The Final Test: Now That's More Like It!

[Richard Schumacher]

An appallingly huge shower of debris, just like on Columbia, and a hole
that would pass a program manager.

The only mystery remaining is how in God's name anyone could see that
mass of wreckage spalling from the wing during the ascent and think it
was entirely derived from a single 1.67 pound piece of foam.

[Richard Schumacher]

"Doug..." wrote:

> Ever since George Mueller and the early days of American manned space
> flight, there has been a dichotomy between those who believe in
> destructive testing vs. those (like Mueller) who believe that you can
> trust properly designed and executed engineering specs to do the job
> they're designed to do.

The problem is that one must be omnipotent to create truly "proper" specs.
Testing is something prudent mortals do to discover that which they know they
have not anticipated or accounted for.

[Richard Schumacher]

JGM wrote:

> It's also worth pointing out again that all indications are that no amount of
> better engineering on the ground, post-launch, would have saved the orbiter and
> crew, so the idea of these lapses being "actionable" has that bridge to cross.

True enough: they were doomed 30 years ago, when the basic design was frozen.



> In some ways this can be considered a free lesson or warning.

As always, different people will draw different lessons, many of them incomplete or
even essentially wrong.

[starman]

Richard Schumacher wrote:
>
> An appallingly huge shower of debris, just like on Columbia, and a hole
> that would pass a program manager.
>
> The only mystery remaining is how in God's name anyone could see that
> mass of wreckage spalling from the wing during the ascent and think it
> was entirely derived from a single 1.67 pound piece of foam.

It made me wonder why they never did any foam impact testing until
Columbia. (AFAIK- they didn't) What was the basis for believing that the
foam couldn't do any serious damage?


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[Doug...]

In article >, says...
> Richard Schumacher wrote:
> >
> > An appallingly huge shower of debris, just like on Columbia, and a hole
> > that would pass a program manager.
> >
> > The only mystery remaining is how in God's name anyone could see that
> > mass of wreckage spalling from the wing during the ascent and think it
> > was entirely derived from a single 1.67 pound piece of foam.
>
> It made me wonder why they never did any foam impact testing until
> Columbia. (AFAIK- they didn't) What was the basis for believing that the
> foam couldn't do any serious damage?

Ever since George Mueller and the early days of American manned space
flight, there has been a dichotomy between those who believe in
destructive testing vs. those (like Mueller) who believe that you can
trust properly designed and executed engineering specs to do the job
they're designed to do. Many have pointed out that Mueller's concept
probably made it possible for such an envelope-pushing engineering
project as Apollo to be accomplished in its time frame, but that hasn't
stopped the proponents of destructive testing from insisting that their
way is best.

These foam impact tests are what you would call destructive testing --
take the component and subject it to conditions that meet or exceed the
conditions it was designed to withstand. Also, remember that the spec
for the RCC panels assumed that *no* foam would be shed from the ET
during ascent. The impacts that are being tested now are outside of the
original design spec for the RCC panels.

All that said, apparently the Crater program that Boeing used to predict
tile damage from foam impacts mis-estimated the tensile strength of the
RCC -- especially that of RCC panels that have been flown more than 25
times. Crater predicted light to moderate damage to tiles impacted by
the size and weight of foam shed on STS-107, at the angle at which the
foam would have impacted (predictions which seemed to be born out by the
first impact tests). But its predictions of the effect of such a foam
impact on the RCC panels were obviously *not* accurate. Again, this goes
back to the assumptions on which the program's predictions are based.

Now, to see whether or not unflown RCC panels suffer the same amount of
damage as the used RCC panel that broke so spectacularly the other day...
this will tell the tale as to whether or not the RCC's seeming fragility
is a true indication of the material's actual tensile strength, or if
it's a result of repeated heating during entries.

--

It's not the pace of life I mind; | Doug Van Dorn
it's the sudden stop at the end... |

[jeff findley]

Doug... > writes:
>
> All that said, apparently the Crater program that Boeing used to predict
> tile damage from foam impacts mis-estimated the tensile strength of the
> RCC -- especially that of RCC panels that have been flown more than 25
> times. Crater predicted light to moderate damage to tiles impacted by
> the size and weight of foam shed on STS-107, at the angle at which the
> foam would have impacted (predictions which seemed to be born out by the
> first impact tests). But its predictions of the effect of such a foam
> impact on the RCC panels were obviously *not* accurate. Again, this goes
> back to the assumptions on which the program's predictions are based.

As far as I know, Crater said *nothing* about RCC damage. It was
always *assumed* that any impact that the tiles could survive, the RCC
would survive, because it was "stronger" than the tiles. RCC impact
modeling and testing was never done prior to loss of Columbia.

Jeff
--
Remove "no" and "spam" from email address to reply.
If it says "This is not spam!", it's surely a lie.

[Bruce Palmer]

Doug... wrote:
> These foam impact tests are what you would call destructive testing --
> take the component and subject it to conditions that meet or exceed the
> conditions it was designed to withstand. Also, remember that the spec
> for the RCC panels assumed that *no* foam would be shed from the ET
> during ascent. The impacts that are being tested now are outside of the
> original design spec for the RCC panels.

Very true.

> All that said, apparently the Crater program that Boeing used to predict
> tile damage from foam impacts mis-estimated the tensile strength of the
> RCC -- especially that of RCC panels that have been flown more than 25
> times. Crater predicted light to moderate damage to tiles impacted by
....

I wasn't aware that Crater was designed to model *any* aspect of the RCC
panels.

--
bp
Proud Member of the Human O-Ring Society Since 2003

[Richard F. Drushel, Ph.D.]

Doug... > spake unto the ether:

: Ever since George Mueller and the early days of American manned space
: flight, there has been a dichotomy between those who believe in
: destructive testing vs. those (like Mueller) who believe that you can
: trust properly designed and executed engineering specs to do the job
: they're designed to do. Many have pointed out that Mueller's concept
: probably made it possible for such an envelope-pushing engineering
: project as Apollo to be accomplished in its time frame, but that hasn't
: stopped the proponents of destructive testing from insisting that their
: way is best.

Here's an excerpt, part of required readings for my Autonomous
Robotics class at CWRU, that addresses this very issue.

*Rich*

Murray, C., and C.B. Cox (1989). Apollo: The Race to the Moon. New York:
Simon and Schuster. 511 pp.


from Chapter 11, "It sounded reckless"

Engineering is rightly regarded as one of the most pragmatic of professions,
but even engineers have their creeds and dogmas. Thus when Joe Shea [deputy
director of O.M.S.F.] once was asked to adjudicate a Marshall-Houston dispute
over the correct way to do a certain type of soldering, he declined. "That's
not technology," he said of the warring views, "that's theology." Now
George Mueller [second director of O.M.S.F.] was going to propose a plan for
rescuing the Apollo schedule that would horrify Marshall and Houston in equal
measure, for it would violate a taboo.

Looking back at the program as a whole, Shea would see Apollo as the story of
three cultures. The differences among the groups he had in mind went far
beyond just "points of view" or "schools of thought." There were the
Germans from Peenemu”nde, the old N.A.C.A. hands from Langley and Lewis [now
Glenn], and the systems engineers from the I.C.B.M. world, each band with its
own tribal history and folkways and prejudices and dialect.

In the early days of the space program, the Germans and the N.A.C.A. hands
lived together peacefully if suspiciously. True, the Germans had seniority
and the N.A.C.A. people struggled to achieve parity, but they had in common
not only their love of engineering and of things that flew, but also a
tradition of craftsmanship. The Germans and the N.A.C.A. hands were
essentially builders of fine machines.

Mueller, like [Brainerd] Holmes [first director of O.M.S.F.] and Shea, was
part of the third tribe, the invaders from the world of systems engineering,
socialized by the experience of building missile systems and early-warning
radar systems for the Department of Defense. They, too, were craftsmen, but
of a different sort. Their craft was not building hardware, but maintaining
the managerial equipment for huge, highly technical, highly complex tasks.

Another difference that had separated the systems engineers from the Germans
and the N.A.C.A. hands grew out of the disparate circumstances under which
their crafts had evolved. The Germans had grown up alongside the rocketry
they were inventing. There was no such thing as rocket technology when the
young Wernher von Braun teamed up with the young Arthur Rudolph and Walter
Reidel and Bernhard Tessman. They had only embryonic ideas and grand
ambitions. They had to inch their way forward. Failure was their only tool
for making progress. Furthermore, the Germans began at a time when the
equipment for diagnosing failures was still primitive, and telemetry of data
was almost unknown. When rockets failed, they did so spectacularly, in
fireballs, obliterating recording equipment and sensors in their explosions.
Often, the Germans found, you couldn't even be sure what had failed, let
alone why.

One of their reactions to this experience was their fabled conservatism,
giving each part and each system within the rocket a generous margin of extra
strength or capacity. Another reaction was to compartmentalize their testing
and development programs into the smallest possible packages, so that each
new step involved testing just one new item. Each step was repeated many
times before going on to the next. Their procedures were methodical,
Germanic--and successful.

The N.A.C.A. hands grew up in the flight-test business. Unlike the Germans,
the N.A.C.A. engineers had the advantage of working with an already reliable
machine, the airplane. Their chief shaping influence was the fact that human
beings rode in their machines. Failures, however rare in statistical terms,
were tallied in human lives, and so the N.A.C.A. engineers too learned to
proceed on a painfully slow incremental schedule. They wouldn't think of
taxiing the prototype of an untried design out to the field and taking off.
First the pilot would run up the motor, and the engineers would gather test
data to be taken back to the office for analysis; then, another day, the
pilot would taxi the aircraft, and the engineers would look carefully at all
those data; then, on still another day, he would reach near-takeoff speeds;
until finally, cautiously, on a day with perfect weather conditions, the
plane would lift into the air on its first flight. And this would be true
even with a plane that had performed superbly in the wind tunnel, not all
that different from other designs that had been flying safely for years. Out
of their different experiences, the N.A.C.A. hands and the Germans came in
the end to similar points of view on flight testing.

