

> (jeff findley) wrote in
> >:
>
> (DSCOTT) writes:
> >> Lady you may not have asked but I would...
> >
> >Dave, you're talking to Mary Shafer, not "any lady".
> >
> >Jeff
>
> I have to admit I don't know her. But likewise I
> dought she knows of my experience either.
> But the postings I follwed implied she had only a
> few months work to get some "certificate" it implied
> she had no degrees. For that matter I did not mention
> my degrees. BSEE electrical engineering in fields and waves
> and a MSEE electrical engineering in control theroy.
> I am sure she or linda better in many things than me.
> Especially writting. However I'm sure I know more about
> advanced calculus or control theory than they especially
> if they only have a few months training no engineering
> experience and no degrees.

I have over thirty years of flight research and test experience in
flying qualities, controls, aerodynamics, hypersonic
aerothermodynamics, dynamics of flight, pilot-vehicle interfaces,
computer programming, instrumentation specification, precision task
design, simulation model definition, simulation verification, and
other similar topics. Most of my work has been done on
high-performance aircraft, including the F-15, F-104, F-4, F-8, F-14,
F-18, F-111, YF-12, SR-71, S-3, DAST, HiMAT, X-15, X-29, X-31, and the
Orbiter (ALT and orbital). I've also worked on the 747 SCA, PA-30,
SRV, the lifting bodies, and four in-flight simulators (TIFS, NT-33A,
GPAS, and VISTA).

I have a BS and MS from UCLA in engineering and post-graduate
engineering course work from CSU-F. I have taken over 20 CEU courses,
including digital signal analysis, structural dynamics, aircraft
accident investigation, FMEA techniques, flight test and flight
research techniques, COTR training, and other topics.

I've been to the F-18 RAG (FRS) at LeMoore, too. I have worked
closely with the USAF, USN, USMC, RAF, and GAF.

I have flown in high-performance aircraft, experimental aircraft, and
other military and civil aircraft, including two variable-stability
bizjets. I have over ten hours in the right seats of the R4D and
C-47.

I have been the lead flying qualities engineer on over a dozen flight
programs. I've been Project Engineer on two projects and Chief
Engineer on four projects. I was a Test Conductor on three research
projects.

I have organized two international flying qualities workshops. I was
General Chair of the '95 AIAA AFM, served on the AFM TC, and was a
Distinguished Lecturer for two years. I've been a NATO specialist and
an AGARD lecturer. I have about thirty publications.

I've flown in the F-104, F-4, NT-33A, NF-16D, Sherpa, JetStar,
Learjets, gliders, Dove, GA aircraft, and Bell 47. I've flown in the
safety chase for the XV-15 Tiltrotor, in the aircraft used in MSBLS
checkout, the VMS, the DMS, and the Pax dome, as well as the RAG sims.

Mary

--
Mary Shafer Retired aerospace research engineer

"A MiG at your six is better than no MiG at all."
Anonymous US fighter pilot

[Reed Snellenberger]

Mary Shafer > wrote in
:

>
> <snipping a "WOW!" resume>
>

Mary,

The first thought that came to mind after reading this summary of your
career was of John Lennon's comments at the end of "Get Back".

Like him, I think it's safe to say that you passed the audition... ;-)

--
Reed Snellenberger

[Roger Balettie]

"Mary Shafer" > wrote:
> Mary Shafer Retired aerospace research engineer

<Wimbledon umpire voice> Point, set, and match, Mrs. Shafer. </Wimbledon
umpire voice>

:)
Roger
--
Roger Balettie
former Flight Dynamics Officer
Space Shuttle Mission Control
http://www.balettie.com/

[Jon Berndt]

"Mary Shafer" > wrote in message

> I have over thirty years of flight research and test experience in
>
> ... <list of every aircraft ever built snipped ...>
>

IIRC, you retired recently? Ever feel the urge to write a book?

[Mary Shafer]

On Fri, 25 Jul 2003 19:07:13 -0700, Mary Shafer
> wrote some stuff about her career:

I forgot to mention that I have chaired numerous peer reviews of
official NASA publications, and participated in a number of Flight
Readiness Reviews, both as a discipline expert and as chair.

