Examine hull before re-entry, a new standard procedure?

[Ross C. Bubba Nicholson]

For a few hundred dollars, inexpensive tiny TV cameras viewable on any
nearby PC can fly attached to the exterior of the shuttle. Flown into
orbit they could be used to examine the hull's integrity. Launches do
not encounter conditions which would disable electronic cameras
(unlike re-entries). They are so inexpensive that multiple cameras
(20 or 30) could be deployed prior to re-entry and a computer
composite composed from their images (most of which would not have the
shuttle in them) for careful analysis. Encountering no air
resistance, cameras would accompany the shuttle until it changed its
velocity vector. This would allow plenty of time to examine the hull
for launch or other damage without exposing crews to routein
spacewalks. A passive system, you could "flush them down the toilet"
and out into space using them where they would be recaptured by the
atmosphere, thus posing no danger to subsequent missions.

[HOST Comp JimS]

>inexpensive tiny TV cameras... can fly attached
>to the exterior of the shuttle....to examine the
>hull's integrity...

I don't think you could get a good view of the underside of
the shuttle from cameras that are mounted directly to the
surface, as they'd be viewing the surface at almost a right
angle. They would have to be held several feet away on a
boom of some sort to get a good view.

Plus, I don't think NASA would look favorably on the idea of
external cameras that would detach during reentry, because
of the possibility of them damaging the tiles, either at the
moment of separation, or if they tumbled in the airstream
and impacted on the shuttle.

A better approach might be to modify the shuttle arm so that
a camera on it could examine the wings and underside of
the shuttle. And if the camera's on the arm, you've got
the additional advantage that it can be repositioned at will to
get the best possible view of a trouble spot.

Jim

[Jorge R. Frank]

(Ross C. Bubba Nicholson) wrote in
m:

> For a few hundred dollars, inexpensive tiny TV cameras viewable on any
> nearby PC can fly attached to the exterior of the shuttle.

Inexpensive TV cameras would be highly unlikely to have sufficient
resolution to meet the shuttle program's "critical damage thresholds",
which are as low as 0.25 in. for the wing leading edge lower surface.

> Flown into
> orbit they could be used to examine the hull's integrity. Launches do
> not encounter conditions which would disable electronic cameras
> (unlike re-entries).

The "ET cam" carried on STS-112 was fogged over by the SRB separation
motors two minutes after liftoff, so your system would have to find a way
to cope with that.

> They are so inexpensive that multiple cameras
> (20 or 30) could be deployed prior to re-entry and a computer
> composite composed from their images (most of which would not have the
> shuttle in them) for careful analysis.

Waiting until prior to re-entry is not wise. By then, consumable levels are
too low to allow much flexibility in scheduling repair EVAs, or powering
down to stretch consumables for a rescue.

In an ascent abort scenario, how do you plan to deploy the cameras to
prevent them from becoming a debris hazard?

Current planning for underside TV camera coverage (by EVA or free-flyers)
is encountering problems with blockage by the orbiter structure, a problem
that would be multiplied with a large number of cameras.

> Encountering no air
> resistance, cameras would accompany the shuttle until it changed its
> velocity vector. This would allow plenty of time to examine the hull
> for launch or other damage without exposing crews to routein
> spacewalks.

If the cameras are completely passive, even the slightest tipoff rates
during deployment will result in them slowly tumbling, and only getting
intermittent views of the orbiter. Unless the ballistic coefficients are
carefully matched, differential drag will fairly quickly carry them from
the vicinity of the orbiter. And the orbiter "changes its velocity vector"
almost continuously; the RCS thrusters that it uses for attitude control
are cross-coupled into translation.

> A passive system, you could "flush them down the toilet"
> and out into space using them where they would be recaptured by the
> atmosphere, thus posing no danger to subsequent missions.

They would remain in orbit for at least some amount of time, and form a
space debris hazard. Again, not wise.

Now, here is what the space shuttle program is *probably* going to do for
vehicle inspection, at least for near-term ISS flights:

On flight day 2, the shuttle RMS (which will now be carried on all flights)
will inspect the crew compartment, OMS pods, vertical stabilizer, the upper
leading edge of both wings except the outboard-most five panels, and the
lower leading edge of the left wing except the outboard-most eight panels.

On flight day 3, during approach to ISS, the orbiter will perform a slow
pitch maneuver at a range of 600 ft below the station, to allow the station
crew to photograph the orbiter through the lab window. A DCS-760 with a 400
mm lens will be used to photograph the "acreage" tiles, while a DCS-760
with a 400 mm lens and a 2x doubler will be used to photograph the landing
gear doors, ET umbilical doors, and elevon coves. An HD video camera may be
added as well.

Post-docking, some time on flight days 3-5, the station RMS will inspect
the nose cap, and any areas missed during the pitch maneuver except the
right main landing gear door, ET doors, or elevon coves.

