Hallerb
July 6th 03, 04:41 AM
http://www.floridatoday.com/columbia/columbiastory2A4996A.htm
Bad managers are getting moved to other postions of shuttle safety. Just like
people trying to protect managers here its occuring in NASA itself.
Those who ignorred safety rules and didnt hold meetings should be shown the
door with a good swift kick if needed. NOT protected.
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Jul 5, 7:11 PM
NASA still lacks more accountability
FLORIDA TODAY
Individual responsibility and accountability.
We have rarely heard those words in the shuttle Columbia accident investigation
despite the long and painful list of failures cited within NASA's badly broken
management system.
Instead, there has been considerable discussion about the need to change the
agency's flawed culture, which certainly must be done before the ships return
to flight, perhaps as soon as next spring.
But the shuttle program is comprised of human beings, and among them are
individuals who were responsible for making a series of fateful decisions that
contributed to Columbia's loss.
And unless their mistakes are very pointedly spelled out -- which they must be
-- there is a great risk that the collapse of individual and collective
management responsibility that the nation has witnessed in the Columbia
disaster could be repeated.
That's why a major shake-up in shuttle program management announced a few days
ago is welcome, but does not yet come close to repairing the significant damage
that has been done.
Specifically, we're talking about the "reassignment" of three leading members
of NASA's mission management team, the group that was charged with shepherding
Columbia's crew through their flight.
Investigators have learned some of them were out of town during the mission and
did not meet daily as required. The lack of meetings included a three-day
stretch during a holiday weekend just after Columbia's launch.
It was during those crucial days that mid-level engineers were trying in vain
to get someone to listen to their fears about the external fuel tank foam that
hit the shuttle's left wing shortly after liftoff, causing a breach that led to
its destruction.
The failure of those managers was inexcusable. But five months after the
accident, NASA still has not spoken about it in detail, and as a result is
continuing its dangerous policy of lax accountability.
For example, mission management team leader Linda Ham and Lambert Austin,
manager of systems integration at Johnson Space Center in Houston, are being
removed from their posts and moved to undetermined new positions.
Ralph Roe, manager of vehicle engineering at JSC, also has been relieved and
given the newly created job of heading an independent safety and engineering
division at Langley Research Center in Virginia.
In all their cases, not a word was said about their on-the-job failures, not to
mention the ill-conceived and wrong decision to put Roe in charge of a safety
office that would include some shuttle responsibilities, a move that should be
reversed.
The men and women who run the shuttle program make life-or-death decisions, and
must be held accountable in an open, honest, professional way so unmistakable
standards of responsibility are established.
NASA's continued speak-no-evil policy on this matter is deafening, and until
the agency addresses it, meaningful and lasting changes cannot occur.
Bad managers are getting moved to other postions of shuttle safety. Just like
people trying to protect managers here its occuring in NASA itself.
Those who ignorred safety rules and didnt hold meetings should be shown the
door with a good swift kick if needed. NOT protected.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------
Complete FLORIDA TODAY coverage delivered to your door. Subscribe now.
Jul 5, 7:11 PM
NASA still lacks more accountability
FLORIDA TODAY
Individual responsibility and accountability.
We have rarely heard those words in the shuttle Columbia accident investigation
despite the long and painful list of failures cited within NASA's badly broken
management system.
Instead, there has been considerable discussion about the need to change the
agency's flawed culture, which certainly must be done before the ships return
to flight, perhaps as soon as next spring.
But the shuttle program is comprised of human beings, and among them are
individuals who were responsible for making a series of fateful decisions that
contributed to Columbia's loss.
And unless their mistakes are very pointedly spelled out -- which they must be
-- there is a great risk that the collapse of individual and collective
management responsibility that the nation has witnessed in the Columbia
disaster could be repeated.
That's why a major shake-up in shuttle program management announced a few days
ago is welcome, but does not yet come close to repairing the significant damage
that has been done.
Specifically, we're talking about the "reassignment" of three leading members
of NASA's mission management team, the group that was charged with shepherding
Columbia's crew through their flight.
Investigators have learned some of them were out of town during the mission and
did not meet daily as required. The lack of meetings included a three-day
stretch during a holiday weekend just after Columbia's launch.
It was during those crucial days that mid-level engineers were trying in vain
to get someone to listen to their fears about the external fuel tank foam that
hit the shuttle's left wing shortly after liftoff, causing a breach that led to
its destruction.
The failure of those managers was inexcusable. But five months after the
accident, NASA still has not spoken about it in detail, and as a result is
continuing its dangerous policy of lax accountability.
For example, mission management team leader Linda Ham and Lambert Austin,
manager of systems integration at Johnson Space Center in Houston, are being
removed from their posts and moved to undetermined new positions.
Ralph Roe, manager of vehicle engineering at JSC, also has been relieved and
given the newly created job of heading an independent safety and engineering
division at Langley Research Center in Virginia.
In all their cases, not a word was said about their on-the-job failures, not to
mention the ill-conceived and wrong decision to put Roe in charge of a safety
office that would include some shuttle responsibilities, a move that should be
reversed.
The men and women who run the shuttle program make life-or-death decisions, and
must be held accountable in an open, honest, professional way so unmistakable
standards of responsibility are established.
NASA's continued speak-no-evil policy on this matter is deafening, and until
the agency addresses it, meaningful and lasting changes cannot occur.