I have also served as the Project Manager for nearly a dozen projects,
including ATLAS and REVD. I also ran a multi-decade engineer handling
qualities and flight control training program.

Mary

--
Mary Shafer Retired aerospace research engineer

"A MiG at your six is better than no MiG at all."
Anonymous US fighter pilot

[Charleston]

"Mary Shafer" > wrote in message
...
>
> I forgot to mention that I have chaired numerous peer reviews of
> official NASA publications, and participated in a number of Flight
> Readiness Reviews, both as a discipline expert and as chair.

I am thinking you have a type A personality...

> I have also served as the Project Manager for nearly a dozen projects,
> including ATLAS and REVD. I also ran a multi-decade engineer handling
> qualities and flight control training program.

....and that you have a sleeping disorder;-)

To think you asked me a question about air speed?

--

Daniel
Mount Charleston, not Charleston, SC

[Jon Berndt]

"Mary Shafer" > wrote in message
>
> I forgot to mention that I have chaired numerous peer reviews of
> official NASA publications, and participated in a number of Flight
> Readiness Reviews, both as a discipline expert and as chair.
>
> I have also served as the Project Manager for nearly a dozen projects,
> including ATLAS and REVD. I also ran a multi-decade engineer handling
> qualities and flight control training program.

Stop it! I'm getting tired just reading this. Question, are you an avid
coffee drinker? :-)

[Mary Shafer]

On Fri, 25 Jul 2003 22:45:09 -0500, "Jon Berndt" >
wrote:

> "Mary Shafer" > wrote in message
> >
> > I forgot to mention that I have chaired numerous peer reviews of
> > official NASA publications, and participated in a number of Flight
> > Readiness Reviews, both as a discipline expert and as chair.
> >
> > I have also served as the Project Manager for nearly a dozen projects,
> > including ATLAS and REVD. I also ran a multi-decade engineer handling
> > qualities and flight control training program.
>
> Stop it! I'm getting tired just reading this. Question, are you an avid
> coffee drinker? :-)

Hey, I had over 30 years to do it all. It's not like I did everything
in a year or two. You can do a lot if you have enough time.

The reason my career had so much variety is that I'm a flying
qualities engineer. We tend to know a fair amount about everything:
aerodynamics, controls, propulsion, performance, handling qualities,
instrumentation, research techniques, task design, flight profile
optimization, and so on. I'm also quick at picking up on what's
important and I know how to ask the right questions. So I spent a lot
of time putting out brush fires.

For example, my understanding of flight dynamics, batch simulations,
simulation validation techniques, programming in FORTRAN, and using
CalComp plotters meant that I got the job of using the Dryden YAV-8B
simulation to help the guys up at Ames validate their YAV-8B
simulation on the VMS. Because we were in a hurry and had a lot of
check cases, I came up with the idea of plotting overlay plots for
each check case so they only had to lay my plot over their strip chart
to be sure that the responses matched. Otherwise, they'd have had to
compare listings of multiple variables. The overlays took a little
finesse because the batch sim wouldn't allow access to the output in
anything but printed form but I figured a way around that little
problem.

Of course, the research test pilots started cringing when they saw me
because I kept sending listings and rolls of plots up to Ames with
them every time I could. This was before FedEx had been invented, so
I used the F-104s of the "Yellow-Tail Air Force". We got the whole
thing done in about six weeks from when I got the list of flight
conditions.

I'm actually a very laid-back, calm person. Not at all a bundle of
energy, but very good at consensus. What I did came easy to me and I
did my best to make things easy for others, too. I don't drink
coffee, just tea. Maybe that's why I'm so calm.