The systems engineers looked upon this philosophical alliance with a certain
disdain. "The systems guys were given a very different chore," as Jim Elms
once put it. "Their chore was, if we have a billion dollars and five years,
what's the best way to get the most pounds of atomic bombs over some place
like Moscow? They had a choice like, 'Let's see, we can build a thousand
missiles with a reliability of seventy-five percent. That means we can get
seven hundred and fifty of those missiles to actually go there for that
billion dollars. Or if we want to make them perfect, we might be able to get
twenty of them over there.' So their goal was to figure out where they
wanted to be on that reliability scale."

When they came to the Apollo Program, the systems engineers accepted that
they had one parameter--the safety of the crew--that was sacrosanct. But the
mentality they brought to the program led them to approach the problem of
safety in different ways than the Germans and the N.A.C.A. hands. Cast out
all taboos, they said, and take a fresh, cold-eyed, analytic look at the
problem, following the implications wherever the data lead. The results led
them to fly in the face of everything that the Germans and the N.A.C.A. hands
believed about flight testing.

The idea came out of experience on the Titan II and Minuteman programs. Shea
had already broached it to Holmes, but Holmes had said no--they could never
sell it to Huntsville and Houston, he thought. George Mueller, who like Shea
had come out of the Air Force ballistic missile program, didn't worry about
whether he could sell it or not. Huntsville and Houston would learn to like
it or else. For this is what his analysis had led him to:

Point number one: They were never going to be able to fly enough Saturn Vs
to be confident of the vehicle because of the number of times it had worked.
So what if they tested the Saturn V six times instead of four? Or eight
times instead of six? Statistically, the extra successes (assuming they were
successes) would be meaningless. All they would have done is to use up two
pieces of hardware that could have been used for real missions. The only way
they were going to man-rate a Saturn V was by having confidence in the
engineering and the ground testing that had gone into it. There was no other
choice.

Point number two: This business of testing one stage of the rocket at a
time, as Marshall always did, didn't accomplish what people thought it did.
You didn't really build brick by brick any more; all that did was to waste
time. Whenever you added a new stage, the ground support equipment was
different, the checkout procedures were different, the countdown was
different, the hardware was different. You had to relearn everything anyhow.

Point number three: The step-by-step approach locked you into an assumption
that you're going to fail. For example, Marshall had scheduled four test
flights of the first stage of the Saturn I. The first stage had worked
perfectly on the first flight, and as Rocco Petrone remembered, even they had
asked themselves, "What the hell are we going to do with the next three?"
Mueller wanted a testing program that put NASA in a position to "take
advantage of success."

Therefore, what Mueller proposed to do was to scrap the plans for incremental
testing of the stages and to condense drastically the testing schedule for
the spacecraft. This was called "all-up" testing--"up" meaning that a
stage is a flight-ready piece of hardware, "all-up" meaning that everything
on the Saturn V would be a real, functioning stage the very first time they
launched it.

....

In later years, von Braun would write good-humoredly about how "George
Mueller visited Marshall and casually introduced us to his philosophy of
'all-up testing.' ... It sounded reckless," von Braun said, but "Mueller's
reasoning was impeccable." Moreover, the leader of the German rocket team
continued, "In retrospect it is clear that without all-up testing the first
manned lunar landing could not have taken place as early as 1969."


*** end excerpt ***

--
Richard F. Drushel, Ph.D. | "Aplysia californica" is your taxonomic
Department of Biology, Slug Division | nomenclature. / A slug, by any other
Case Western Reserve University | name, is still a slug by nature.
Cleveland, Ohio 44106-7080 U.S.A. | -- apologies to Data, "Ode to Spot"

[Doug...]

In article >,
says...
>
> <snip>
>
> I wasn't aware that Crater was designed to model *any* aspect of the RCC
> panels.

Hmmm... I *know* that the foam impact assessment that Boeing generated,
based on the film/video of the foam impact, addressed potential RCC
damage (with the conclusion that any such damage was unlikely to pose a
safety issue). I remember specifically that it included an assessment of
potential RCC damage as well as tile damage. I guess I assumed that
Crater had been used in this aspect of the assessment, as well as the
tile impact aspect.

Then the question becomes, if Crater wasn't used in generating that
portion of Boeing's assessment, upon what evaluation tools was the RCC
part of the assessment based?

--

It's not the pace of life I mind; | Doug Van Dorn
it's the sudden stop at the end... |

[JGM]

Doug... wrote:

>apparently the Crater program that Boeing used to predict
>tile damage from foam impacts mis-estimated the tensile strength of the
>RCC -- especially that of RCC panels that have been flown more than 25
>times. Crater predicted light to moderate damage to tiles impacted by
>the size and weight of foam shed on STS-107, at the angle at which the
>foam would have impacted (predictions which seemed to be born out by the
>first impact tests). But its predictions of the effect of such a foam
>impact on the RCC panels were obviously *not* accurate. Again, this goes
>back to the assumptions on which the program's predictions are based.

The Crater program does not (or was not used in this case to) predict RCC
behavior at all. The "worst case" scenario simulated was based upon foam
impact with a tile area well behind the leading edge. Even then the analysis
team undercut its own findings by citing previous analyses where the program
predicted more damage than actually occurred, and stating that the dataset used
to develop Crater (based on small objects hitting tiles) required huge
extrapolations to simulate the Columbia foam strike.

The actual briefings from the Boeing team on this issue (made while Columbia
was still on-orbit) are at http://www.nasa.gov/columbia/media/index.html (near
the bottom).

There are some significant lessons to be learned from studying these
presentations. The first briefing (
http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/2202main_COL_debris_boeing_030121.pdf ) on 1/21 was
authored by a team of 5 and is titled ". . .Assessment of Debris Impacting
Orbiter Lower Surface in STS-107 Mission". Immediately this title misleads the
viewer, since it implies that the location of the debris strike is known to be
on the lower surface. In fact, analysis of the video indicated the strike was
at the leading edge of the wing and this location for the strike was explitly
called out in the very first mention of the incident (several days earlier) in
the Second Daily Report ( http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/2220main_MER_reports.pdf ).
Despite the misleading title, the 1/21 presentation defines the entire left
wing including the leading edge as part of the Predicted Impact Area and goes
so far as to calculate impact velocity and angle at several places along the
RCC (see chart on page 6 of the presentation). Inexplicably the chart shows a
maximum impact angle of 21 degrees at the inside leading edge of the wing again
despite the video evidence and previous official characterization of the impact
area as the "leading edge". At the time of this presentation the Crater
analysis had not been done but promises (page 8) that they are underway and
will be available the next day.

The next Boeing briefing actually occurs on the 23rd and is authored by a
Boeing team of 4 with *no commonality in personnel to the briefing of the
21st*. This briefing (
http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/2203main_COL_debris_boeing_030123.pdf ) is titled
"Orbiter Assessment of STS-107 Bipod Insulation Ramp Impact". Again note the
assumption of unproven (at the time) information. The first lines of the first
chart explicitly state that there was no information in the Crater database to
allow prediction of effects of foam on RCC. Most of the following information
describes the results of Crater analysis on the TPS. Again the somewhat
alarming predictions of "potential for large TPS damage" are undercut by
reminders that the tool has, in the past, overpredicted damage. The dangerous
pattern here is that the "official tool" is used but then the results are
discounted or minimized, with no understanding of the root cause of previous
discrepancies. Page 8 of this briefing does address RCC strikes but limits
itself to assumptions of strike angles of 25 degrees or less (accepting the
previous Boeing team's assumption of a 21-degree maximum impact angle - from
page 6 of the 1/21 presentation) and limits itself to prediction of "damage
depth". Again these results appear to be extrapolated from a dataset (ice and
RTV impacts) with orders of magnitude difference in density. The conclusion
here (that RCC damage would be limited to the coating) is, in retrospect,
obviously wrong, but it's hard to tell where the error occurred as the cascade
of assumptions (about impact location, angle, and extrapolatability of data)
progressed. Page 10 of this second report has the scary chart showing
predicted results of several cases of possible damage -- the first four
scenarios are shown as resulting in "no issue" while the "results" section for
the final two scenarios (large wing area tiles missing and 2 tiles missing from
landing gear area) are left eerily blank. This is the most dramatic example of
the apparent cultural unwillingness to document a true worst-case scenario.
Two pages later in the "summary and conclusion" the presentation ends on a
confusing note: the bottom line is that "safe return is indicated even with
significant tile damage" but this is "contingent upon" further analysis. A
proper summary would not make such a conclusion with such open contingencies.
Also note that the results of the"further analysis" that the safe return of the
orbiter was contingent upon are conspicuously absent from the record despite
the fact that 6 more days would elapse before de-orbit.

The final Boeing report (
http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/2204main_COL_debris_boeing_030124.pdf ) is by a single
author, one of the team of 5 that did the 1/21 presentation. Again the title
calls out "lower surface". This is mostly a rehash of the 1/21 presentation.
Of interest here is the diagram on page 3 showing the "predicted impact area
derived from film observations and trajectory analysis". This diagram shows
the imact area extending to within a few inches of the leading edge --
precisely the area where the change of impact angle is greatest. As in all the
data in all the Boeing presentation, no margin of error or level of statistical
uncertainty is indicated. Also curious is the inclusion of two versions of the
velocity/angle chart (pages 4 and 5), one identical to the 1/21 chart and one
with significantly increased velocity predictions in the more central areas but
missing velocity predictions nearer to the leading edge. These two seemingly
contradictory charts are presented without comment or explanation.
All in all these presentations are pretty good examples of how *not* to present
critical technical data: no statement of underlying assumptions, no statistical
margins of uncertainty, selective presentation of scenario outcomes,
conclusions presented with significant contingencies outstanding, etc.