Inspection options for the right lower leading edge and wingtips are under
consideration, such as boom extensions for the RMS/SSRMS. Should these not
be ready for return-to-flight, EVA inspection might be required.

This plan accomplishes inspection early enough to provide lots of options
for repair EVAs, and consumable stretch for rescue missions.

--
JRF

Reply-to address spam-proofed - to reply by E-mail,
check "Organization" (I am not assimilated) and
think one step ahead of IBM.

[HOST Comp JimS]

I said:
>>A better approach might be to modify the shuttle arm
>>so that a camera on it could examine the wings and
>>underside of the shuttle...

Herb replied:
>And if you'd been reading along at home for more
>than a few days, this is exactly what those with
>the most inside information have been saying...

Herb, I'm not sure if your comment was directed at me,
or at the person who posted the original question. If it
was directed at me, I certainly am aware that this idea
has been discussed previously. I wasn't trying to imply
that it was a new idea.

Jim

[Bruce Treffinger]

http://www.space.com/businesstechnology/technology/nasa_robots_030209.html

"... One system, the AERCam-SPRINT has already proven its robotic right
stuff. It flew
on STS-87 in 1997."

So, you add an antenna that deploys from the canister over the side of
the orbiter. Why are we making this so complicated?

"Jorge R. Frank" wrote:

>
> Current planning for underside TV camera coverage (by EVA or free-flyers)
> is encountering problems with blockage by the orbiter structure, a problem
> that would be multiplied with a large number of cameras.
>

--
The Rule of Abi-Bar-Shim (Project Mgr. - Great Pyramid):

"At some point it becomes necessary to behead all the architects and
begin construction."

eof

[Brian Thorn]

On Tue, 8 Jul 2003 20:41:34 GMT, Bruce Treffinger
> wrote:

>http://www.space.com/businesstechnology/technology/nasa_robots_030209.html
>
>"... One system, the AERCam-SPRINT has already proven its robotic right
>stuff. It flew
> on STS-87 in 1997."
>
>So, you add an antenna that deploys from the canister over the side of
>the orbiter. Why are we making this so complicated?

The antenna could itself damage the Orbiter's TPS. A better idea is an
antenna mounted on the end of the RMS.

Brian

[Terrell Miller]

"Ross C. Bubba Nicholson" > wrote in message
om...

> We do not know that Columbia was disabled at
> launch, it could have happened in space.

I think it's safe to say now that, by far, teh most likely cause fo the
accident was the foamstrike.

> Free-flying video camera robots can meet all these objections. First,
> how about a lens cap, an anti-static spray, - a defogger or just
> deploy more cameras?

just make sure that all those cameras are safely mounted (gotta test
everything thoroughly) so *they* don't fall off and impact the orbiter with
evcen more force than the foam they are monitoring.

> Now, an escape pod in the shuttle might be a good idea, too, eh?

only if you don't need to carry any cargo. BTW...*what* escape pod? Gotta
design one basically from scratch, take a decade. We goona ground the
shuttle fleet that long?

> Flying the shuttle, crew could eject into the pod and let the shuttle
> land itself a la Buran. It would extend the lifespan of the shuttle
> fleet if descents can not be man-rated, which they certainly cannot be
> without complete inspections.

what makes you think an unmanned descent profile would be any more likely to
preserve the orbiter than a manned profile? Unmanned pulls *more* G and heat
loads, not less...

> Repairs can be effected in orbit.

sure, just roll down the window and look for the nearest Home Depot :(

--
Terrell Miller


"We pay for love, but the hate comes free"
-Gordon Sumner

[G EddieA95]

>> We do not know that Columbia was disabled at
>> launch, it could have happened in space.
>
>I think it's safe to say now that, by far, teh most likely cause fo the
>accident was the foamstrike.
>

If a future shuttle were struck by spacejunk just large enough to endanger the
TPS, would the crew even know of the impact? Should sensors of some kind be
introduced for that kind of an emergency?

[G EddieA95]

>escape pod in the shuttle might be a good idea, too, eh?
>
>only if you don't need to carry any cargo. BTW...*what* escape pod? Gotta
>design one basically from scratch,

Escape pods were probably never doable. AIUI, every aircraft that had them was
*designed* to use them. Has any aircraft ever been retrofitted with pods that
then functioned successfully?

>you think an unmanned descent profile would be any more likely to
>preserve the orbiter than a manned profile? Unmanned pulls *more* G and heat
>loads,

.....not to mention there would be a gaping hole in the shuttle's nose where the
lifepods had been. The orbiter would become unrecoverable, even by remote
piloting.

[Terrell Miller]

"Jorge R. Frank" > wrote in message
...

