Re: Could Columbia have been Saved?

[John E. Perry]

Abrigon Gusiq wrote:
> What is the procedure and protocols for when the Shuttle is known to have taken some damage?
>

I have no idea. As I said before, I'm not privy to such matters. They
may be publicly available, but I don't know where it might be.

> Did the sending the craft down after there was known damage.
>

If I've figured out what this nonsensical sentence means, you're asking
if "they sent the craft..."

Yes. But they were sure it was not critical damage.

> And could it have been differently?
>

Of course.

> And did it have to happen?
>

Yes, given the way things went. Any of many things would have avoided
the disaster, but you have to know what the problems are to avoid them.
Or, you have to recognize their importance.

> And what ways are there, to make sure this sort of accident/disaster never happens again, or
> atleast alot less chances..
>

This is an unanswerable question. The Challenger sort of accident never
happened again, and it's very likely this sort will never happen again.
So, what's the next kind of accident? As I said before,
"After all, many apparently much worse problems were already known, and
had been addressed. That's what opened the window to let this one
occur,..."

jp

[Bryan Ashcraft]

"Abrigon Gusiq" > wrote in message
...
> If ISS had been available as a space dock, so that the damage could have
been checked out
> before the shuttle went to land. Could it have been discovered and
repaired in space, if the
> ISS Was available to repair it?
>
> Alternate, new policy, would they have let the shuttle go down with a
crew, or should have
> instead sent up a Soyuz or like, to act as a ferry to Earth, and bring the
damaged shuttle
> down remotely?
>

Might want to look this up using the following links:-

The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found
at the following URLs:

Text-Only Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html

Enhanced HTML Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html

[Charles Buckley]

Abrigon Gusiq wrote:
> What is the procedure and protocols for when the Shuttle is known to have taken some damage?
>

Depends very much on the circumstances. In this case, they had
a very remote chance of rescue, but that would presuppose they
knew the cause of the accident and could positively eliminate
it as a cause for the rescue vehicle. In case of foam impact,
this was not the case. The next vehicle was as much at risk.

> Did the sending the craft down after there was known damage.
>

They did not know there was damage. They thought there was a
remote possibility of it having some. There is a fairly extensive
previous experience with foam impacts to go off of though. They
were studying that particular damage recently as it did seem
to be occuring more often. Or, maybe it was not being obscured
by other more important issues.


> And could it have been differently?
>

On an offchance, the damage would have been visible from
recon satellites. Meaning the damage had to be a certain size
and angle from the recon satellites. Also, recon sats would not
help in the least in a large cross-sections of types of damage.
(ie, structural failure internal to the vehicle)

> And did it have to happen?
>

The could have grounded the fleet a long, long time ago.

> And what ways are there, to make sure this sort of accident/disaster never happens again, or
> atleast alot less chances..
>

Well. They can make a reasonable stab at not having foam impact the
Shuttle again, but generally, there is not a lot they can do with
Shuttle given the shear number of single-point catastrophic failure
modes. It is just a matter of time before the next one is lost.
(If you look at NASA's projected safety rating prior to the accident,
you'll see that NASA had a fairly reasonable guess as to the likelihood
of losing another Shuttle. Using their modified flight rate and modified
safety projection, you have a loss of 1-2 more shuttles prior to the
end-of-life of the Shuttle program).

> Definetly some changes of policy and procedure, as well as how things are done. Change in future
> shuttles or like craft!?


Not really. The main thing to consider is that Columbia's best chance
was in that the next Shuttle was fairly close to being launched. There
was a very short window between that particular sequence of flights.
That really does not happen when you have a flight rate of 4 flights
per year, which will be often the case in the coming few years.

The real gain would be to scratch the next Hubble flight and fly only
to ISS. That would help shuttles that have problems going up find a
harbor.

>
> What purpose does the ISS have for the future exploration of space, other than to serve as a very
> expensive laboratory in space? Not that this is a bad idea, just that how can it be used to get
> humanity into space, to build colonies and like efforts?
>

What does that have to do with anything? Shuttle is for ISS. ISS is
for Shuttle. Stop one and you stop the other. Shuttle has no mission
outside ISS. And it would be longer to ramp up uses for Shuttle than
ground the fleet and build something else in it's place.

> Mike
>
>
>
>
> "John E. Perry" wrote:
>
>
>>Abrigon Gusiq wrote:
>>
>>>If ISS had been available as a space dock, so that the damage could have been checked out
>>>before the shuttle went to land. Could it have been discovered and repaired in space, if the
>>>ISS Was available to repair it?
>>
>>Others have already answered that question better than I could have.
>>
>>
>>>Alternate, new policy, would they have let the shuttle go down with a crew, or should have
>>>instead sent up a Soyuz or like, to act as a ferry to Earth, and bring the damaged shuttle
>>>down remotely?
>>
>>Recall that they only sent the shuttle down because they were convinced
>>-- from bottom to top of the hierarchy -- that there was no problem.
>>I'm sure they're developing new policies right now that may include
>>these ideas, and other ideas that may be better or worse. Not being
>>privy to such internal discussions, none of us (unless some of those
>>involved are monitoring these ng's) can really answer for them.
>>
>>By the way, my comment wasn't intended to denounce discussion of
>>alternatives here. I think "how could this have been done better, and
>>what can be done to improve it" is altogether appropriate. I was
>>addressing the "they were assholes because they didn't do...", and then
>>concocting solutions that weren't available when the shuttles were
>>built, and second-guessing alternatives to solve one problem that
>>appeared insignificant until it actually happened.
>>
>>After all, many apparently much worse problems were already known, and
>>had been addressed. That's what opened the window to let this one
>>occur, assuming the presently indicated scenario is the correct one
>>(which, by the way, is still not altogether certain, is it?).
>>
>>jp

[Andrew Gray]

In article >, Joann Evans wrote:
>
> Second, even if it did, the crew would have to know or suspect that
> there was a problem that required such inspection. Your policy would
> require that all future shuttle missions be such that ISS rendezvous is
> possible, further limiting its usefulness.