JGM

Your account of the Boeing analysis does not describe mere incompetence but
appears to be a good description of actionable negligence on the part of the
Boeing engineers who did the analysis and the management members to whom the
"Reports" were delivered.

"JGM" > wrote in message
...
|
| The Crater program does not (or was not used in this case to) predict
RCC
| behavior at all. The "worst case" scenario simulated was based upon foam
| impact with a tile area well behind the leading edge. Even then the
analysis
| team undercut its own findings by citing previous analyses where the
program
| predicted more damage than actually occurred, and stating that the dataset
used
| to develop Crater (based on small objects hitting tiles) required huge
| extrapolations to simulate the Columbia foam strike.
|
| The actual briefings from the Boeing team on this issue (made while
Columbia
| was still on-orbit) are at http://www.nasa.gov/columbia/media/index.html
(near
| the bottom).
|
| There are some significant lessons to be learned from studying these
| presentations. The first briefing (
| http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/2202main_COL_debris_boeing_030121.pdf ) on 1/21
was
| authored by a team of 5 and is titled ". . .Assessment of Debris Impacting
| Orbiter Lower Surface in STS-107 Mission". Immediately this title
misleads the
| viewer, since it implies that the location of the debris strike is known
to be
| on the lower surface. In fact, analysis of the video indicated the strike
was
| at the leading edge of the wing and this location for the strike was
explitly
| called out in the very first mention of the incident (several days
earlier) in
| the Second Daily Report (
http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/2220main_MER_reports.pdf ).
| Despite the misleading title, the 1/21 presentation defines the entire
left
| wing including the leading edge as part of the Predicted Impact Area and
goes
| so far as to calculate impact velocity and angle at several places along
the
| RCC (see chart on page 6 of the presentation). Inexplicably the chart
shows a
| maximum impact angle of 21 degrees at the inside leading edge of the wing
again
| despite the video evidence and previous official characterization of the
impact
| area as the "leading edge". At the time of this presentation the Crater
| analysis had not been done but promises (page 8) that they are underway
and
| will be available the next day.
|
| The next Boeing briefing actually occurs on the 23rd and is authored by a
| Boeing team of 4 with *no commonality in personnel to the briefing of the
| 21st*. This briefing (
| http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/2203main_COL_debris_boeing_030123.pdf ) is titled
| "Orbiter Assessment of STS-107 Bipod Insulation Ramp Impact". Again note
the
| assumption of unproven (at the time) information. The first lines of the
first
| chart explicitly state that there was no information in the Crater
database to
| allow prediction of effects of foam on RCC. Most of the following
information
| describes the results of Crater analysis on the TPS. Again the somewhat
| alarming predictions of "potential for large TPS damage" are undercut by
| reminders that the tool has, in the past, overpredicted damage. The
dangerous
| pattern here is that the "official tool" is used but then the results are
| discounted or minimized, with no understanding of the root cause of
previous
| discrepancies. Page 8 of this briefing does address RCC strikes but
limits
| itself to assumptions of strike angles of 25 degrees or less (accepting
the
| previous Boeing team's assumption of a 21-degree maximum impact angle -
from
| page 6 of the 1/21 presentation) and limits itself to prediction of
"damage
| depth". Again these results appear to be extrapolated from a dataset (ice
and
| RTV impacts) with orders of magnitude difference in density. The
conclusion
| here (that RCC damage would be limited to the coating) is, in retrospect,
| obviously wrong, but it's hard to tell where the error occurred as the
cascade
| of assumptions (about impact location, angle, and extrapolatability of
data)
| progressed. Page 10 of this second report has the scary chart showing
| predicted results of several cases of possible damage -- the first four
| scenarios are shown as resulting in "no issue" while the "results" section
for
| the final two scenarios (large wing area tiles missing and 2 tiles missing
from
| landing gear area) are left eerily blank. This is the most dramatic
example of
| the apparent cultural unwillingness to document a true worst-case
scenario.
| Two pages later in the "summary and conclusion" the presentation ends on a
| confusing note: the bottom line is that "safe return is indicated even
with
| significant tile damage" but this is "contingent upon" further analysis.
A
| proper summary would not make such a conclusion with such open
contingencies.
| Also note that the results of the"further analysis" that the safe return
of the
| orbiter was contingent upon are conspicuously absent from the record
despite
| the fact that 6 more days would elapse before de-orbit.
|
| The final Boeing report (
| http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/2204main_COL_debris_boeing_030124.pdf ) is by a
single
| author, one of the team of 5 that did the 1/21 presentation. Again the
title
| calls out "lower surface". This is mostly a rehash of the 1/21
presentation.
| Of interest here is the diagram on page 3 showing the "predicted impact
area
| derived from film observations and trajectory analysis". This diagram
shows
| the imact area extending to within a few inches of the leading edge --
| precisely the area where the change of impact angle is greatest. As in
all the
| data in all the Boeing presentation, no margin of error or level of
statistical
| uncertainty is indicated. Also curious is the inclusion of two versions
of the
| velocity/angle chart (pages 4 and 5), one identical to the 1/21 chart and
one
| with significantly increased velocity predictions in the more central
areas but
| missing velocity predictions nearer to the leading edge. These two
seemingly
| contradictory charts are presented without comment or explanation.
| All in all these presentations are pretty good examples of how *not* to
present
| critical technical data: no statement of underlying assumptions, no
statistical
| margins of uncertainty, selective presentation of scenario outcomes,
| conclusions presented with significant contingencies outstanding, etc.
|
| JGM

[JGM]

wrote:

>Your account of the Boeing analysis does not describe mere incompetence but
>appears to be a good description of actionable negligence on the part of the
>Boeing engineers who did the analysis and the management members to whom the
>"Reports" were delivered.

Well, that's easy to say in hindsight, and I urge everyone to read the
material themselves and form their own conclusion. In fairness (and I meant to
add this to my original post), looking at the slides does not tell the whole
story about what might have been added in presentation, what assumptions might
have been challenged and defended, etc. Unfortunately there do not appear to
be publicly available minutes or recordings of the the internal briefings so
the document becomes the record. Reading between the lines one might see a
reasonable, perhaps culture-based focus of time and effort on the solvable
rather than the unsolvable scenarios -- however this team may have taken that
concept too far if they chose not just to not work the Bad Day scenarios but
also not to report thier possible existence.

It's also worth pointing out again that all indications are that no amount of
better engineering on the ground, post-launch, would have saved the orbiter and
crew, so the idea of these lapses being "actionable" has that bridge to cross.
In some ways this can be considered a free lesson or warning.

JGM

If the shuttle had broken up 40 seconds earlier, the debris field would have
been the Dallas-Fort Worth Metroplex with millions of people on the ground
and potentially hundreds if not thousands of casualties--not an unpopulated
East Texas pine forest. The shuttle could have been brought in over water if
necessary--if NASA and Boeing had done their jobs and properly assessed the
potential damage and probable severe hazards of re-entry.

Linda Ham's cancellation of the shuttle imaging requested by the NASA
shuttle engineers was also a big part of the gross negligence committed by
NASA and Boeing. What possible reason could she have had to overrule the
engineers? Surely not because "they didn't go through the proper channels"?
A 16" diameter ( or anything near that size ) hole could have been easily
imaged either by Starfire ground-based telescopes and/or by Air Force
satellites.

I suspect the Congressional Oversight Committees will have some further
thoughts on this fiasco, particularly as more FOIA "leaks" regarding past
shuttle problems keep dribbling out. And, of course, the NASA Administrator
himself is on record in testimony before Congress to the effect that "if we
had known the shuttle was in mortal danger, we would have moved heaven and
earth to attempt a rescue".


| It's also worth pointing out again that all indications are that no amount
of
| better engineering on the ground, post-launch, would have saved the
orbiter and
| crew, so the idea of these lapses being "actionable" has that bridge to
cross.
| In some ways this can be considered a free lesson or warning.
|
| JGM
|

[Hallerb]

>
>> It's also worth pointing out again that all indications are that no amount
>of
>> better engineering on the ground, post-launch, would have saved the orbiter
>and
>> crew, so the idea of these lapses being "actionable" has that bridge to
>cross.

Yes BUT we better be ready if it occurs again.

Example a orbiter makes it to orbit after a major malfunction.. Manuvering
ability is impaired. Unable to reenter or dock at ISS the crew is stranded.

We should be prepared for such bad days

[Lynndel Humphreys]

Several former employees are seeking employment as risk assessment analysis
specialist emphasizing their attention to detail capabilities.


> wrote in message
...
> If the shuttle had broken up 40 seconds earlier, the debris field would
have
> been the Dallas-Fort Worth Metroplex with millions of people on the ground
> and potentially hundreds if not thousands of casualties--not an
unpopulated
> East Texas pine forest. The shuttle could have been brought in over water
if
> necessary--if NASA and Boeing had done their jobs and properly assessed
the
> potential damage and probable severe hazards of re-entry.
>
> Linda Ham's cancellation of the shuttle imaging requested by the NASA
> shuttle engineers was also a big part of the gross negligence committed by
> NASA and Boeing. What possible reason could she have had to overrule the
> engineers? Surely not because "they didn't go through the proper
channels"?
> A 16" diameter ( or anything near that size ) hole could have been easily
> imaged either by Starfire ground-based telescopes and/or by Air Force
> satellites.
>
> I suspect the Congressional Oversight Committees will have some further
> thoughts on this fiasco, particularly as more FOIA "leaks" regarding past
> shuttle problems keep dribbling out. And, of course, the NASA
Administrator
> himself is on record in testimony before Congress to the effect that "if
we
> had known the shuttle was in mortal danger, we would have moved heaven and
> earth to attempt a rescue".
>
>
> | It's also worth pointing out again that all indications are that no
amount
> of
> | better engineering on the ground, post-launch, would have saved the
> orbiter and
> | crew, so the idea of these lapses being "actionable" has that bridge to
> cross.
> | In some ways this can be considered a free lesson or warning.
> |
> | JGM
> |
>
>




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What an interesting reply. What is the basis for your casualty estimate?
Dallas-Fort Worth has a population of over 3,000,000. The East Texas piney
woods, where the bulk of the heavy debris came down, maybe at a stretch
5,000. I don't think "tripling 5,000" quite gets you to 3,000,000. How could
anyone possibly guess how many casualties would have been suffered if the
large debris had rained down on 3,000,000 plus people?