> No, it's not. If the expendable cameras can't communicate with the
orbiter,
> they're useless. NASA is going to have to solve the underside comm problem
> for EVA repair,

....which is probably a very KISS-able fix, just put an off-the-shelf
transponder package into something that can be mounted to RMS during the
EVA. It's not a question of difficulty, just that it wasn't there for
STS107.

> > Sure, but Columbia didn't approach ISS, did they? Oops.
>
> Most future shuttle missions will go to ISS. There are only two non-ISS
> flights on the manifest for the remainder of the shuttle program, both to
> the Hubble Space Telescope. They are far enough in the future that near-
> term attention is concentrated on an inspection/repair solution for ISS
> flights. A standalone solution can come later.

but in reality will probably keep getting shelved, then forgotten. NASA will
just ignore the risk on the non-ISS flights.


> > Now, an escape pod in the shuttle might be a good idea, too, eh?
> > Flying the shuttle, crew could eject into the pod and let the shuttle
> > land itself a la Buran.
>
> Buran had auto-land capability, but did not have escape pods.
>
> > It would extend the lifespan of the shuttle
> > fleet if descents can not be man-rated,
>
> No, it would not. There are numerous failure modes during entry that
> require crew intervention, up to and including manual flying, for the
> vehicle to survive.

not to mention that the gear deploy is manual, and designing an auto system
adds another crit-1 level of complexity to the current design.

--
Terrell Miller


"We pay for love, but the hate comes free"
-Gordon Sumner

[Ross C. Bubba Nicholson]

(HOST Comp JimS) wrote in message >...
> >inexpensive tiny TV cameras... can fly attached
> >to the exterior of the shuttle....to examine the
> >hull's integrity...
>
> I don't think you could get a good view of the underside of
> the shuttle from cameras that are mounted directly to the
> surface, as they'd be viewing the surface at almost a right
> angle. They would have to be held several feet away on a
> boom of some sort to get a good view.

hmmm. Nasa engineer?

> Plus, I don't think NASA would look favorably on the idea of
> external cameras that would detach during reentry, because
> of the possibility of them damaging the tiles, either at the
> moment of separation, or if they tumbled in the airstream
> and impacted on the shuttle.

Then dump/launch them when where needed.

> A better approach might be to modify the shuttle arm so that
> a camera on it could examine the wings and underside of
> the shuttle. And if the camera's on the arm, you've got
> the additional advantage that it can be repositioned at will to
> get the best possible view of a trouble spot.

RMS is a complex mechanical disaster waiting to happen.

> Jim

[Ross C. Bubba Nicholson]

Herb Schaltegger > wrote in message >...
> In article >,
> (HOST Comp JimS) wrote:
>
> > A better approach might be to modify the shuttle arm so that
> > a camera on it could examine the wings and underside of
> > the shuttle. And if the camera's on the arm, you've got
> > the additional advantage that it can be repositioned at will to
> > get the best possible view of a trouble spot.
>
> And if you'd been reading along at home for more than a few days, this
> is exactly what those with the most inside information have been saying
> is the leading plan for the last month or two. Google this group for
> the terms "RMS", "tile", "repair" and "inspection" and the threads
> should pop right up. Posts by Jorge Frank in these threads are very
> instructive.

If this is the "leading plan" then we are in a pot hole of trouble.
Think also that breaching the cargo bay doors will be needed for
routein RMS inspections, with all the past losses and extra risks and
"pollution" of the immediate environment distorting inspection
capability. Using JPL's help for a passive or near passive cheap fix
means greater astronaut safety and superior sensing. Climb down off
your EMS horse and ask them for a quick favor.

[Mike Speegle]

In news:Ross C. Bubba Nicholson > typed:
> Herb Schaltegger > wrote in message
> >...
> > In article >,
> > (HOST Comp JimS) wrote:
> >
> > > A better approach might be to modify the shuttle arm so that
> > > a camera on it could examine the wings and underside of
> > > the shuttle. And if the camera's on the arm, you've got
> > > the additional advantage that it can be repositioned at will to
> > > get the best possible view of a trouble spot.
> >
> > And if you'd been reading along at home for more than a few days,
> > this
> > is exactly what those with the most inside information have been
> > saying
> > is the leading plan for the last month or two. Google this group
> > for
> > the terms "RMS", "tile", "repair" and "inspection" and the threads
> > should pop right up. Posts by Jorge Frank in these threads are
> > very
> > instructive.
>
> If this is the "leading plan" then we are in a pot hole of trouble.
> Think also that breaching the cargo bay doors will be needed for
> routein RMS inspections, with all the past losses and extra risks and
> "pollution" of the immediate environment distorting inspection
> capability. Using JPL's help for a passive or near passive cheap fix
> means greater astronaut safety and superior sensing. Climb down off
> your EMS horse and ask them for a quick favor.