Joann - this is a somewhat misplaced point. All future STS flights are
slated for ISS, with the exception of two or three Hubble servicing
flights. Columbia was planned to be (and is now likely to remain) the
last of the free-flying self-contained flights - to remove a capacity
that NASA and/or Congress had chosen not to use (wasn't 107 added at
political request?) is unlikely to limit usefulness significantly.

(Moving back to the original point, AIUI replacing or repairing RCC
panels on the ground would be enough of a problem, much less doing it
reliably on-orbit)

> And we've already seen that catastrophic accidents can happen on
> shuttle ascent and Soyuz descent, too.

And Soyuz has shown they can happen on-orbit, as has Mir... accidents
can come and bite you anywhere, not just the times you're looking for
them.

--
-Andrew Gray

[Ken S. Tucker]

Andrew Gray > wrote in message >...

{snip]

> And Soyuz has shown they can happen on-orbit, as has Mir... accidents
> can come and bite you anywhere, not just the times you're looking for
> them.

About fixing a damaged shuttle in orbit?

It's seems impossible to load up every shuttle to foresee all
improbable causes of a shuttle problem threw launch and
in orbit.

Is it possible to use an ICBM to shoot up what might be
needed?

Of course, this is a dedicated USAF SAC old silo rapid
response missle, with a last stage able to maneuver to the shuttle.
At the silo location, NASA has a warehouse with every
conceivable thingy that could help a distressed orbiting
shuttle (or Alpha).

I also wonder if the astronauts had something sticky on the
bottom of their shoes if they may have been able to adhere
to the shuttle gently while inspecting.

Regards Ken S. Tucker

[Scott Lowther]

Ken S. Tucker wrote:

> I also wonder if the astronauts had something sticky on the
> bottom of their shoes if they may have been able to adhere
> to the shuttle gently while inspecting.

"Sticky" and "hard vacuum" don't go well together. To the point...
anything sticky will dry out like decades-old duct tape on a fence post
in very short order when exposed to space.

--
Scott Lowther, Engineer

"Any statement by Edward Wright that starts with 'You seem to think
that...' is wrong. Always. It's a law of Usenet, like Godwin's."
- Jorge R. Frank, 11 Nov 2002

[Rand Simberg]

On Mon, 14 Jul 2003 00:16:07 -0700, in a place far, far away, Scott
Lowther > made the phosphor on my monitor glow
in such a way as to indicate that:

>"Sticky" and "hard vacuum" don't go well together. To the point...
>anything sticky will dry out like decades-old duct tape on a fence post
>in very short order when exposed to space.

Well, there's velcro, but it probably wouldn't hold up very well
during entry. Or ascent, for that matter...

--
simberg.interglobal.org * 310 372-7963 (CA) 307 739-1296 (Jackson Hole)
interglobal space lines * 307 733-1715 (Fax) http://www.interglobal.org

"Extraordinary launch vehicles require extraordinary markets..."
Swap the first . and @ and throw out the ".trash" to email me.
Here's my email address for autospammers:

[Ken S. Tucker]

"Christopher M. Jones" > wrote in message >...

>"Henry Spencer" > wrote:

>> Current US ICBMs have little or no payload to orbit, as I recall --
>> they're just not designed for it. They definitely don't have upper
>> stages capable of significant orbital maneuvering.

Yes of course, their design is sub-orbital.

>> Which is not to say that such a rapid-reaction launcher couldn't be built.
>> But it's not something that's available off the shelf right now, not quite.
>
>Little payload is correct. And actually, as I understand it
>there is a rapid-reaction launcher (modified ICBM) on the
>shelf right now. I'll have to dig up the details but I think
>it has a payload to LEO of around a few hundred kg. I gather
>that it's supposed to be mostly secret, since the mention of
>the capability was rather vague.

Well these new Tridents being installed into subs look fast and
reliable. Of course there would be a need for a fouth stage to have
the ability to effectively rendevous. But as pointed out by Henry
this capability is 60's state-of-the-art, (Gemini and Titan).

While reading threw this thread many posters had various solutions
to the befuddled Columbia, but most solutions involved jury-rigging
onboard materials, with questionable results.

My general thinking is this, if America can keep 1000 minuteman
missiles on standby to destroy something, they should be able to
keep 2 to repair something, leaving an effective deterrent of 998
missiles.

Evidentally the Russians specialized in unmanned replenishment
capsules, but in some emergency to either a shuttle or alpha the
capsule could be a piloted craft, with supplies, and a capable
pilot dealing with anomalies.

Reagards
Ken S. Tucker