Mary

--
Mary Shafer Retired aerospace research engineer

"A MiG at your six is better than no MiG at all."
Anonymous US fighter pilot

[ElleninLosAngeles]

> If you hadn't thought to ask the right questions, would you later take
> responsibility, or would you say something along the lines of "It
> wasn't anyone's fault, we just didn't know"? This is what I'm
> currently hearing from NASA management. They are currently unwilling
> to take any responsibility for what's happened.
> I'm afraid this attitude will lead to the culture staying the same.
> After all, if you don't admit any responsibility for the failure, then
> why should you change the way you act in the future? If you feel
> you've done nothing wrong, where is the motivation to change?
> Jeff

I've been thinking about this and I think the 3 in the press
conference would have come across better if they were prepped by a PR
person - maybe they were by a NASA PR person but I think a real pro
out of NYC,etc. would have told them to prepare a positive statement,
admit some guilt but say you are looking forward to the future where
the mistakes will be rectified. I think they should have been prepared
to admit SOMETHING they overlooked/would do differently in hindsight
but instead they seemed to be speaking off-the-cuff and a person's
first instinct is to say "Oh, no, I'm a nice person, I did nothing
wrong." They delved into saying they had no malicious intent in
harming the crew which of course no one thinks they did! I'm not sure
why after all these months they weren't prepared to admit they wished
they'd done things differently....I don't think the CAIB is going to
be happy with some of their quotes.

[Herb Schaltegger]

In article >,
Mary Shafer > wrote:

> On 25 Jul 2003 16:14:41 GMT, (DSCOTT) wrote:
>
> > (jeff findley) wrote in
> > >:
> >
> > (DSCOTT) writes:
> > >> Lady you may not have asked but I would...
> > >
> > >Dave, you're talking to Mary Shafer, not "any lady".
> > >
> > >Jeff
> >
> > I have to admit I don't know her. But likewise I
> > dought she knows of my experience either.
> > But the postings I follwed implied she had only a
> > few months work to get some "certificate" it implied
> > she had no degrees. For that matter I did not mention
> > my degrees. BSEE electrical engineering in fields and waves
> > and a MSEE electrical engineering in control theroy.
> > I am sure she or linda better in many things than me.
> > Especially writting. However I'm sure I know more about
> > advanced calculus or control theory than they especially
> > if they only have a few months training no engineering
> > experience and no degrees.
>
> I have over thirty years of flight research and test experience in
> flying qualities, controls, aerodynamics, hypersonic
> aerothermodynamics, dynamics of flight, pilot-vehicle interfaces,
> computer programming, instrumentation specification, precision task
> design, simulation model definition, simulation verification, and
> other similar topics. Most of my work has been done on
> high-performance aircraft, including the F-15, F-104, F-4, F-8, F-14,
> F-18, F-111, YF-12, SR-71, S-3, DAST, HiMAT, X-15, X-29, X-31, and the
> Orbiter (ALT and orbital). I've also worked on the 747 SCA, PA-30,
> SRV, the lifting bodies, and four in-flight simulators (TIFS, NT-33A,
> GPAS, and VISTA).
>
> I have a BS and MS from UCLA in engineering and post-graduate
> engineering course work from CSU-F. I have taken over 20 CEU courses,
> including digital signal analysis, structural dynamics, aircraft
> accident investigation, FMEA techniques, flight test and flight
> research techniques, COTR training, and other topics.
>
> I've been to the F-18 RAG (FRS) at LeMoore, too. I have worked
> closely with the USAF, USN, USMC, RAF, and GAF.
>
> I have flown in high-performance aircraft, experimental aircraft, and
> other military and civil aircraft, including two variable-stability
> bizjets. I have over ten hours in the right seats of the R4D and
> C-47.
>
> I have been the lead flying qualities engineer on over a dozen flight
> programs. I've been Project Engineer on two projects and Chief
> Engineer on four projects. I was a Test Conductor on three research
> projects.
>
> I have organized two international flying qualities workshops. I was
> General Chair of the '95 AIAA AFM, served on the AFM TC, and was a
> Distinguished Lecturer for two years. I've been a NATO specialist and
> an AGARD lecturer. I have about thirty publications.
>
> I've flown in the F-104, F-4, NT-33A, NF-16D, Sherpa, JetStar,
> Learjets, gliders, Dove, GA aircraft, and Bell 47. I've flown in the
> safety chase for the XV-15 Tiltrotor, in the aircraft used in MSBLS
> checkout, the VMS, the DMS, and the Pax dome, as well as the RAG sims.
>
> Mary

(Dave's snotty post and Mary's extremely impressive c.v. intentionally
not snipped!)