Are you suggesting it is irrelevant where a mortally damaged orbiter is
brought down? If so, I don't think Congress will agree with you.

BTW, I watched the shuttle break up right in front of me through
binoculars--in Dallas.


"Paul F. Dietz" > wrote in message
...
| wrote:
|
| > If the shuttle had broken up 40 seconds earlier, the debris field would
have
| > been the Dallas-Fort Worth Metroplex with millions of people on the
ground
| > and potentially hundreds if not thousands of casualties--not an
unpopulated
| > East Texas pine forest.
|
| This greatly overstates the case. Shifting the debris footprint backward
| could have tripled the number of people under it, but this would have been
| unlikely to have caused even dozens of casualities, let alone hundreds or
| thousands.
|
| Paul
|
|

[Jorge R. Frank]

(JGM) wrote in
:

> All in all these
> presentations are pretty good examples of how *not* to present
> critical technical data: no statement of underlying assumptions, no
> statistical margins of uncertainty, selective presentation of scenario
> outcomes, conclusions presented with significant contingencies
> outstanding, etc.

Edward Tufte also has some insights on these presentations at his website:

<http://www.edwardtufte.com/1932964854/bboard/q-and-a-fetch-
msg?msg_id=0000Rs&topic_id=1&topic=Ask%20E%2eT%2e>

(Watch URL word wrap, if your reader doesn't parse the <> properly.)


--
JRF

Reply-to address spam-proofed - to reply by E-mail,
check "Organization" (I am not assimilated) and
think one step ahead of IBM.

"Jorge R. Frank" > wrote in message
...
| (JGM) wrote in
| :
|
| > All in all these
| > presentations are pretty good examples of how *not* to present
| > critical technical data: no statement of underlying assumptions, no
| > statistical margins of uncertainty, selective presentation of scenario
| > outcomes, conclusions presented with significant contingencies
| > outstanding, etc.
|
| Edward Tufte also has some insights on these presentations at his website:
|
| <http://www.edwardtufte.com/1932964854/bboard/q-and-a-fetch-
| msg?msg_id=0000Rs&topic_id=1&topic=Ask%20E%2eT%2e>
|
| (Watch URL word wrap, if your reader doesn't parse the <> properly.)

Very well done website. Interesting though that Dr Ride seems unaware that
imaging requests were in fact made by senior engineers--and cancelled by
Linda Ham. Has any reason ever been given for this cancellation? If it was a
concern about "proper channels" as some have suggested, that procedural
nonsense could have been easily fixed.

And, of course, by definition Ms Ham had to have been well aware of the
engineers' concerns. Any suggestion that such concerns over the condition of
the orbiter somehow did not get to program management is thus nonsense since
"program management" cancelled the imaging requests.

[Paul F. Dietz]

wrote:

> What an interesting reply. What is the basis for your casualty estimate?

The expected number of casualities should be proportional to the number
of people in the debris zone (assuming the debris distribution is not
too nonuniform.) The heaviest debris was nonuniform, but the heaviest
debris was a small fraction of the total, and affected a very small area
that would be unlikely to hit many people anyway.

Paul

[Herb Schaltegger]

In article >,
> wrote:

>
> BTW, I watched the shuttle break up right in front of me through
> binoculars--in Dallas.
>

BTW, what was the slant-range to the breakup at ~218,000 feet "right in
front of you"?

And, if you're going to be pedantic, calculate the population density
for the Dallas-Ft. Worth metroplex (not just the raw population number)
and overlay the debris footprint of the breakup. Given the number of
pieces more substantial than a couple of tiles and the population
density figures, combined with an overlay of the debris pattern, you'll
see that your worries are about as significant as your "expert" opinions
were regarding the Starfire images some months ago.

--
Herb Schaltegger, Esq.
Chief Counsel, Human O-Ring Society
"I was promised flying cars! Where are the flying cars?!"
~ Avery Brooks

[Doug...]

In article >, says...
> wrote:
>
> > What an interesting reply. What is the basis for your casualty estimate?
>
> The expected number of casualities should be proportional to the number
> of people in the debris zone (assuming the debris distribution is not
> too nonuniform.) The heaviest debris was nonuniform, but the heaviest
> debris was a small fraction of the total, and affected a very small area
> that would be unlikely to hit many people anyway.

And my understanding is that very little of the debris (mainly just the
main engines) actually hit the ground with any remnant speed. They only
recovered what, 20% or so of the vehicle, right? Mostly in pieces a foot
across or less. The rest of the vehicle literally burned up.

Mr. Wallace, you have to understand that smaller, lighter pieces will
achieve a quite low terminal velocity when they get down into the thicker
parts of the atmosphere. A vast majority of the debris was found resting
lightly on grass (or in some cases, asphalt) surfaces, without so much as
denting the ground underneath. I would wager that a majority of the
pieces could have struck people as they landed and inflicted no more than
cuts and bruises. And even with a higher population density, it's not
like pieces were falling every few feet -- the debris was spread out over
such a large area that the odds of a piece hitting someone, even if a
major metropolitan area were in the midst of the footprint, would still
be relatively small.

--

It's not the pace of life I mind; | Doug Van Dorn
it's the sudden stop at the end... |

[Lynndel Humphreys]

If some of those pieces had hit people on the ground, well, it could have
been much much much worse.


"Doug..." > wrote in message
...
> In article >, says...
> > wrote:
> >
> > > What an interesting reply. What is the basis for your casualty
estimate?
> >
> > The expected number of casualities should be proportional to the number
> > of people in the debris zone (assuming the debris distribution is not
> > too nonuniform.) The heaviest debris was nonuniform, but the heaviest
> > debris was a small fraction of the total, and affected a very small area
> > that would be unlikely to hit many people anyway.
>
> And my understanding is that very little of the debris (mainly just the
> main engines) actually hit the ground with any remnant speed. They only
> recovered what, 20% or so of the vehicle, right? Mostly in pieces a foot
> across or less. The rest of the vehicle literally burned up.
>
> Mr. Wallace, you have to understand that smaller, lighter pieces will
> achieve a quite low terminal velocity when they get down into the thicker
> parts of the atmosphere. A vast majority of the debris was found resting
> lightly on grass (or in some cases, asphalt) surfaces, without so much as
> denting the ground underneath. I would wager that a majority of the
> pieces could have struck people as they landed and inflicted no more than
> cuts and bruises. And even with a higher population density, it's not
> like pieces were falling every few feet -- the debris was spread out over
> such a large area that the odds of a piece hitting someone, even if a
> major metropolitan area were in the midst of the footprint, would still
> be relatively small.
>
> --
>
> It's not the pace of life I mind; | Doug Van Dorn
> it's the sudden stop at the end... |




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http://www.newsfeeds.com - The #1 Newsgroup Service in the World!
-----== Over 80,000 Newsgroups - 16 Different Servers! =-----

"Paul F. Dietz" > wrote in message
...
| wrote:
|
| > What an interesting reply. What is the basis for your casualty
estimate?
|
| The expected number of casualities should be proportional to the number
| of people in the debris zone (assuming the debris distribution is not
| too nonuniform.) The heaviest debris was nonuniform, but the heaviest
| debris was a small fraction of the total, and affected a very small area
| that would be unlikely to hit many people anyway.
|
| Paul
|
|

So it is your view that a shuttle breakup debris fall landing on over
3,000,000 plus people concentrated in an densely populated urban area "would
be unlikely to hit many people anyway"? Interesting. And your "many" would
approximate what? 2? 5? 25? 100? 500 ( the quite possible number
concentrated in a relatively small area of a large DFW shopping mall on a
Saturday morning )?

RK can tell you about possible debris ground impact velocities--a human body
with a large wind surface area can approach 180 mph in free fall simply by
tucking in your arms and straightening your legs--I've personally done it. A
relatively small surface area dense metal object would, of course, be going
much, much faster on impact--simple high school physics.

Again, the basic point I made was that ( getting away from picking nits
about exact numbers of casualties which is unknowable )--an uncontrolled
shuttle breakup spraying debris over 3,000,000 people densely concentrated
in an urban area is to avoided at all costs, right?

[LooseChanj]

On or about Thu, 10 Jul 2003 16:49:35 GMT, >
> made the sensational claim that:
> So it is your considered opinion that it would be OK to knowingly allow a
> shuttle to break up and have its debris field over an urban area of
> 3,000,000 people because of a low level of risk to those on the ground? Wow!

You're not too bright are you? You're arguing that a bullet was dodged.
Said bullet not existing in the first place. Bob Haller spews enough
chicken little bull**** around this group, there's really no need for any
more thankyoueversoverymuch.
--
This is a siggy | To E-mail, do note | This space is for rent
It's properly formatted | who you mean to reply-to | Inquire within if you
No person, none, care | and it will reach me | Would like your ad here

[Diane Wilson]

In article >,
says...
> What an interesting reply. What is the basis for your casualty estimate?
> Dallas-Fort Worth has a population of over 3,000,000. The East Texas piney
> woods, where the bulk of the heavy debris came down, maybe at a stretch

Did you look at a map?

The debris would come down along the flight path, no matter where the
breakup occurred. The flight path was south of Dallas-Ft. Worth.
Under no circumstances would there have been significant debris fall
in large population centers.