??? Breaching the cargo bay doors is done *every* flight,
regardless (if by breaching you mean opening). They don't open, you
come back quickly.
--
Mike
__________________________________________________ ______
"Colorado Ski Country, USA" Come often, Ski hard,
Spend *lots* of money, Then leave as quickly as you can.

[Ross C. Bubba Nicholson]

Brian Thorn > wrote in message >...
> On Tue, 8 Jul 2003 20:41:34 GMT, Bruce Treffinger
> > wrote:
>
> >http://www.space.com/businesstechnology/technology/nasa_robots_030209.html
> >
> >"... One system, the AERCam-SPRINT has already proven its robotic right
> >stuff. It flew
> > on STS-87 in 1997."
> >
> >So, you add an antenna that deploys from the canister over the side of
> >the orbiter. Why are we making this so complicated?
>
> The antenna could itself damage the Orbiter's TPS. A better idea is an
> antenna mounted on the end of the RMS.
>
> Brian

Or just launch redundant systems, one far enough away from the shuttle
to act as an active re-transmission link, a satellite's satellite, if
you will.

[G EddieA95]

> Terrorists may have shot Columbia down anytime from
>ascent to re-entry. With an Israeli astronaut on board, it was a
>tempting, and easy, target, since one puncture meant doom.

Great conspiracy theory, but nope. To shoot down the shuttle in orbit requires
the equivalent of an ICBM. Satellites, as well as NASA tracking stations,
would have seen such an attack; no terror organization has such rockets, while
for a country to do it would be an act of war; and it certainly didn't happen
on the way up or down, as the missile would have been fired from US territory.

[Chuck Stewart]

On Mon, 14 Jul 2003 01:10:35 +0000, Mike Speegle wrote:

> In news:Ross C. Bubba Nicholson > typed:

>> The RMS is just as likely to damage the Orbiter's TPS, if we're going
>> to open up and deploy the RMS for this, we could just use telephone
>> cable and tether the dang thing.

> The RMS has programmed in limits to prevent that. Do you think
> using the RMS is inherently dangerous?

I was beginning to wonder if "Ross" was just the latest troll to
land in this group, or if he just doesn't know much about shuttle
operations... or both.

His ignorance is clearly shown in his responses and his apparent
assumption that he already knows the answers... when it is quite
obvious he doesn't know much on this subject.

If he wants to _learn_ the answers he can start by reading the FAQ:

http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html

--
Chuck Stewart
"Anime-style catgirls: Threat? Menace? Or just studying algebra?"

[Herb Schaltegger]

In article >,
(Ross C. Bubba Nicholson) wrote:

> RMS is a complex mechanical disaster waiting to happen.

Over a hundred flights and HOW many times has RMS failed?

Troll . . .

--
Herb Schaltegger, Esq.
Chief Counsel, Human O-Ring Society
"I was promised flying cars! Where are the flying cars?!"
~ Avery Brooks

[Herb Schaltegger]

In article >,
(Ross C. Bubba Nicholson) wrote:

> Are you telling me that re-contact with the shuttle would be
> problematic when they are moving at the same velocity?

The foam was moving at the same velocity as the rest of the stack when
it came off the bipod ramp, too. It didn't take much time/distance for
it to reach a delta-V of ~750 fps, did it?

--
Herb Schaltegger, Esq.
Chief Counsel, Human O-Ring Society
"I was promised flying cars! Where are the flying cars?!"
~ Avery Brooks

[Jorge R. Frank]

(Ross C. Bubba Nicholson) wrote in
om:

> "Jorge R. Frank" > wrote in message
> >...
>> (Ross C. Bubba Nicholson) wrote in
>> om:
>>
>> > "Jorge R. Frank" > wrote in message
>> > >...
>> >> (Ross C. Bubba Nicholson) wrote in
>> >> m:
>> >>

>> However, a camera passively deployed at a velocity sufficient to
>> ensure no re-contact with the orbiter
>
> Are you telling me that re-contact with the shuttle would be
> problematic when they are moving at the same velocity?

Re-contact is always problematic and should be avoided.

> will not remain close enough to achieve that
>> resolution for long. You also get no depth resolution, which is also
>> critical.
>
> Another trivial objection. An ISS Inspector need be carried up once
> and left in space (if maneuverable) to inspect follow-on shuttle
> flights, the extra RMS bulk would permanently diminish capacity and
> waste fuel repeatedly.

The RMS will be carried on all future shuttle flights anyway for EVA
repair, so you might as well use it for inspection.

> The RMS inspection solutions include a lidar for depth
>> measurement. It can give precise depth measurements because the RMS
>> is fixed to the orbiter; therefore, the position of the lidar
>> relative to the surface being scanned is well-known.
>
> Recognizing areas of the surface poses no problem for the free-flying
> sensor, either.