As my kids would say, "Mary, you GO, girl!" ;-)

--
Herb Schaltegger, Esq.
Chief Counsel, Human O-Ring Society
"I was promised flying cars! Where are the flying cars?!"
~ Avery Brooks

[Anthony Frost]

In message >
Mary Shafer > wrote:

> I've been to the F-18 RAG (FRS) at LeMoore, too. I have worked
> closely with the USAF, USN, USMC, RAF, and GAF.

GAF?

I'm wondering if I should worry as I think I worked out the other TLAs
and ETLAs...

Anthony

--
| Weather prediction will never be accurate until we |
| kill all the butterflies |

[David A. Scott]

Herb Schaltegger > wrote in
:

>
> (Dave's snotty post and Mary's extremely impressive c.v. intentionally
> not snipped!)
>
> As my kids would say, "Mary, you GO, girl!" ;-)
>
>


Yes if its true its sounds better than my resume. But she is not Ham
and I still would have tried to get the bottom of the foam problem before
it burned up. I suspect Mary would have too. 30 years is better than 26.
I suspose unless beer is off limits to her like coffee I wouldn't of
minded having a beer with her in the good old days.





David A. Scott

[Dale]

On 27 Jul 2003 02:21:04 GMT, rk > wrote:

>Oh yeah? But how about Microshaft Flight Simulator?

Yeah- I bet she never landed that C-47 on the deck of the
Golden Gate Bridge.... :)

Dale

[Terrence Daniels]

"David Higgins" > wrote in message
...
> I've been reading Mary's posts here for something like
> 15 years. In that time I've never seen any reason to
> ignore her posts -- indeed she's one of the few reasons
> I put up with the crap that's been going on here the
> last few years.

Seconded, though that might not mean much from me - I often contribute to
the crap. I do feel flight-qualified enough to say that D "KILL THE
MANAGEMENT" SCOTT questioning her street cred isn't a legitimate inquiry
worth reading, it's just pretentious heckling from the Usenet Peanut
Gallery.

Mary is a no-BS, honest-to-god Qualified Voice and I always learn something
from her posts.

So, Mary: Thank you.

[Terrence Daniels]

"Mary Shafer" > wrote in message
...

> Oh my god

Trying to find my jaw, it's on the floor here somewhere... And here I
thought I was hot stuff because I beta-tested "Il-2 Sturmovik" ;)

Mary, did you ever get a flight in the SR-71?

[Jan C. Vorbrüggen]

> Having said all that, I can honestly say that I am highly confident that
> there is no way I would have let the Boeing pitches -- particularly the 1/23
> briefing -- go by without *significant* probing, follow-up questions, and
> documented requests for more information. The number of caveats and
> disclaimers is the first clue that questions need to be asked. The "flight
> condition is significantly outside of test database" statement on page 6 of > the 1/23 is *begging* for followup. [...]
> Note that nothing about these analyses or presentations requires specialized
> aerospace knowledge -- anyone with a basic understanding of simulation tools
> and general engineering analysis processes should have been able to ask
> these types of questions.

Just my thoughts when I first saw these slides.

Apart, of course, from the abominable practice of putting too much with
too many indentation levels on a single slide. For me, anything with more
than 3-5 top-level bullets is a reason for rejection.

Jan

[John Maxson]

It's worse than not being too "bright." This self-styled USENET
Van Gogh has great trouble painting an undistorted picture.

--
John Thomas Maxson, Retired Engineer (Aerospace)
Author, The Betrayal of Mission 51-L (www.mission51l.com)

David A. Scott > wrote in message
. 1.4...
> "Terrence Daniels" > wrote in
> thlink.net
> >
> > Seconded, though that might not mean much from me - I often contribute
> > to the crap. I do feel flight-qualified enough to say that D "KILL THE
> > MANAGEMENT" SCOTT questioning her street cred isn't a legitimate
> > inquiry worth reading, it's just pretentious heckling from the Usenet
> > Peanut Gallery.
> >
> >
>
>
> Your not to bright. I have never stated the above statement with
> the KIL word. Someone as ignorant as you may think that. But my frequent
> quote was "FIRE THE MANAGERS" Theres a big difference for most folks.
>
>
> David A. Scott

[Mary Shafer]

On Sat, 26 Jul 2003 13:39:59 +0100, Anthony Frost >
wrote:

> In message >
> Mary Shafer > wrote:
>
> > I've been to the F-18 RAG (FRS) at LeMoore, too. I have worked
> > closely with the USAF, USN, USMC, RAF, and GAF.
>
> GAF?