Diane

I get it--NASA planned the shuttle breakup so it would happen exactly 42
seconds before reaching the Dallas area, right? Unbelievable! What is it
about the words "random" or "out of control" do you not understand?
"Sensational claim"--are you 10 years old?


"LooseChanj" > wrote in message news:u6hPa.63621
...


| On or about Thu, 10 Jul 2003 16:49:35 GMT, >
| > made the sensational claim that:
| > So it is your considered opinion that it would be OK to knowingly allow
a
| > shuttle to break up and have its debris field over an urban area of
| > 3,000,000 people because of a low level of risk to those on the ground?
Wow!


| You're not too bright are you? You're arguing that a bullet was dodged.
| Said bullet not existing in the first place. Bob Haller spews enough
| chicken little bull**** around this group, there's really no need for any
| more thankyoueversoverymuch.
|

[Herb Schaltegger]

In article >,
> wrote:

> (snipped for brevity)

You are SUCH a troll. To think, we thought we'd run you off like you've
been run off all the amateur astronomy ng's. My time-expiring killfile
policy gains another exception.

<PLONK!>

--
Herb Schaltegger, Esq.
Chief Counsel, Human O-Ring Society
"I was promised flying cars! Where are the flying cars?!"
~ Avery Brooks

No amateur astronomy groups have ever run me off--I currently participate in
about 6. I responded to your snotty post showing your continuing ignorance
regarding Starfire telescope imaging capabilities with a damaged shuttle in
orbit. Still don't think it could have resolved a 6" to 16" diameter hole in
the RCC, do you? The CAIB understands my point full well. A grownup would
have simply ignored my post if he found it so upsetting. "Plonk"??--are you
for real??

Your debate techniques resemble those of a 10 year old throwing a temper
tantrum. God help your legal clients! A Texas Court would have you removed
from the Courtroom if you pulled a similar stunt in a trial. I assume by
your response I struck a pretty sensitive nerve.

Live with it--NASA and Boeing screwed up big time! Read the CAIB Report when
it finally comes out. What a joke you are--a "Human O-Ring" all right Mr.
Herb, Esq.


"Herb Schaltegger" > wrote in message
...
| In article >,
| > wrote:
|
| > (snipped for brevity)
|
| You are SUCH a troll. To think, we thought we'd run you off like you've
| been run off all the amateur astronomy ng's. My time-expiring killfile
| policy gains another exception.
|
| <PLONK!>
|
| --
| Herb Schaltegger, Esq.
| Chief Counsel, Human O-Ring Society
| "I was promised flying cars! Where are the flying cars?!"
| ~ Avery Brooks
|

[Bruce Palmer]

wrote:
> What an interesting reply. What is the basis for your casualty estimate?
> Dallas-Fort Worth has a population of over 3,000,000. The East Texas piney
> woods, where the bulk of the heavy debris came down, maybe at a stretch
> 5,000. I don't think "tripling 5,000" quite gets you to 3,000,000. How could
> anyone possibly guess how many casualties would have been suffered if the
> large debris had rained down on 3,000,000 plus people?
>
> Are you suggesting it is irrelevant where a mortally damaged orbiter is
> brought down? If so, I don't think Congress will agree with you.
>
> BTW, I watched the shuttle break up right in front of me through
> binoculars--in Dallas.

"how many casualties would have been suffered if the large debris had
rained down on 3,000,000 plus people?"

You tell us, genius. You appear to have done it a couple of posts ago,
but now you say nobody could possibly guess the number.

First, assume the flight path actually went over the Metroplex. It
didn't, but let's assume it did. Now assume the people are more or less
spread out uniformly over a roughly circular area encompassing DFW and
centered on the airport. Take slice a few miles wide through the heart
of this area and calculate, proportionally, how many people are in that
area. Then calculate the population density in that swath and figure
out how much of that is empty space. The space inside your head doesn't
count.

Oh, I forgot ... you're from Dallas. You can't do any of that. Suck
down a few more cow-****^H^H^H^H shiner bocks in Deep Ellum and get back
to us. Hint: The probability of _someone_ getting injured by falling
debris would have been higher, no doubt, but the absolute probability
would still be quite small.

--
bp
Proud Member of the Human O-Ring Society Since 2003

[Bruce Palmer]

LooseChanj wrote:

> On or about Thu, 10 Jul 2003 16:49:35 GMT, >
> > made the sensational claim that:
>
>> So it is your considered opinion that it would be OK to knowingly allow a
>>shuttle to break up and have its debris field over an urban area of
>>3,000,000 people because of a low level of risk to those on the ground? Wow!
>
>
> You're not too bright are you?

He said he was from Dallas, didn't he? QED

Actually I think Shiner Bock is an OK beer--they certainly sell a lot of it
in Houston. I anxiously await the Congressional Oversight Committee Hearing
wherein the NASA Administrator testifies it is no problem to bring a
crippled shuttle in over a large urban area because "the absolute
probability of being hit would still be quite small".

All air traffic--I am also a pilot--approaching one of the largest airports
in the world--DFW--from the South that Sat morning could have also plowed
right through the debris shower that showed up so nicely on East Texas
radar. Probability of being struck by debris--who knows? No problem, right?


"Bruce Palmer" > wrote in message
t...

|| First, assume the flight path actually went over the Metroplex. It
| didn't, but let's assume it did. Now assume the people are more or less
| spread out uniformly over a roughly circular area encompassing DFW and
| centered on the airport. Take slice a few miles wide through the heart
| of this area and calculate, proportionally, how many people are in that
| area. Then calculate the population density in that swath and figure
| out how much of that is empty space. The space inside your head doesn't
| count.
|
| Oh, I forgot ... you're from Dallas. You can't do any of that. Suck
| down a few more cow-****^H^H^H^H shiner bocks in Deep Ellum and get back
| to us. Hint: The probability of _someone_ getting injured by falling
| debris would have been higher, no doubt, but the absolute probability
| would still be quite small.
|
| --
| bp
| Proud Member of the Human O-Ring Society Since 2003
|

This is almost funny. Never been to Dallas have we?


"Bruce Palmer" > wrote in message
t...
| LooseChanj wrote:
|
| > On or about Thu, 10 Jul 2003 16:49:35 GMT, >
| > > made the sensational claim that:
| >
| >> So it is your considered opinion that it would be OK to knowingly allow
a
| >>shuttle to break up and have its debris field over an urban area of
| >>3,000,000 people because of a low level of risk to those on the ground?
Wow!
| >
| >
| > You're not too bright are you?
|
| He said he was from Dallas, didn't he? QED
|
|

[Jorge R. Frank]

Bruce Palmer > wrote in
t:

> wrote:
>> What an interesting reply. What is the basis for your casualty
>> estimate? Dallas-Fort Worth has a population of over 3,000,000. The
>> East Texas piney woods, where the bulk of the heavy debris came down,
>> maybe at a stretch 5,000.

The four largest towns in and near the debris field (Corsicana, Palestine,
Nacogdoches, and Lufkin) have a combined population of over 100,000.

The main debris field (where all the heavy debris fell) was about 250 miles
long and ten miles wide. Almost all debris that hit outside this field was
light.

Prior to its breakup, Columbia's groundtrack crossed I-35W just south of
Alvarado (27 miles south of downtown Ft. Worth), and crossed I-35E a bit
further south of Waxahachie (27 miles south of downtown Dallas).

So, had Columbia broken up sooner, the main debris field would still have
completely missed D/FW, though the southern suburbs (Everman, Duncanville,
De Soto, Lancaster, etc.) would have gotten sprinkled with lighter debris
such as tile fragments. Towns like Cleburne, Alvarado, Waxahachie, and
Corsicana would have borne the brunt of the heavier debris. These four
towns have a combined population of about 75,000. So human casualties would
have been possible, but still unlikely.

--
JRF

Reply-to address spam-proofed - to reply by E-mail,
check "Organization" (I am not assimilated) and
think one step ahead of IBM.

[Mike Speegle]

In news:Jorge R. Frank > typed:
> Bruce Palmer > wrote in
> t:
>
> > wrote:
> > > What an interesting reply. What is the basis for your casualty
> > > estimate? Dallas-Fort Worth has a population of over 3,000,000.
> > > The East Texas piney woods, where the bulk of the heavy debris
> > > came down, maybe at a stretch 5,000.
>
> The four largest towns in and near the debris field (Corsicana,
> Palestine, Nacogdoches, and Lufkin) have a combined population of
> over 100,000.
>
> The main debris field (where all the heavy debris fell) was about 250
> miles long and ten miles wide. Almost all debris that hit outside
> this field was light.
>
> Prior to its breakup, Columbia's groundtrack crossed I-35W just south
> of Alvarado (27 miles south of downtown Ft. Worth), and crossed I-35E
> a bit further south of Waxahachie (27 miles south of downtown Dallas).
>
> So, had Columbia broken up sooner, the main debris field would still
> have completely missed D/FW, though the southern suburbs (Everman,
> Duncanville, De Soto, Lancaster, etc.) would have gotten sprinkled
> with lighter debris such as tile fragments. Towns like Cleburne,
> Alvarado, Waxahachie, and Corsicana would have borne the brunt of the
> heavier debris. These four towns have a combined population of about
> 75,000. So human casualties would have been possible, but still
> unlikely.

Yeahbut, what do facts have to do with hysteria??? ;-)
--
Mike
__________________________________________________ ______
"Colorado Ski Country, USA" Come often, Ski hard,
Spend *lots* of money, Then leave as quickly as you can.

[Jon Berndt]

"Jorge R. Frank" > wrote in message

> The main debris field (where all the heavy debris fell) was about 250
miles
> long and ten miles wide. Almost all debris that hit outside this field was
> light.