Incorrect. You *still* don't get depth measurement.

> You don't get that with a passively
>> deployed camera, and adding an expendable lidar to each camera is
>> cost- prohibitive.
>
> The Russians have an ISS Inspector that is free-floating,
> self-lighting, maneuverable, etc. We could use that at or near the
> ISS.

They tested it once at Mir in 1997; it didn't work.

>> With RMS inspection, it is also possible to schedule the inspection
>> to optimize lighting for each surface being scanned. This is
>> important because the contrast of the damage can be extremely low.
>> With passively deployed cameras, this becomes more complex. Remember
>> the old engineering axiom: Keep It Simple, Stupid.
>
> Flash bulbs are simple, reliable, repeatable, AVAILABLE.

They also provide only straight-on lighting, which is exactly what you
*don't* want; you want oblique lighting to create shadows. Same reason the
Apollo landings were right after lunar sunrise instead of lunar noon.

Plus, you have now added one more system (and more complexity) to your
cameras.

> I hope ditching the RMS is easy, since it will eventually fail.
> Winding it around the vehicle like you guys plan on a routein basis is
> unwise, as it would complicate getting the doors closed.

You are greatly exaggerating the hazards of the RMS.

> You will not
> get long shots of the vehicle from an inspector on the endo of the
> arm,

You don't need long shots for inspection. You need lots and lots of close-
up shots.

> Ok, clear lens caps on a string. Of course, you could just release
> the cameras or use the ISS Inspector when needed. Not placing them on
> the hull where they would get soiled is yet another option.

It's an option, but then that's one area of the hull you won't be able to
inspect.

>> The beauty of RMS inspection, as opposed to using expendable
>> deployable cameras, is that you can do it more than once.
>
> Let them swim back aboard, then.

OK, now you're talking about adding propulsion and autonomous guidance,
navigation, and control to your cameras. This is getting more complex (and
more expensive) every time you reply.

> You're going to open the sbd's wide
> for the RMS anyway.

No, the final inspection would be done before the doors are closed. No need
to reopen.

> THAT risk (of not being able to reclose the
> doors) would not be taken if you pass them via some other smaller STS
> ostium.

There's no such ostium now. So now you're talking extensive orbiter
modifications too?

>> > We do not know that Columbia was disabled at
>> > launch, it could have happened in space.
>>
>> The evidence that Columbia was damaged at launch is now overwhelming.
>> There is no evidence whatsoever to support the hypothesis that it
>> was damaged in space.
>
> No it is not. Terrorists may have shot Columbia down anytime from
> ascent to re-entry. With an Israeli astronaut on board, it was a
> tempting, and easy, target, since one puncture meant doom.

There is no evidence whatsoever to support such a scenario. Your replies
are becoming increasingly bizarre. I expect you to bring up HAARP any time
now.

> Inadvertant deployment during ascent could be prevented by
> not deploying them during ascent. Throwing stuff overboard (like
> these small probes) during ascent, like anything falling overboard, is
> unlikely. It would not add a crit-1 system to the orbiter, that's an
> unlikely evaluation.

How does your deployment system *ensure* that? Inadvertent deploy can be
caused by a command path failing high or mechanical failure of the
deployment mechanism. Both must be designed fail-safe to ensure that no
single failure results in deployment.

> There are other convenient ostia (other than
> shuttle bay doors) through which camera probes could be launched with
> low probability of failure and low probability of affecting vehicle
> performance.

No, there are not. You would have to add them.

>> >> On flight day 2, the shuttle RMS (which will now be carried on all
>> >> flights) will inspect the crew compartment, OMS pods, vertical
>> >> stabilizer, the upper leading edge of both wings except the
>> >> outboard-most five panels, and the lower leading edge of the left
>> >> wing except the outboard-most eight panels.
>
> Great. Permanent dead weight.

It's not dead weight. The RMS is already used on all Hubble flights and
most ISS flights.

>> >> On flight day 3, during approach to ISS, the orbiter will perform
>> >> a slow pitch maneuver at a range of 600 ft below the station, to
>> >> allow the station crew to photograph the orbiter through the lab
>> >> window. A DCS-760 with a 400 mm lens will be used to photograph
>> >> the "acreage" tiles, while a DCS-760 with a 400 mm lens and a 2x
>> >> doubler will be used to photograph the landing gear doors, ET
>> >> umbilical doors, and elevon coves. An HD video camera may be added
>> >> as well.
>
> Just borrow their ISS Inspector

Doesn't work. See above.

> or make one that will do both jobs.

Why? Using a handheld camera from inside the ISS is much easier and
cheaper.