German Air Force.

> I'm wondering if I should worry as I think I worked out the other TLAs
> and ETLAs...

RAG--Replacement Air Group
FRS--Fleet Replenishment Squadron (pronounced "RAG")
RAF--Royal Air Force
VMS--Vertical Motion Simulator
DMS--Differential Motion Simulator
TIFS--Total In-Flight Simulator
VISTA--Variable-stability In-flight Simulation Training Aircraft
ATLAS--Adaptable Target Lighting Array System
REVD--Research External Vision Device
DAST--Drones for AeroStructural Testing
HiMAT--Highly Maneuverable Aircraft Technology
ALT--Approach and Landing Tests
SCA--Shuttle Carrier Aircraft
SRV--Spin Research Vehicle
GPAS--General Purpose Airborne Simulator
UCLA--University of California, Los Angeles
CSU-F--California State University-Fresno
CEU--Continuing Education Unit
FMEA--Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
COTR--Contracting Officer's Technical Representative
AIAA--American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
AFM--Atmospheric Flight Mechanics
TC--Technical Committee
NATO--North Atlantic Treaty Organization
AGARD--Advisory Group on Aeronautics Research and Development
GA--General Aviation
MSBLS--Microwave Scanning Beam Landing System
NAS--Naval Air Station

Not a TLA or ETLA, but
Pax--NAS Patuxent River

HTH. HAND.

(Hope That Helps. Have A Nice Day.)

Mary

--
Mary Shafer Retired aerospace research engineer

"A MiG at your six is better than no MiG at all."
Anonymous US fighter pilot

[Mary Shafer]

On Mon, 28 Jul 2003 06:52:27 GMT, "Terrence Daniels"
> wrote:

> Mary, did you ever get a flight in the SR-71?

Never even joked about getting one. The most I ever hoped for was to
ride in the back seat of the take-off safety chase and do an airborne
pickup on the SR-71 when it took off.

I was a research engineer, not rated aircrew, and there was no way
they'd ever let me ride in the SR-71. I didn't even have a ghost of a
glimmer of a good reason to do so. The chase, on the other hand, I
could almost justify, with a lot of tap-dancing and a little begging.

Mary

--
Mary Shafer Retired aerospace research engineer

"A MiG at your six is better than no MiG at all."
Anonymous US fighter pilot

[Anthony Frost]

In message >
Mary Shafer > wrote:

> On Sat, 26 Jul 2003 13:39:59 +0100, Anthony Frost >
> wrote:
>
> > In message >
> > Mary Shafer > wrote:
> >
> > > I've been to the F-18 RAG (FRS) at LeMoore, too. I have worked
> > > closely with the USAF, USN, USMC, RAF, and GAF.
> >
> > GAF?
>
> German Air Force.

Ah right. I've never seen it referred to anything other than the
Luftwaffe in that sort of context.

> > I'm wondering if I should worry as I think I worked out the other TLAs
> > and ETLAs...

> Not a TLA or ETLA, but
> Pax--NAS Patuxent River

Except that one. And a couple of others where I got something close...

> HTH. HAND.
>
> (Hope That Helps. Have A Nice Day.)