Even if Columbia had disintegrated so the worst concentration of debris was
smack inside the centroid of the DFW population (or Houston), what would be
the statistical probabilities of being hit? If you model the population
center as a circle 20 miles in diameter, and place 3 million people in
there, distributing them evenly, a quick calculation (could be wrong -
someone check this) places them in a grid standing about 108 feet apart.
That's about 2400 people per square mile. Granted some of those people might
be in concentrated groups, but there are also areas that are a lot less
dense - and many people would be in buildings and protected from all but the
largest pieces. *Property* damage might not be insignificant, but the
presumed doesn't stop people from building neighborhoods off the end of
runways even in light of the historical record of occasional plane crashes
into neighborhoods. Now, the 3 million people is a gross approximation, but
the point is that even if you change the numbers around the "people density"
is still pretty small. Am I missing something in this argument?

Nevertheless, I think there might end up being an attempt where possible to
avoid heavily populated areas.

Jon

[Charleston]

> wrote in message
...
>
> "Paul F. Dietz" > wrote in message
> ...
> | wrote:

> Again, the basic point I made was that ( getting away from picking nits
> about exact numbers of casualties which is unknowable )--an uncontrolled
> shuttle breakup spraying debris over 3,000,000 people densely concentrated
> in an urban area is to avoided at all costs, right?

Yes?

Daniel

[Paul F. Dietz]

Doug... wrote:

> And my understanding is that very little of the debris (mainly just the
> main engines) actually hit the ground with any remnant speed. They only
> recovered what, 20% or so of the vehicle, right? Mostly in pieces a foot
> across or less. The rest of the vehicle literally burned up.

Quite a bit more than the engines hit the ground at high speed (canonical
example: that steel rod that embedded itself in furniture in a dentist's office
in Nagodoches.) Being hit by something like that would ruin your whole day.

Paul

[Paul F. Dietz]

wrote:

> So it is your view that a shuttle breakup debris fall landing on over
> 3,000,000 plus people concentrated in an densely populated urban area "would
> be unlikely to hit many people anyway"? Interesting.

I said the *heaviest* parts, junior. Do try reading for comprehension.

Paul

[Dosco Jones]

I have. I spent a month there one weekend. He's right.

Dosco


> wrote in message
...
> This is almost funny. Never been to Dallas have we?
>
>
> "Bruce Palmer" > wrote in message
> t...
> | LooseChanj wrote:
> |
> | > On or about Thu, 10 Jul 2003 16:49:35 GMT, >
> | > > made the sensational claim that:
> | >
> | >> So it is your considered opinion that it would be OK to knowingly
allow
> a
> | >>shuttle to break up and have its debris field over an urban area of
> | >>3,000,000 people because of a low level of risk to those on the
ground?
> Wow!
> | >
> | >
> | > You're not too bright are you?
> |
> | He said he was from Dallas, didn't he? QED
> |
> |
>
>
>

[James Steven York]

On 11 Jul 2003 00:27:27 GMT, "Jorge R. Frank" >
wrote:

>Corsicana would have borne the brunt of the heavier debris. These four
>towns have a combined population of about 75,000. So human casualties would
>have been possible, but still unlikely.

It's a useful exercise for people to look at any space or aerial
photograph of Earth and note how much of what you see is rock, water,
vegetation, and how much appears to be the tops of people's heads.

Make it easier. How much appears to be roads or the roofs of
buildings where people might likely be? I know that isn't fair, most
of those things are too small to be seen except in the most detailed
photographs. But that tells you something about the odds of random
space debris actually hitting somebody.

Even in a populated area, it's possible to drop a lot of stuff (small
enough not to do area damage through kinetic energy or to collapse
buildings) and miss hurting anyone. Of course, one good ball bearing
landing on a person could kill them, but the odds of an unguided
object hitting a human being are slim.

[Greg D. Moore \(Strider\)]

"Jon Berndt" > wrote in message
...
>
> Even if Columbia had disintegrated so the worst concentration of debris
was
> smack inside the centroid of the DFW population (or Houston), what would
be
> the statistical probabilities of being hit? If you model the population
> center as a circle 20 miles in diameter, and place 3 million people in
> there, distributing them evenly, a quick calculation (could be wrong -
> someone check this) places them in a grid standing about 108 feet apart.
> That's about 2400 people per square mile. Granted some of those people
might
> be in concentrated groups, but there are also areas that are a lot less
> dense - and many people would be in buildings and protected from all but
the
> largest pieces. *Property* damage might not be insignificant, but the
> presumed doesn't stop people from building neighborhoods off the end of
> runways even in light of the historical record of occasional plane crashes
> into neighborhoods. Now, the 3 million people is a gross approximation,
but
> the point is that even if you change the numbers around the "people
density"
> is still pretty small. Am I missing something in this argument?

Nope, I think you have it about right.

I'd hazard a guess that the flight that went down in the Jamaica section of
Queens (do I have that right) dumped far more hardware in a far more
concentrated area with a far larger amount of burning fuel and killed a
small number of folks on the ground.

In any case event, I can't think of a plane crash in a densely populated
area that killed many folks on the ground.


>
> Nevertheless, I think there might end up being an attempt where possible
to
> avoid heavily populated areas.
>
> Jon
>
>

[Scott M. Kozel]

"Greg D. Moore \(Strider\)" > wrote:
>
> I'd hazard a guess that the flight that went down in the Jamaica section of
> Queens (do I have that right) dumped far more hardware in a far more
> concentrated area with a far larger amount of burning fuel and killed a
> small number of folks on the ground.
>
> In any case event, I can't think of a plane crash in a densely populated
> area that killed many folks on the ground.

Over 2,600 killed in the WTC on 911, and 125 in the Pentagon.

A plane crash in South America killed about 80 at a stadium, about 15
years ago.

--
Scott M. Kozel Highway and Transportation History Websites
Virginia/Maryland/Washington, D.C. http://www.roadstothefuture.com
Philadelphia and Delaware Valley http://www.pennways.com

[Charleston]

"Scott M. Kozel" > wrote in message
...
> "Greg D. Moore \(Strider\)" > wrote:
> >
> > I'd hazard a guess that the flight that went down in the Jamaica section
of
> > Queens (do I have that right) dumped far more hardware in a far more
> > concentrated area with a far larger amount of burning fuel and killed a
> > small number of folks on the ground.
> >
> > In any case event, I can't think of a plane crash in a densely populated
> > area that killed many folks on the ground.
>
> Over 2,600 killed in the WTC on 911, and 125 in the Pentagon.
>
February 1st was a Saturday, IIRC. Day of week, time of day, and flight
path (to a minor degree) are all variables NASA can use in the future to
reduce the odds of human endangerment and property damage during reentry. I
guess the question I have is what are the ISS principal reentry overflight
areas since what happened is now in the past.

Daniel

[Jorge R. Frank]

"Charleston" > wrote in
news:%JqPa.1085$zy.581@fed1read06:

> I guess the question I have is what are the ISS
> principal reentry overflight areas since what happened is now in the
> past.

There are two, descending and ascending. The descending profile crosses
the west coast near Seattle and overflies the central US toward Florida. I
would guess that profile won't be used any more. The ascending profile
crosses Central America near the Yucatan, then Cuba, toward Florida.


--
JRF

Reply-to address spam-proofed - to reply by E-mail,
check "Organization" (I am not assimilated) and
think one step ahead of IBM.

[Doug...]

In article >, jsb@hal-
pc.dot.org says...
> "Jorge R. Frank" > wrote in message
>
> > The main debris field (where all the heavy debris fell) was about 250
> miles
> > long and ten miles wide. Almost all debris that hit outside this field was
> > light.
>
> Even if Columbia had disintegrated so the worst concentration of debris was
> smack inside the centroid of the DFW population (or Houston), what would be
> the statistical probabilities of being hit? If you model the population
> center as a circle 20 miles in diameter, and place 3 million people in
> there, distributing them evenly, a quick calculation (could be wrong -
> someone check this) places them in a grid standing about 108 feet apart.
> That's about 2400 people per square mile. Granted some of those people might
> be in concentrated groups, but there are also areas that are a lot less
> dense - and many people would be in buildings and protected from all but the
> largest pieces.
>
> <snip rest of well-done post>

This is one of the points I've tried to make -- where people are
concentrated into a city, they're also predominantly indoors or are
protected otherwise (in cars and such) from directly being struck by
falling debris. They're also fairly easy to inform about civil defense
issues (sirens, television and radio bulletins, etc.). The word would be
out as the first of the debris fell that you'd be better off indoors, and
that would decrease even more the number of people in danger of being
struck directly.

As I've said, there were *very* few pieces that impacted with both a lot
of mass and a lot of speed. I think the remnants of the main engines
were the only items recovered that could have really damaged buildings
had they fallen into a city. Everything else landed fairly lightly, as
can be seen easily in the images of the debris as it was discovered on
the ground.

So, truly, the danger of physical injury would have been not tremendously
larger had the debris footprint included a major city. The biggest
danger, aside from the main engines, would have been leaking propellant
tanks and such -- the toxic spills. A few of those did occur out in the
countryside, and had a nitrazine tank impacted and spilled in a housing
complex, you could have seen some injuries from that. But, again, there
were relatively few such toxic debris pieces that survived to the ground,
compared to the many thousands of pieces a foot or smaller in largest
dimension.

--

It's not the pace of life I mind; | Doug Van Dorn
it's the sudden stop at the end... |

You are a hoot--a legend in your own mind! And incapable of anything other
than getting off topic and picking nits to show how "smart" you are. I
figure you are either an insecure academic or a blue collar worker--which is
it?

Should a damaged shuttle be brought in over heavily populated areas? A
simple yes or no will suffice.

"Paul F. Dietz" > wrote in message
...
| wrote:
|
| > So it is your view that a shuttle breakup debris fall landing on over
| > 3,000,000 plus people concentrated in an densely populated urban area
"would
| > be unlikely to hit many people anyway"? Interesting.
|
| I said the *heaviest* parts, junior. Do try reading for comprehension.
|
| Paul
|

Visit Dallas sometime--20 miles out of downtown, you are still in the
suburbs.