>> > I would still inspect immediately prior to re-entry.
>>
>> Fine, an RMS-based system can do that too, since it's not expendable.
>
> But buttoning up the RMS means leaving those last, dangerous actions
> unchecked, very unwise.
>
>> >> Post-docking, some time on flight days 3-5, the station RMS will
>> >> inspect the nose cap, and any areas missed during the pitch
>> >> maneuver except the right main landing gear door, ET doors, or
>> >> elevon coves.
>> >>
>> >> Inspection options for the right lower leading edge and wingtips
>> >> are under consideration, such as boom extensions for the
>> >> RMS/SSRMS. Should these not be ready for return-to-flight, EVA
>> >> inspection might be required.
>
> And expose our astronauts to unnecessary risks doing tedious
> inspections?

You are making the same damn reply to something I've already answered.
Learn how to quote. See below.

>> > Better to
>> > use it for what it was intended.
>>
>> The RMS is *already* used for inspection during the flight day 2
>> checkout. The proposed change would merely target the inspections to
>> the aforementioned areas.
>
> It is a poor choice because it leaves shuttle bay door closure after
> RMS retraction uninspected,

That is a very short time-of-exposure, so the risk is very low.

>> > EVAs? Maybe if you actually plan to
>> > fix something, perhaps.
>>
>> The EVA inspection is only a fallback if NASA fails to develop an RMS
>> boom extension prior to return-to-flight.

> I think it is a boom-doggle for inspection, but for repair it would be
> the way to go with EVA.

If you have to carry it *anyway* for repair, why not use it for inspection?
No extra weight or development costs.

This is getting tiresome. Your system is more complex and more dangerous
than the system NASA plans to use. Every time a flaw in your system is
pointed out, your answer is to make it even more complex. You are
exaggerating the hazards of the RMS while understating the hazards of your
system. You bring up red herrings like ISS Inspector, which was tested once
and didn't work. Your alternative scenarios to foam damage for Columbia's
loss are becoming increasingly bizarre. I will waste no more of my time on
this discussion.
--
JRF

Reply-to address spam-proofed - to reply by E-mail,
check "Organization" (I am not assimilated) and
think one step ahead of IBM.

[Ross C. Bubba Nicholson]

"Terrell Miller" > wrote in message >...
> "Ross C. Bubba Nicholson" > wrote in message
> om...
>
> > We do not know that Columbia was disabled at
> > launch, it could have happened in space.
>
> I think it's safe to say now that, by far, teh most likely cause fo the
> accident was the foamstrike.
>
> > Free-flying video camera robots can meet all these objections. First,
> > how about a lens cap, an anti-static spray, - a defogger or just
> > deploy more cameras?
>
> just make sure that all those cameras are safely mounted (gotta test
> everything thoroughly) so *they* don't fall off and impact the orbiter with
> evcen more force than the foam they are monitoring.

Shuttles have that torpedo tube, don't they? If not, it would be a
good idea to retro-fit one on.

> > Now, an escape pod in the shuttle might be a good idea, too, eh?
>
> only if you don't need to carry any cargo. BTW...*what* escape pod? Gotta
> design one basically from scratch, take a decade. We goona ground the
> shuttle fleet that long?

It did not take a decade and we have multiple proven systems. We do
not need entirely new systems, an Apollo-type escape pod would fit
inside the cargo bay for Hubble repair missions. We could even leave
it in orbit to service the next Hubble (non-ISS) mission. The ISS
already has this capability per our Russian allies. Escape pods
should be highest priority, anyway.

> > Flying the shuttle, crew could eject into the pod and let the shuttle
> > land itself a la Buran. It would extend the lifespan of the shuttle
> > fleet if descents can not be man-rated, which they certainly cannot be
> > without complete inspections.
>
> what makes you think an unmanned descent profile would be any more likely to
> preserve the orbiter than a manned profile? Unmanned pulls *more* G and heat
> loads, not less...

Um, I was thinking of saving the astronauts. An unmanned descent
profile could also be less stressful, since it would be less
time-critical. Indeed, descent may not be such a good idea, anyway.
I say, last flight of the shuttle should be into orbit to stay, and
come home in escape pods.

> > Repairs can be effected in orbit.
>
> sure, just roll down the window and look for the nearest Home Depot :(

Repairs to the exterior of the shuttle orbiter can be effected in
orbit with a space dock. Envelope the hull concentrically with light
and easily deployable inflatables of barrier film. Like a facist,
they will gain strength (and increasing atmospheric pressure) with
more layers. (Plus they'll be less and less vulnerable to
projectiles, too.) A weightless, shirtsleeve environment of virtually
any size can be had of any convenient gas desired, and a near
shirtsleeve atmosphere of some nitrogen, would facilitate temporary
repair. Remember, only a temporary repair would be needed (to get the
shuttle down), and escape pods (soyus) could bring down the crew.