Indeed. :-)

Anthony

--
| Weather prediction will never be accurate until we |
| kill all the butterflies |

[Mary Shafer]

On Tue, 29 Jul 2003 09:16:37 +0100, Anthony Frost >
wrote:

> In message >
> Mary Shafer > wrote:
>
> > On Sat, 26 Jul 2003 13:39:59 +0100, Anthony Frost >
> > wrote:
> >
> > > In message >
> > > Mary Shafer > wrote:
> > >
> > > > I've been to the F-18 RAG (FRS) at LeMoore, too. I have worked
> > > > closely with the USAF, USN, USMC, RAF, and GAF.
> > >
> > > GAF?
> >
> > German Air Force.
>
> Ah right. I've never seen it referred to anything other than the
> Luftwaffe in that sort of context.

They call it the German Air Force to differentiate it from the WW II
Luftwaffe, I think. I normally call it the Luftwaffe myself, but I
think GAF is actually more correct. I've seen both in reasonably
reliable sources.

Just be glad I didn't use the German initials, not that I know what
they are without more research.

Did I mention the DLR (formerly DFVLR), IFM, ONERA, CSIRO, and ARL?
DERA? NRL? NRC? A&AEE? They're German (2), French, Australian (2),
British, Dutch, Canadian, and British government research and
aerospace organizations, respectively. There's a Swedish one, as well
as a Finnish one, I've worked with, too,

Ah, ha! The emergency generator just shut itself down. The power is
back on. We had an intense thunderstorm that included a bolt of
lightning that hit a transformer somewhere on this side of town.
Naturally, this kind of weather, which Midwesterners wouldn't even
think of as special, is the lead story on the local TV news. We've
even had camera helicopters up here, broadcasting video of drowned
intersections, broken branches, and other storm-related damage.

Mary

--
Mary Shafer Retired aerospace research engineer

"A MiG at your six is better than no MiG at all."
Anonymous US fighter pilot

[Derek Lyons]

Mary Shafer > wrote:
>I'm actually a very laid-back, calm person. Not at all a bundle of
>energy, but very good at consensus. What I did came easy to me and I
>did my best to make things easy for others, too. I don't drink
>coffee, just tea. Maybe that's why I'm so calm.

That would be more from social connations, not caffeine... Tea has
just as much, and frequently more if badly prepared.

D.
--
The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found
at the following URLs:

Text-Only Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html

Enhanced HTML Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html

Corrections, comments, and additions should be
e-mailed to , as well as posted to
sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for
discussion.

[Derek Lyons]

Mary Shafer > wrote:

<resume snipped, posting hijacked to make a meta-comment>

Why is that computer oriented folks think they know everything about
everything?

Owning a PC and Photoshop does not make one an expert at photgrammetry
or photo interpretation. Having an EE degree and some aviation
experience does not make one qualified at making real time decisions
about engineering topics.

What is it about the sci.space.* groups that make new posters think
that nobody but them knows anything about the topic at hand, or that
none of the regular posters have any related experiences?

D.
--
The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found
at the following URLs:

Text-Only Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html

Enhanced HTML Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html

Corrections, comments, and additions should be
e-mailed to , as well as posted to
sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for
discussion.

[Derek Lyons]

Mary Shafer > wrote:

>On Thu, 24 Jul 2003 16:39:40 -0600, OM
><om@our_blessed_lady_mary_of_the_holy_NASA_research _facility.org>
>wrote:
>
>
>> Bottom Line: a diploma or a certificate has the same value as a sheet
>> of toilet paper if there's no practical experience behind it.
>
>IFF it's related to computers.

Yep. OM confuses the relatively benign certification system IT people
use with the real world where certificated people do things that have
real consequences.

>Certification is extremely important in many areas. Component
>soldering, CPR, first responder, HAZMAT, control room staffing, flight
>line driving, inspecting aircraft maintenance and repair, installing
>e-seats and pyros, time card entry, and a whole bunch more stuff I can
>name.

Ordinance handling, weapons handling, SUBSAFE QA inspector, MCC
Supervisor...

>I was certified as a test conductor, roughly the equivalent of CAPCOM.
>I didn't get certified by taking a multiple-choice test after an hour
>lecture. I spent months studying for the certification.

Not unusual for that level of certification. My Lady estimates that
it will 6-8 months to get her CPA certificate, and that's *after* 5
years (equivalent) of college.

>Believe me, that certification meant something. There were times I
>held the pilot's life in my hands.