"Jon Berndt" > wrote in message
...
| > "Jon Berndt" > wrote in message
| > ...
| > >
| > > Even if Columbia had disintegrated so the worst concentration of
debris
| was
| > > smack inside the centroid of the DFW population (or Houston), what
would
| be
| > > the statistical probabilities of being hit? If you model the
population
| > > center as a circle 20 miles in diameter, and place 3 million people in
|
| For the record, I meant 20 mile *radius*, and my calcs were based on that.
|
|
|
|

Naah--most in this group are like NASA program management--lets just keep
this whole foam damage thing quiet, cross our fingers and play the odds that
nothing will happen. OOPS!

"Scott M. Kozel" > wrote in message
...
| "Greg D. Moore \(Strider\)" > wrote:
| >
| > I'd hazard a guess that the flight that went down in the Jamaica section
of
| > Queens (do I have that right) dumped far more hardware in a far more
| > concentrated area with a far larger amount of burning fuel and killed a
| > small number of folks on the ground.
| >
| > In any case event, I can't think of a plane crash in a densely populated
| > area that killed many folks on the ground.
|
| Over 2,600 killed in the WTC on 911, and 125 in the Pentagon.
|
| A plane crash in South America killed about 80 at a stadium, about 15
| years ago.
|
| --
| Scott M. Kozel Highway and Transportation History Websites
| Virginia/Maryland/Washington, D.C. http://www.roadstothefuture.com
| Philadelphia and Delaware Valley http://www.pennways.com

Jon-

Let me try to make it real simple since my point seems to have eluded most.
Do you bring a damaged shuttle in over large urban areas, yes or no?
Dissembling about damage probabilities and population density statistics is
a debate technique that most law students get over in their first year of
school. When you have a hostile witness who sets up "straw men" in answer to
a rather simple question in a courtroom, you can have some real fun with
him. Ask Herb, Esq.

BTW, have you ever flown a commercial airliner through a shuttle "debris
shower"? Could be an interesting exercise. And, of course, the odds are that
you could probably get away with it but if you don't??

Regards, Andy

"Jon Berndt" > wrote in message
...
| > wrote in message news:m2zPa.339
|
| > Visit Dallas sometime--20 miles out of downtown, you are still in the
| > suburbs.
|
| I've been there - beautiful city - but of course I wasn't taking
| measurements. Maybe you've provided this already, but how would you
"model"
| the city for a rough statistical analysis? Would you include the suburbs?
| Or, would you consider that many of those in the suburbs would be working
in
| the city? How many people live in the city AND suburbs? I suspect - as I
| mentioned - that changing the numbers around won't grossly affect the end
| point I was trying to make. If you have some figures in mind for a model
of
| the city (diameter and enclosed population) I'd be interested to hear
them.
|
| Regards,
|
| Jon
|
|

[Charleston]

"Jon Berndt" > wrote in message
...
> > wrote in message news:m2zPa.339
>
> > Visit Dallas sometime--20 miles out of downtown, you are still in the
> > suburbs.
>
> I've been there - beautiful city -...

Either you were deprived as a child or you live in Texas ;-)

Daniel

[Charleston]

> wrote in message
y.com...
> Jon-
>
> Let me try to make it real simple since my point seems to have eluded
most.
> Do you bring a damaged shuttle in over large urban areas, yes or no?
> Dissembling about damage probabilities and population density statistics
is
> a debate technique that most law students get over in their first year of
> school. When you have a hostile witness who sets up "straw men" in answer
to
> a rather simple question in a courtroom, you can have some real fun with
> him. Ask Herb, Esq.
>
> BTW, have you ever flown a commercial airliner through a shuttle "debris
> shower"? Could be an interesting exercise. And, of course, the odds are
that
> you could probably get away with it but if you don't??

You explain to the public that landing at Edwards AFB has its own set of
problems and it costs more? Jorge pointed out that ISS landings would
probably be coming in from the south now. I pointed out some of the
variables NASA does have control over. Maybe there are others.

Daniel

Daniel

[Lynndel Humphreys]

conversation mode on --real time all others
please skip to bottom to reference conversation

ISPs please forgive extra bandwidth

net breaking in 5 4 3 2 1

You might also consider that on a working day many would be inside protected
from much of the debris. However, the data recorder would have a killer
object.




> > Visit Dallas sometime--20 miles out of downtown, you are still in the
> > suburbs.
>
> I've been there - beautiful city - but of course I wasn't taking
> measurements. Maybe you've provided this already, but how would you
"model"
> the city for a rough statistical analysis? Would you include the suburbs?
> Or, would you consider that many of those in the suburbs would be working
in
> the city? How many people live in the city AND suburbs? I suspect - as I
> mentioned - that changing the numbers around won't grossly affect the end
> point I was trying to make. If you have some figures in mind for a model
of
> the city (diameter and enclosed population) I'd be interested to hear
them.




-----= Posted via Newsfeeds.Com, Uncensored Usenet News =-----
http://www.newsfeeds.com - The #1 Newsgroup Service in the World!
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[Jon Berndt]

Andy wrote:

> Let me try to make it real simple since my point seems to have eluded
most.
> Do you bring a damaged shuttle in over large urban areas, yes or no?
> Dissembling about damage probabilities and population density statistics
is
> a debate technique that most law students get over in their first year of
> school. When you have a hostile witness who sets up "straw men" in answer
to
> a rather simple question in a courtroom, you can have some real fun with
> him. Ask Herb, Esq.

It's a valid question. When it is possible to avoid large urban areas,
sure - they should be avoided. As part of mission planning, perhaps there
it is a good idea to make the best effort at avoiding overflight. But your
point is being addressed by statistics for a reason - it's not a ploy.
Everything in life involves a calculated risk. I brought up the example of
building neighborhoods right under the approach to major airfields, even in
light of the non-zero (proven) risk of residing there. That's an accepted,
calculated risk.

It probably won't always be possible to avoid all large urban population
centers in returning shuttles to earth - perhaps it is in fact NOT possible
to design an entry flightpath that avoids all of them. Again, prevention is
going to be the best "cure". I wouldn't lose any sleep if the shuttle were
retargeted to overfly Houston on every flight in the future.

Then again, I used to live *directly* under the approach to Houston Hobby
airport.

Jon

[Jon Berndt]

"Charleston" > wrote in message news:6tzPa.1158

> "Jon Berndt" > wrote in message
> ...
> > > wrote in message news:m2zPa.339
> >
> > > Visit Dallas sometime--20 miles out of downtown, you are still in the
> > > suburbs.
> >
> > I've been there - beautiful city -...
>
> Either you were deprived as a child or you live in Texas ;-)
>
> Daniel

:-) You know the answer to that one - though IMHO it doesn't hold a candle
to the Twin Cities.

Jon

[Doug...]

In article >, jsb@hal-
pc.dot.org says...
> "Charleston" > wrote in message news:6tzPa.1158
>
> > "Jon Berndt" > wrote in message
> > ...
> > > > wrote in message news:m2zPa.339
> > >
> > > > Visit Dallas sometime--20 miles out of downtown, you are still in the
> > > > suburbs.
> > >
> > > I've been there - beautiful city -...
> >
> > Either you were deprived as a child or you live in Texas ;-)
> >
> > Daniel
>
> :-) You know the answer to that one - though IMHO it doesn't hold a candle
> to the Twin Cities.

I've visited Dallas-Ft. Worth and I live in Minneapolis-St. Paul. I
would heartily agree that, while the DFW area is OK (especially for
Texas, which tends to be miles and miles of not much more than miles and
miles), Mpls-St. Paul is a much nicer, more aesthetically pleasing,
culturally interesting, comfortable place to live. Even in the winter.

--

It's not the pace of life I mind; | Doug Van Dorn
it's the sudden stop at the end... |

"Jon Berndt" > wrote in message
...
| Andy wrote:
|
| > Let me try to make it real simple since my point seems to have eluded
| most.
| > Do you bring a damaged shuttle in over large urban areas, yes or no?
| > Dissembling about damage probabilities and population density statistics
| is
| > a debate technique that most law students get over in their first year
of
| > school. When you have a hostile witness who sets up "straw men" in
answer
| to
| > a rather simple question in a courtroom, you can have some real fun with
| > him. Ask Herb, Esq.
|
| It's a valid question. When it is possible to avoid large urban areas,
| sure - they should be avoided. As part of mission planning, perhaps there
| it is a good idea to make the best effort at avoiding overflight. But
your
| point is being addressed by statistics for a reason - it's not a ploy.
| Everything in life involves a calculated risk. I brought up the example
of
| building neighborhoods right under the approach to major airfields, even
in
| light of the non-zero (proven) risk of residing there. That's an accepted,
| calculated risk.
|
| It probably won't always be possible to avoid all large urban population
| centers in returning shuttles to earth - perhaps it is in fact NOT
possible
| to design an entry flightpath that avoids all of them. Again, prevention
is
| going to be the best "cure". I wouldn't lose any sleep if the shuttle were
| retargeted to overfly Houston on every flight in the future.
|
| Then again, I used to live *directly* under the approach to Houston Hobby
| airport.
|
| Jon

Jon-

Your responses are civil so I will try to treat them with respect. I'm
apparently still not making my point clear. My comments were directed
specifically at the very poor judgment involved in bringing the *damaged*
shuttle in very close to Dallas and the South approach to DFW airport on Feb
1st, not landing shuttles generally.