[Ross C. Bubba Nicholson]

Herb Schaltegger > wrote in message >...
> In article >,
> (Ross C. Bubba Nicholson) wrote:
>
> > RMS is a complex mechanical disaster waiting to happen.
>
> Over a hundred flights and HOW many times has RMS failed?
>
> Troll . . .

Sure, RMS is working fine-so far, but now you're going to "extend" it
and curl it all the way around the ship in a task it was never
designed to do. A simple, been-done solution exists, but if the RMS
team needs the extra funding for this rube goldberg extension idea, to
heck with common sense. Perhaps if turf were less important, NASA
wouldn't be shy 17 astronauts.

[Jorge R. Frank]

(Ross C. Bubba Nicholson) wrote in
om:

> Sure, RMS is working fine-so far, but now you're going to "extend" it
> and curl it all the way around the ship in a task it was never
> designed to do. A simple, been-done solution exists, but if the RMS
> team needs the extra funding for this rube goldberg extension idea, to
> heck with common sense.

LOL! Your scheme is far more Rube Goldberg than the RMS extension, and it
gets even more complex whenever anyone points out the numerous flaws in it.

--
JRF

Reply-to address spam-proofed - to reply by E-mail,
check "Organization" (I am not assimilated) and
think one step ahead of IBM.

[Ross C. Bubba Nicholson]

(G EddieA95) wrote in message >...
> > Terrorists may have shot Columbia down anytime from
> >ascent to re-entry. With an Israeli astronaut on board, it was a
> >tempting, and easy, target, since one puncture meant doom.
>
> Great conspiracy theory, but nope. To shoot down the shuttle in orbit requires
> the equivalent of an ICBM. Satellites, as well as NASA tracking stations,
> would have seen such an attack; no terror organization has such rockets, while
> for a country to do it would be an act of war; and it certainly didn't happen
> on the way up or down, as the missile would have been fired from US territory.

Check your assent trajectory again. The shuttle was within easy range
of aa guns shortly after takeoff, and all of them have access. And
it's not a theory. I've heard the issue discussed before by two
Saudis one of whom can now be seen on the FBI site.

[Jorge R. Frank]

(Ross C. Bubba Nicholson) wrote in
om:

> (G EddieA95) wrote in message
> >...
>> > Terrorists may have shot Columbia down anytime from
>> >ascent to re-entry. With an Israeli astronaut on board, it was a
>> >tempting, and easy, target, since one puncture meant doom.
>>
>> Great conspiracy theory, but nope. To shoot down the shuttle in
>> orbit requires the equivalent of an ICBM. Satellites, as well as
>> NASA tracking stations, would have seen such an attack; no terror
>> organization has such rockets, while for a country to do it would be
>> an act of war; and it certainly didn't happen on the way up or down,
>> as the missile would have been fired from US territory.
>
> Check your assent trajectory again. The shuttle was within easy range
> of aa guns shortly after takeoff, and all of them have access.

There is no evidence from either the launch films or recovered debris to
suggest that the shuttle was struck by AA fire.

There is irrefutable evidence that the orbiter was struck by a piece of
foam from the external tank 82 seconds after liftoff. There is clear and
convincing evidence that this foam was capable of causing catastrophic
damage to the orbiter.

> And
> it's not a theory. I've heard the issue discussed before by two
> Saudis one of whom can now be seen on the FBI site.

Snort. "I read it on the Internet; therefore it must be true."

--
JRF

Reply-to address spam-proofed - to reply by E-mail,
check "Organization" (I am not assimilated) and
think one step ahead of IBM.

[Herb Schaltegger]

In article >,
(Ross C. Bubba Nicholson) wrote:

> ???? Yes breaching the cargo bay doors is done *every* flight. If
> they open and then don't close, with nothing else done you die during
> re-entry.

You have no idea what you're babbling on about, do you? How many times
have the bay doors failed? And what has this failure mode got to do
with Columbia?

> Opening them and closing them more often, or checking the
> shuttle only with doors open, these are both suboptimal.

Are you as clueless as you appear? The doors are opened on EVERY FLIGHT
ONE TIME very shortly after reaching orbit. They are then closed ONE
TIME just before making the entry burn. What has this got to do with
anything? How do you seriously propose to inspect with the doors closed?

> Suppose
> you're looking for a leak. One way to locate the leak would be to
> flood a suspect compartment with a detection gas or smoke observable
> in the vacuum of space.

A leak where? Through the payload bay doors? Why would you be all that
concerned? If the doors themselves aren't penetrated and you get some
potential pressure leakage through the door seals I doubt it makes any
difference. The doors are not intended to be pressure tight anyway, so
far as I know. They're on the leeward side of the vehicle during entry
and face relatively benign entry conditions. And do you realize how
much volume of gas you'd need to leak check the payload bay doors, at
least without a gas chromatograph sniffer handy?