<nods> The three proudest days of my life. The day my Dolphins were
pinned on, the day I qualified MCC supervisor, and the day My Lady
honored my by saying 'I Do'.

D.
--
The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found
at the following URLs:

Text-Only Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html

Enhanced HTML Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html

Corrections, comments, and additions should be
e-mailed to , as well as posted to
sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for
discussion.

[Derek Lyons]

"Roger Balettie" > wrote:

>"Richard F. Drushel, Ph.D." > wrote:
>> Maybe every 18-24 months there should be a large-scale integrated
>> sim that *is* LOCV (Loss of Crew and Vehicle).
>
>You don't want to advertise it like that, though... if you *know* going in
>that there's no way to save the Kobayashi Maru, what point is there in
>trying hard to *do* so?

Agreed. 99% of the training value in sims and drills isn't in the
initial actions, but in deferred actions and the discussions afterward
that get into the philosophy , the *why* you did what you did and how
such a situation might otherwise be handled or prevented.

Koyabishi Maru is a bad choice of a model. In that scenario you
*know* you are going to die, and your only choices are to die
gallantly or reprogram the simulator. The entire simulation is
designed to bring about a single pre-ordained choice. In the real
world, it's frequently the things you miss that kill you, whether a
small failure or a trend you failed to discern, and scenarios are
designed to illustrate that point.

D.
--
The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found
at the following URLs:

Text-Only Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html

Enhanced HTML Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html

Corrections, comments, and additions should be
e-mailed to , as well as posted to
sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for
discussion.

[Derek Lyons]

"Charleston" > wrote:
>It is impossible to never fail, but you never stop trying to avoid failure!
>Never. What tore me up more than anything else about Columbia, was the
>fatalistic "there is nothing we could have done" attitude that some NASA
>managers took on as their mantra.

The problem is, it's still not apparent that anything in fact *could
have been done*. It's not certain that the damage could have imaged
by off hull resources. It's not certain that the crew themselves
could have found the damage on EVA.

Yes, there were chance missed, but they were chances not certainties.

> As long as the crew lived, hope lived.

Wishful thinking at best.

If I'm at 300 feet with a missile compartment flooding from a two foot
hole, I'm doomed. It may take many minutes to reach crush depth, but
no force in the world will stop the flooding. At about 30% flooding,
the weight of water taken on exceeds the buoyancy we can produce even
with all tanks dry. Somewhere around 40% we can no longer hold
ourselves up using the full throttle and the control surfaces on hard
rise. Somewhere around 50% we lose the ability to even use the
throttle and control surfaces to modulate our descent rate and angle.

There a tiny slim hope that maybe, just maybe, I can reach the escape
trunk and cycle through it in time, but the odds are about the same as
hitting the Powerball. (Which doesn't mean I won't try, but it does
mean I don't disillusion myself to the chances.)

>How sad it is that the engineers at NASA and its contractors were denied
>the chance to become the heroes.

How sad it is that folks continue to make the claim that they 'should
have done something, anything, and it's certain to come out bright' in
the complete absence of any supporting evidence.

Yes, there were chance missed, but they were chances not certainties.

D.
--
The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found
at the following URLs:

Text-Only Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html

Enhanced HTML Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html

Corrections, comments, and additions should be
e-mailed to , as well as posted to
sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for
discussion.

[Stephen Stocker]

In article >, Derek Lyons wrote:
> Mary Shafer > wrote:
>
><resume snipped, posting hijacked to make a meta-comment>
>
> Why is that computer oriented folks think they know everything about
> everything?

> Owning a PC and Photoshop does not make one an expert at photgrammetry
> or photo interpretation. Having an EE degree and some aviation
> experience does not make one qualified at making real time decisions
> about engineering topics.
>
> What is it about the sci.space.* groups that make new posters think
> that nobody but them knows anything about the topic at hand, or that
> none of the regular posters have any related experiences?

It's not just new posters, but you have a good point. And then there
are those of us who know very little of anything shuttle-related, but
are aware that the credentials often mean very little, regardless of
the field.

Thankfully, there are also a few who'll honestly say "We just don't
know" if such is the case. That's a sure way to earn my respect.

Steve