And I do understand calculated risk odds having engaged in skydiving,
flying, scuba, etc--all of which have made it impossible for me to get
reasonably priced life insurance. Do I think I am taking some calculated
risks? Betting my life on the premise that there will be no major equipment
malfunctions? Of course, but they are largely--if not totally--controllable.
OTOH, I would not skydive, fly or scuba with equipment I had good reason to
believe was defective. Would you? And I have a nephew who is a Captain with
Air Tran with normal rates for life insurance. Statistically, airline flying
is less dangerous than driving on I-10 in Houston.

If airliners crashed every 50 flights, the public would not get near them,
nor would I. Even line military jets would be grounded if they had a crash
every 50 flights. The shuttle is inherently very dangerous and should not be
deorbited over population centers which I understand may now be NASA's
position as well. Would I go on an orbital ride tomorrow, however? You
bet--its called "assumption of risk" but the general public has made no such
agreement. And I'll bet the liability astronaut waiver would be an
interesting document. In the typical skydive drop zone waiver you sign for a
ride to altitude or to rent equipment you acknowledge that *you may die*,
frequently in red highlighted letters.

Andy

[Richard Schumacher]

wrote:

> What an interesting reply. What is the basis for your casualty estimate?
> Dallas-Fort Worth has a population of over 3,000,000. The East Texas piney
> woods, where the bulk of the heavy debris came down, maybe at a stretch
> 5,000. I don't think "tripling 5,000" quite gets you to 3,000,000. How could
> anyone possibly guess how many casualties would have been suffered if the
> large debris had rained down on 3,000,000 plus people?

No need to guess at all. Calculate it by taking the area that was actually
struck by something violently enough to have caused death and multiply that by
the population density of Dallas/Fort Worth. In very round numbers, 100 square
meters times 3 million people/300 square kilometers = 1 fatality.

[Jon Berndt]

Andy wrote:

> Your responses are civil so I will try to treat them with respect. I'm
> apparently still not making my point clear. My comments were directed
> specifically at the very poor judgment involved in bringing the *damaged*
> shuttle in very close to Dallas and the South approach to DFW airport on
Feb
> 1st, not landing shuttles generally.

I see! Well, if they had *known* the shuttle was damaged I believe they
would surely have brought Columbia down at Edwards. Of course, if they had
thought she was damaged, this would have (hopefully) kicked off a whole
series of contingency actions aimed at saving the crew and ship. In this
case the fault was not in bringing her back in a flight path near populated
areas. Once they had decided to bring her down they had convinced
themselves (at least those in positions of making the "big" decisions) that
she was flyable. If there is a potential of flying back a damaged vehicle in
the future, one would expect a return flight path to avoid potential harm to
those on the ground - and one which also gives the best chances to the crew.

Jon

[dave schneider]

> wrote in with
[...]
>
> Your responses are civil so I will try to treat them with respect. I'm
> apparently still not making my point clear. My comments were directed
> specifically at the very poor judgment involved in bringing the *damaged*
> shuttle in very close to Dallas and the South approach to DFW airport on Feb
> 1st, not landing shuttles generally.

But the people making landing calculations were given to understand
that this would be a pretty much nominal reentry and so there was no
motivation to change the flight path.

[...]
> If airliners crashed every 50 flights, the public would not get near them,
> nor would I. Even line military jets would be grounded if they had a crash
> every 50 flights. The shuttle is inherently very dangerous and should not be
> deorbited over population centers which I understand may now be NASA's
> position as well.

At that time the estimates of the loss frequency was not as low as
"every 50 flights"; some estimates were as still as high "every 450".
Indeed, even now we have estimate for l-bar ("ellbar"), but nothing
useful for sigma-l, so we have no way of knowing if we should expect
the next loss in 49 flights, 75, or 25.

/dps

[Greg D. Moore \(Strider\)]

"Scott M. Kozel" > wrote in message
...
> "Greg D. Moore \(Strider\)" > wrote:
> >
> > I'd hazard a guess that the flight that went down in the Jamaica section
of
> > Queens (do I have that right) dumped far more hardware in a far more
> > concentrated area with a far larger amount of burning fuel and killed a
> > small number of folks on the ground.
> >
> > In any case event, I can't think of a plane crash in a densely populated
> > area that killed many folks on the ground.
>
> Over 2,600 killed in the WTC on 911, and 125 in the Pentagon.

Scott, that's disingenuous and you know it. The World Trade Centers and the
Pentagon were purposely targeted.

Big difference.


>
> A plane crash in South America killed about 80 at a stadium, about 15
> years ago.

Right. And compare that to what other posters were saying about Columbia
coming down over Dallas. Not to dismiss 80 deaths, but that's a far cry
from the thousands one poster was claiming.


>
> --
> Scott M. Kozel Highway and Transportation History Websites
> Virginia/Maryland/Washington, D.C. http://www.roadstothefuture.com
> Philadelphia and Delaware Valley http://www.pennways.com

[Greg D. Moore \(Strider\)]

> wrote in message
.. .
>
>
> Your responses are civil so I will try to treat them with respect. I'm
> apparently still not making my point clear.

Your point is clear. Just most aren't agreeing with it.


>My comments were directed
> specifically at the very poor judgment involved in bringing the *damaged*
> shuttle in very close to Dallas and the South approach to DFW airport on
Feb
> 1st, not landing shuttles generally.

Keep in mind that at the time there was no indication that the shuttle WAS
damaged.

Had NASA known, perhaps they would have changed the flight profile. But
they didn't know.

[Paul F. Dietz]

wrote:

> You are a hoot--a legend in your own mind! And incapable of anything other
> than getting off topic and picking nits to show how "smart" you are. I
> figure you are either an insecure academic or a blue collar worker--which is
> it?

Wrong again. You're really good at that.

Come back when you learn to think well enough to say anything worth
listening to.

Paul

[Scott M. Kozel]

"Greg D. Moore \(Strider\)" > wrote:
>
> "Scott M. Kozel" > wrote:
> > "Greg D. Moore \(Strider\)" > wrote:
> >
> > > In any case event, I can't think of a plane crash in a densely populated
> > > area that killed many folks on the ground.
> >
> > Over 2,600 killed in the WTC on 911, and 125 in the Pentagon.
>
> Scott, that's disingenuous and you know it.

You made an incorrect statement and I called you on it. Qualify it in
the future and you'll be ok.

> The World Trade Centers and the Pentagon were purposely targeted.

But they were still "plane crashes", and it shows what a "plane crash"
can do.

> Big difference.
>
> > A plane crash in South America killed about 80 at a stadium, about 15
> > years ago.
>
> Right. And compare that to what other posters were saying about Columbia
> coming down over Dallas. Not to dismiss 80 deaths, but that's a far cry
> from the thousands one poster was claiming.

[John Thomason]

"Scott M. Kozel" > wrote in message >...
> "Greg D. Moore \(Strider\)" > wrote:
> >
> > "Scott M. Kozel" > wrote:
> > > "Greg D. Moore \(Strider\)" > wrote:
> > >
> > > > In any case event, I can't think of a plane crash in a densely populated
> > > > area that killed many folks on the ground.
> > >
> > > Over 2,600 killed in the WTC on 911, and 125 in the Pentagon.
> >
> > Scott, that's disingenuous and you know it.
>
> You made an incorrect statement and I called you on it. Qualify it in
> the future and you'll be ok.

You're absolutely right, Scott. And don't forget all the bombs that
were dropped from aircraft over cities during the last 7 or 8 decades.
After all, those pieces of metal were attached to the airplane before
they fell and killed all those people.

Dufus. You knew exactly what he meant. No qualification required.

[OM]

On 14 Jul 2003 11:32:50 -0700, (John Thomason) wrote:

>Dufus. You knew exactly what he meant. No qualification required.

....On the other hand, he's dealing with Greg Moore, who's tenacity for
being a dolt has been self-demonstrated on more than one occasion.


OM

--

"No ******* ever won a war by dying for | http://www.io.com/~o_m
his country. He won it by making the other | Sergeant-At-Arms
poor dumb ******* die for his country." | Human O-Ring Society

- General George S. Patton, Jr

[Scott M. Kozel]

(John Thomason) wrote:
>
> "Scott M. Kozel" > wrote:
> > "Greg D. Moore \(Strider\)" > wrote:
> > > "Scott M. Kozel" > wrote:
> > > > "Greg D. Moore \(Strider\)" > wrote:
> > > >
> > > > > In any case event, I can't think of a plane crash in a densely populated
> > > > > area that killed many folks on the ground.
> > > >
> > > > Over 2,600 killed in the WTC on 911, and 125 in the Pentagon.
> > >
> > > Scott, that's disingenuous and you know it.
> >
> > You made an incorrect statement and I called you on it. Qualify it in
> > the future and you'll be ok.
>
> You're absolutely right, Scott. And don't forget all the bombs that
> were dropped from aircraft over cities during the last 7 or 8 decades.
> After all, those pieces of metal were attached to the airplane before
> they fell and killed all those people.
>
> Dufus. You knew exactly what he meant. No qualification required.

Dufus. Bombs contain high explosives, and they are not airplanes. The
911 crashes were actual airplane crashes into a densely populated area,
even if they were intentional, and they were not carrying bombs.

Besides, my original reply to him also said --

"A plane crash in South America killed about 80 at a stadium, about 15
years ago".

That was an accidental crash.

--
Scott M. Kozel Highway and Transportation History Websites
Virginia/Maryland/Washington, D.C. http://www.roadstothefuture.com
Philadelphia and Delaware Valley http://www.pennways.com

[Greg D. Moore \(Strider\)]

"Scott M. Kozel" > wrote in message
...
>
> Besides, my original reply to him also said --
>
> "A plane crash in South America killed about 80 at a stadium, about 15
> years ago".
>
> That was an accidental crash.

And one that was far more germane to the original point. Meant to thank you
for that one. Wasn't aware of it.


>
> --
> Scott M. Kozel Highway and Transportation History Websites
> Virginia/Maryland/Washington, D.C. http://www.roadstothefuture.com
> Philadelphia and Delaware Valley http://www.pennways.com