> Having to open the cargo bay doors and wind
> out the arm means all the dirt from operations in the bay can escape
> and contaminate your inspection.

What "dirt from operations" are you talking about? It's not like the
crew is mixing cement and making camp fires in the cargo bay, you know.
Besides, given the environment the orbiter experiences through launch,
orbit and entry, very little in the payload bay could "contaminate" an
inspection site sufficient to make any difference.

BTW, try to respond to posts within at least a couple of days, 'mkay?
Several weeks after the fact is a bit untimely.

--
Herb Schaltegger, Esq.
Chief Counsel, Human O-Ring Society
"I was promised flying cars! Where are the flying cars?!"
~ Avery Brooks

[Jorge R. Frank]

(Ross C. Bubba Nicholson) wrote in
om:

> So at least two systems have been deployed and tried, one
> successfully, one not vs. a new and untried extension of the shuttle's
> robot arm.

Even the successful system (AERCam/SPRINT) leaves a lot to be desired for
the inspection job. Extensions of the robot arm have been done before
(SPIFEX, STS-64) and worked well. This is not a challenging task,
especially compared to what you are proposing.

> Now, what happens when the North Koreans launch a "peaceful capsule"
> into ISS space? Do we open the shuttle bay and telescope out the arm
> to take a look?

The shuttle payload bay is *always* open while the orbiter is in orbit.
There are radiators on the inside of the doors, and they require the doors
to be open in order to cool the orbiter.

> Or do we send a probe to meet the Koreans (and set
> off their proximity fuse)?

No, we simply inform the N. Koreans that we will consider any hostile act
against the shuttle and ISS to be an act of war not just against the US,
but against all the ISS international partners (Russia, Europe, Japan, and
Canada). They will either back down or be utterly destroyed.

> Of course, the crew compartment SHOULD BE the escape pod, by adding a
> catastrophy deployable parachute (even the shuttle drag shutes could
> be used by laying a wire from the rear cabin bulkhead to the back of
> the craft)

Incorrect. The drag chute is too small for the crew compartment.

> or balloon, at least there would be a chance of survival
> for both shuttle destruction scenarios we've seen. In both shuttle
> accidents, the crew survived only to die in the descent of their
> intact crew compartment.

In the case of Columbia, the compartment did not stay intact for long, less
than a minute.

--
JRF

Reply-to address spam-proofed - to reply by E-mail,
check "Organization" (I am not assimilated) and
think one step ahead of IBM.

[Hallerb]

>
>Check your assent trajectory again. The shuttle was within easy range
>of aa guns shortly after takeoff, and all of them have access. And
>it's not a theory. I've heard the issue discussed before by two
>Saudis one of whom can now be seen on the FBI site.

Does anyone else think this is possible???

[MasterShrink]

>
>>
>>Check your assent trajectory again. The shuttle was within easy range
>>of aa guns shortly after takeoff, and all of them have access. And
>>it's not a theory. I've heard the issue discussed before by two
>>Saudis one of whom can now be seen on the FBI site.
>
>Does anyone else think this is possible???
>

No...and I can't believe I'm replying to this but there are maybe two points I
think a terrorist would have a remote chance in hell of actually shooting at
the shuttle in flight...two seconds after liftoff and two seconds before
touchdown.

-A.L.

[Terrell Miller]

"Ross C. Bubba Nicholson" > wrote in message
om...

> ???? Yes breaching the cargo bay doors is done *every* flight. If
> they open and then don't close, with nothing else done you die during
> re-entry.

which is precisely why each crew trains for an emergency door-close EVA.
Crippen almost had to do that on STS1.

> Opening them and closing them more often, or checking the
> shuttle only with doors open, these are both suboptimal.

The doors are opened and closed once per flight, that's it. they can't stay
on orbit more than a few hours with the doors closed, which is why they open
them.

> Suppose
> you're looking for a leak. One way to locate the leak would be to
> flood a suspect compartment with a detection gas or smoke observable
> in the vacuum of space.

what "compartments", exactly? The shuttle doesn't have any. It's got the
flight deck, the middeck, the lower bay, and the airlock. None of those are
sealable from the others, it's one big crew compartment.

If they have a "lab" module in the payload bay it has its own tunnel and
hatch, so you could seal that off into a "compartment", but so what?

And what "detection gas", exactly? You mean the ship's O2 supply?

> Having to open the cargo bay doors and wind
> out the arm means all the dirt from operations in the bay can escape
> and contaminate your inspection.

You do realize that the astronauts dump their urine and waste water
overboard, yes? You were saying something about "contamination"...?

--
Terrell Miller


"I think the significant thing is that whatever prodecure we use, we are not
prepared to handle what I would call a fluid bowel movement. That is where
we were very...lucky. I was deathly afraid of that."
-Wally Schirra, Apollo 7 mission debrief